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Abstract 
As the Internet is progressively integrated into industrial and defense-related networks 
around the globe, it is becoming increasing important to understand how state and sub-state 
groups can use Internet vulnerabilities as a conduit of attack.  The current social science 
literature on cyber threats is largely dominated by descriptive, U.S.-centric research. While this 
scholarship is important, the findings are not generalizable and fail to address the global aspects 
of network vulnerabilities.  As a result, this dissertation employs a unique dataset of cyber threats 
from around the world, spanning from 1990 to 2011.  This dataset allows for three diverse 
empirical studies to be conducted.  The first study investigates the political, social, and economic 
characteristics that increase the likelihood of a state being targeted for cyber threats.  The results 
show that different state characteristics are likely to influence the forms of digital attack 
targeting.  For example, states that experience increases in GDP per capita and military size are 
more likely to be targeted for cyber attacks.  Inversely, states that experience increases in GDP 
per capita and those that are more democratic are less likely to be targeted for cyber terrorism. 
The second study investigates the role that international rivalries play in cyber threat targeting.  
The results suggest that states in rivalries may have more reason to strengthen their digital 
security, and rival actors may be cautious about employing serious, threatening forms of cyber 
activity against foes because of concerns about escalation.  The final study, based upon the crisis 
bargaining theory, seeks to determine if cyber threat targeting decreases private information 
asymmetry and therefore decreases conflict participation.  Empirical results show that the loss of 
digital information via cyber means may thus illicit a low intensity threat or militarized action by 
a target state, but it also simultaneously increases the likelihood that a bargain may be 
researched, preventing full scale war by reducing the amount of private information held 
between parties. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
During the early morning hours of September 6, 2007, a squadron of Israeli F-15s and F-
16s departed from Ramat David Airbase in northern Israel.  The objective of the mission was to 
destroy a suspected nuclear reactor site at Dayr ez-Zor in Northern Syria.  Despite the 
technological supremacy of Israeli aircraft, Syrian radar was still capable of tracking potential 
enemies, giving the Syrian military time to organize its defense.  In order to ensure the success of 
the mission, and increase the chances of all aircraft returning to Israeli airspace, both Syrian 
regional and national radar detection systems would need to be eliminated.  To accomplish this 
feat, and with an expectation that such a mission would eventually be conducted, Israeli-paid 
contractors had previously been employed to covertly install unique software and hardware in 
the Syrian radar defense network.  These seemingly harmless components, given a moment’s 
notice, could be remotely activated by Israeli forces and effectively disable the radar system.  On 
September 6, the tactic worked perfectly.  By activating the software and hardware components, 
Israeli technicians hundreds of miles away were able to manipulate the radar and prevent the 
system from detecting the approaching aircraft.  Israeli forces were then able to fly into Syrian 
airspace undetected, destroy the target, and return home without incident.  This example 
demonstrates just one instance of the Internet, and networked technology, being adapted as a 
weapon of conflict between states (Handler 2012; Rid 2013).  
Despite its humble beginnings, the Internet and World Wide Web have been adapted and 
adopted by states across the globe for a plethora of positive functions.  This technology, much 
like the telegraph and radio before it, provides individuals with a means of communication and 
sharing ideas across broad geographic locations.  In addition, the expansion of computing power 
and networked technologies has provided industries with the ability to automate many of the 
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vital systems and social services we take for granted.  For example, no longer do we see a lone 
police officer in the middle of a busy intersection directing traffic.  This job was long ago 
replaced by automated traffic signals.  In much the same vein, engineers have designed ever-
more complex and “smart” electric grids integrated with computing and networked technologies.  
Computers can now predict and divert increased levels of electricity to locations in need, while at 
the same time maximizing efficiency at the plants responsible for generating that power (see 
Sioshansi 2011). 
While there are a host of benefits and advantages associated with networked technology, 
Internet connectivity has also produced a wide variety of unintended consequences.  At the 
extreme end of the spectrum, there are those actors that seek to employ the Internet as a weapon 
or as a means of accessing private information that would otherwise be impossible without a 
physical presence. These actors include nation-states, terrorist organizations, corporations, as 
well as private citizens.  Such actors have used the Internet to conduct a wide variety of 
malevolent activities, such as pilfering sensitive documents related to the F-35 fighter project 
from Lockheed Martin, or using highly specific computer code to target centrifuges within the 
Iranian nuclear program.  Thus, because of its widespread integration throughout much of the 
industrialized world, and notwithstanding its many benefits, the Internet could potentially be 
seen as a serious security vulnerability for militaries, corporations, and private citizens.  This was 
a harsh reality the Syrian government and military learned in September 2007, and it is a reality 
that many states around the globe are learning within increasing regularity.  
Despite the fact that the Internet has become a revolutionary tool of communication, and 
networked technology has been adopted by states across the globe, there are still a wide variety 
of questions yet to be answered regarding its role as a tool of foreign policy and conflict. This 
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dissertation will thus offer an initial analysis of the use of the Internet by states, sub-state groups, 
and individuals for malicious purposes.  In particular, this research will fill gaps in the current 
social science literature by examining the characteristics of states targeted for digital cyber 
threats, how participation in international rivalries impacts the prospect of being a target, and 
how cyber espionage can influence asymmetric information exchange and conflict participation.  
Theoretical foundations will be borrowed from current international relations research on 
terrorist targeting, interstate rivalries, and crisis bargaining.  Such an approach is necessary, 
given the paucity of systematic studies on cyber threats.  Additionally, these questions will be 
explored through the use of thorough empirical tests, in an effort to propel the current study of 
cyber threats beyond a descriptive approach.  The dataset employed for this task is revolutionary 
in the study of cyber threats, and was built specifically to test a broad range of research questions 
like those posed in this dissertation.  Finally, the ultimate goal of this research is to provide 
insight into some of the ways in which a revolutionary form of communication has become a 
security vulnerability for the many states that now use it for a host of vital functions. 
Historians of technology, in particular, offer valuable insight on the way that new 
innovations such as the Internet develop new roles and purposes beyond those originally 
conceived (Bimber 1994; Kelly 2010; Naimi and French 2010; Nye 2006).  David Nye (2006), 
for example, points out that, “deterministic conceptions of technology seem misguided when one 
looks closely at the invention, the development, and the marketing of individual devices” (31).  
Nye (2006) goes on to note, “even if one can predict which new technologies are possible and 
forecast which designs will thrive in the market, people may fail to foresee how they will be 
used” (44).  The history of the Internet, which was conceived as a means of communication and 
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research but has also been adapted into a major vulnerability and conduit for attack, most 
certainly exhibits the unpredictability of technology.  
Communications technology has a long history of being unpredictable and having 
unintended impacts on interstate relations (Headrick 1991).  A series of communications 
technology have been trumpeted as means to tie peoples more closely together and enhance 
prospects of world peace.1  However, as Headrick shows, they are often quickly adapted by 
nations as a means of strengthening control over foreign territory and inflicting injury on their 
opponents.  For example, the invention of the telegraph and the laying of cable around the world 
spurred a host of agreements between states to ensure transmission lines could cross international 
borders.  Eventually, however, London’s control over the bulk of these cables allowed the British 
empire to spread into parts of the world that were previously inaccessible or ungovernable by 
competing European powers.2 In addition to integrating the telegraph as a military asset, the 
English used their strong monopoly on undersea cables as a foreign policy tool, as they would 
                                                 
1 For example, during the 19th century, French diplomat and Suez Canal developer Ferdinand de Lesseps postulated 
that “men, by knowing one another, will finally cease fighting” (Headrick 1991, 274). 
2 This was demonstrated during the Indian rebellion of 1857, when the English faced a large and well-armed militia 
seeking to drive the European power out the Asian subcontinent.  Despite the militia’s robust membership, the 
Indians were hampered with poor and disorganized communication.  The British, having established a stout Indian 
telegraph service consisting of over 7,000km of telegraph cable and 46 telegraph offices, were able to coordinate 
with military planners in southern India as well as in Britain itself regarding how to subdue the uprising.  The British 
military incorporated telegraph technology to the point that new telegraph stations were established as the English 
army moved north and towards victory (Headrick 1991).  According to Colonial Patrick Stewart, who accompanied 
British commander-in-chief General Colin Campbell during the Indian rebellion, British military telegraphers were 
able “to put the end of the telegraph wire in Sir Colin’s hand wherever he went.  No sooner were headquarters 
established at any spot, than the post and the wire were established also.  It was the first time that the telegraph had 
been made to keep pace with the advance of an army in the field” (Headrick 1991, 52). 
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regularly spy on unencrypted transmissions of competing powers sent through British-owned 
lines.   
The British domination of undersea cables and their effective use in military campaigns 
spurred other European powers, particularly France and Germany, to develop competing cable 
systems and rely on them more and more for private communication.  Given that the early 20th 
century was an atmosphere of continental and international tension, the rapid adoption of 
communication systems like the telegraph and radio also began to expose the technologies’ 
weaknesses.  For example, German submarine warfare during World War I demonstrated that 
transatlantic telegraph cables could easily be cut, disrupting communication between continents 
and armies.  Additionally, the rapid expansion of telegraph services led to the establishment of 
communication intelligence agencies.  These agencies were responsible for intercepting and 
deciphering the private information of rival telegraphs and transmissions. 
This need to control, and at times disrupt, the flow of communication and pilfer the 
confidential information transmitted through it would do little to ease tensions prior to World 
War I and World War II and played a major role in the conduct of these wars (Headrick 1991; 
Winkler 2008).  Ultimately concerning the development and adoption of instantaneous 
transcontinental communications, Headrick (1991) observes, “international cooperation preceded 
international disagreements” (12).  In other words, the adoption of communication technology 
like the telegraph required substantial agreement among states, however it also allowed for larger 
empires and more stable trade networks capable of enhancing military war machines.  Thus, as 
suspicions and tensions grew, communications also contributed to international insecurity with 
the rise of targeted electronic communication disruption, sophisticated electronic espionage, and 
intelligence agencies (Headrick 1991). 
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Ironically, the British domination of telegraph cables, the vulnerability of transatlantic 
cables to submarine attack, and the active espionage being conducted by numerous European 
powers would also stir the United States to develop its own communication network.  As 
Winkler (2008) points out, the United States had, “a desire to realign world communications in 
ways that would minimize Great Britain’s predominant position, move the United States from 
the periphery to the center of the global cable and radio network, and apply the benefits of this 
transformation to the nation’s standing and influence in the world” (4).  As a result, World War I 
found the United States investing heavily into researching new formats of communication, 
including telephone, shortwave radio, and even satellites, that would be less susceptible to the 
weaknesses of conventional telegraph cables.3  These innovations were meant to provide the 
United States with secure forms of communication that could be built and maintained by U.S. 
corporations, thus alleviating dependence on other states.   
The interwar period in the United States found military planners building upon their early 
advancements in radio.  As Millett (1996) observes, “the strategic uncertainty of the interwar 
period influenced development of radio communications security systems as well as the 
exploitation of radio beams (radar) for navigation and target acquisition” (341).  World War I 
had demonstrated that the speed and security of communication were vital to success, and radio 
provided such attributes.  During the Second World War, these radio resources proved to be an 
integral component of both Allied and Axis armies.  However, despite advances in security and 
encryption, radio transmissions became vulnerable to enemy interception and jamming.  This 
fear of espionage and a loss of communication would appear again shortly after the end of World 
                                                 
3 The creation of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) was a direct result of the US Navy’s desire to ensure that 
America’s international radio connections remained under U.S. control. 
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War II.  In particular, the Cold War found the Soviet Union actively jamming Western radio 
transmissions.  Thus, much like the telegraph, reliance on radio communications for strategic 
priorities carried both rewards and risks.  Foes found ways to exploit technological weaknesses 
and hamper transmissions.  Jamming, coupled with a fear of Communist espionage and nuclear 
attack, forced the United States to continue to build upon its earlier advances in communication 
technology.  This ultimately led to sophisticated projects such as the ARPANET, a precursor to 
the Internet (Winkler 2008). 
Much like the communication systems of the early 20th century, contemporary states are 
adopting the Internet as a foreign policy tool.  The trajectory and exploitable weaknesses of this 
digital network were perhaps less well understood by its original developers than pioneers of 
telegraph and radio communications.  The agency responsible for creating the Internet’s 
predecessor was the consequence of another revolutionary piece of technology: satellite orbiters.  
On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the first manmade satellite to orbit the 
Earth.  As a result of the Soviet’s technological prowess, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
mandated that the Pentagon ensure the United States catch up to the Soviet Union, and 
eventually surpass its defense-related technological innovation.  As a result of DoD Directive 
5105.15, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was created in February 1958.  The 
agency’s original mission was to prevent technological surprises, and support America’s 
burgeoning space program (Ceruzzi 2008).  Because of the exceptional amount of data being 
generated as a result of America’s new space program, coupled with the wide geographic 
distribution of NASA’s contractors, researchers began to postulate the feasibility of computers 
that could not only share data but also “talk” to each other.  The new network would also serve a 
subsidiary purpose, similar in nature to the British telegraph system 60 years prior.  The United 
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States wanted a reliable, robust system of communication that could be relied upon in the event 
of conflict with the Soviet Union. 
The networking of computers was first discussed in a series of memos by MIT Professor 
and ARPA Computer Research Director J.C.R. Licklider in 1962.  Licklider envisioned a 
“Galactic Network,” or “a globally interconnected set of computers through which everyone 
could quickly access data and programs from any site” (Leiner et al. 1999).  During the same 
time period, MIT PhD candidate Leonard Kleinrock was finishing his dissertation on packet 
switching.  The idea of packet switching was revolutionary, since up to that point data transfers 
were routed directly from terminal to terminal via circuits.  Packet switching allows data to be 
divided into segments, transmitted individually until they reach their destination, and then 
reassembled into the original message or data.  While the dividing of data into packets was 
novel, it was the idea that the individual segments could be sent via different routes to their final 
destination that made researchers take notice of the theory.  Combined, the concept of a 
“Galactic Network,” and the ability to send data via packet switching would become the 
backbone of a truly revolutionary means of data and research sharing (Leiner et al. 1999).  By 
1969, Licklider’s successor, Lawrence G. Roberts, had refined both the structure and 
specifications of the new network, dubbed the ARPANET.  Later that year, “four host computers 
were connected together into the initial ARPANET, and the budding Internet was off the 
ground” (Leiner et al. 1999). 
Throughout the 1970s and early-1980s, the ARPANET continued to grow through a 
barrage of new innovations.  One of the earliest such innovations was email, which allowed the 
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Internet to become a forum for the immediate open exchange of ideas.4  Email was quickly 
joined by the creation of the File Transfer Protocol (FTP), graphical user interface (GUI), and the 
point and click mouse.  In addition to these new innovations, ARPA researchers began 
postulating various means of connecting the ARPANET to other networks.  This project, dubbed 
the “Internet Program,” was tasked with the creation of a worldwide network of networks.  In 
1976, ARPA staff successfully connected the ARPANET to other similar networks through the 
use of transmission control protocol/internet protocol (TCP/IP).  This basic idea of connecting 
individual networks together without reconfiguring each network, and sans a centralized hub, is 
the basis of the modern-day Internet (Abbate 2000).  The Internet evolved beyond its military 
foundation with ARPANET by the late 1980s, however.  ARPANET had been stripped of much 
of its military research funding in the 1980s, and larger academic networks such as NSFNet had 
developed, and they would eventually become the backbone of Internet connectivity.   
The transition of the Internet from a military project into a publicly-accessible tool was 
made possible as a result of several innovations.  The first was the gradual integration of 
networking components and TCP/IP settings into personal computers throughout the 1980s and 
                                                 
4 Ironically the Internet, which was designed as a means of quickly and efficiently sharing data, was initially 
standardized in the late 1960s and early 1970s by hand-typed letters.  The standardization of the ARPANET was a 
result of the establishment of the Request for Comments (RFC) notes.  These notes were originally exchanged by 
university researchers via the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) and were, “intended to be an informal, fast distribution 
way to share ideas with other network researchers” (Leiner et al. 1999).  As it turns out, these RFC notes may have 
been among first loss of business the USPS suffered as a result of email.  As noted by (Leiner et al. 1999), 
“Email has been a significant factor in all areas of the Internet, and that is certainly true in the development of 
protocol specifications, technical standards, and Internet engineering.  The very early RCSs often presented a set of 
ideas developed by the researchers at one location to the rest of the community.  After email came into use, the 
authorship pattern changed – RFCs were presented by joint authors with common view independent of their 
locations.”  
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early 1990s.5  Second, Tim Berners-Lee developed Hypertext Transfer protocol (HTTP) as well 
as the first web browser, named World Wide Web.6  More popular browsers, namely Mosaic and 
Netscape, would follow and ultimately gave consumers the ability to search the Web from the 
comforts of their own homes.  Abbate (2000) notes of web browsers, they “completed the 
Internet’s transformation from a research tool to a popular medium by providing an application 
attractive enough to draw the masses of potential Internet users into active participation” (217).  
Ultimately, because of HTTP and the web browser, coupled with the ability of consumers to 
access these resources via their home computers, the decentralized and user-driven World Wide 
Web we know today largely came into being.   
                                                 
5 Interestingly, Abbate (2000) notes that TCP/IP protocols were never mandated as an official specification of 
networking technology.  Instead, it had become the de facto standard promoted by the U.S. government, as well as 
research groups in the United States and Europe.  The protocol eventually became widespread through adoption by 
computer manufacturers, and became the de factor protocol around the world.  The QWERTY typewriter keyboard 
followed a similar path in its widespread, global adoption. 
6 Berners-Lee was heavily influenced by authors of the computer counterculture during the 1960s and 1970s.  Most 
notable of these authors was Ted Nelson, who called on ordinary people to learn computer technology.  Seeking to 
“democratize” the Internet and information sharing, Nelson postulated that information should be linked together, as 
opposed to the conventional way of presenting information: linearly.  Berners-Lee’s adapted Nelson’s theory and 
developed what is known as hypertext, or HTTP, which effectively linked pieces of information such as text, 
images, audio, and video on computers around the world (Abbate 2000).  Because Berners-Lee’s HTTP standard 
was built upon TCP/IP settings, which were a component in most personal computers, HTTP and web browsers 
gave ordinary users a means of easily accessing public information across the globe.  Despite its many advantages, 
this innovation spurred a variety of unintended consequences.  One such consequence of global information sharing, 
and the adoption of personal computers and Internet technology, is the rise of harmful activity such as contemporary 
cyber attacks, cyber terrorism, and cyber espionage.  
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 The Internet and the “World Wide Web” thus developed in an often unforeseen and 
unpredictable manner.7  There can be little doubt, however, that both concepts were founded 
upon an initial desire to share research and information in a peaceful, open atmosphere.  
According to Denning (1989), “most [early] users thought of the network as a way of 
communicating with colleagues, and a tool supporting collaboration” (531).  In many regards, 
the purpose behind the Internet mirrored that of the telegraph and radio: safe, reliable 
communication.  The notion expressed by Denning was also noted by Berners-Lee.  When asked 
what he had in mind when he first developed the Web, he replied, “The dream behind the Web is 
of a common information space in which we communicate by sharing information.  ...once the 
state of our interactions was on line, we could then use computers to help us analyze it, make 
sense of what we are doing, where we individually fit in, and how we can better work together” 
(Berners-Lee 1998).  These were lofty goals, but they are becoming realized through the rapid 
spread of the Internet into the daily lives of countless billions around the world.   
 Despite the peaceful intentions of those who invented the Internet, the warning of 
historians of technology (Kelly 2010; Naimi and French 2010) regarding the negative and 
unpredictable aspects of technology apply equally to the present case.8  And in a manner similar 
                                                 
7 One of the most unique aspects of the Internet is the fact that it is an exceptionally user-generated and user-shaped 
entity.  Abbate (2000) astutely notes that, “much of the Internet’s success can be attributed to its users’ ability to shape 
the network to meet their own objectives” (5).   
8 Despite the hope for “a better world to come,” some historians of technology are less idealistic in detailing the 
unintended consequences of innovation.  For example, Naimi and French (2010) point out that we should not be 
surprised when technologies are molded for purposes beyond their original intent.  Citing Newtonian physics, they 
posit, “Technological innovation brings both new opportunities and new problems.  And inevitably, adoption of 
technological innovations leads to adaption and uses not envisioned by the inventor.  For every intended 
consequence, there will be an opposite and equal unintended consequence” (Naimi and French 2010, 4).  Further, as 
Kelly (2010, 246) observes, “there are no technologies without vices and none that are neutral.  There is no 
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to the telegraph and radio preceding it, the Internet suffers from a variety of weaknesses that 
states, as well as private users, are willing to exploit.  These weaknesses exist both as a result of 
technical oversight, as well as the Internet’s rapid adoption and adaption by states around the 
globe.  Much of the Internet developed with little regard for digital security, or certainly less 
regard than exists today.  A basic component of Internet connectivity, TCP/IP, for example, 
evolved into “a principal vulnerability that hackers use…to gain root access to a computer” 
(Garber 2000, 15).  Additionally, the decentralized nature of the Internet allows users to remain 
largely anonymous, thereby lowering the risk of being caught.9  Coupled with these physical 
attributes are the vulnerabilities inherent in the software designed to access the Web.  Martin, 
Graham and Caines (2011) point out that, “weaknesses in operating systems, network operating 
systems, default configuration of network devices and firewalls, encryption, and poorly written 
applications” lay behind many digital vulnerabilities (10).  A recent example of a weakness in 
coding was the Heart Bleed bug, which left the passwords of millions of Internet users 
vulnerable (Worthington 2014). 
 In conjunction with its physical and software attributes, the Internet provides a lucrative 
conduit through which to attack because of its complex integration into private industrial 
functions and national security networks in advanced states.  Networked technology has been 
incorporated by private firms to help increase the efficiency of mass transit systems, power grids, 
nuclear facilities, air traffic control systems, water and sewer systems, and a number of other 
crucial components of infrastructure.  As noted in the introductory example, governments have 
                                                 
powerfully constructive technology that is not also powerfully destructive in another direction, just as there is no 
great idea that cannot be greatly perverted for great harm.”   
9 Because of its somewhat anarchic structure, the Internet, “has been a difficult place for policymakers seeking to 
enforce the laws of the real world” (Chharia 2013, 30). 
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infused Internet technology into services that aid national security, such as radar and 
communication systems.  Unfortunately, integration by both groups has opened these systems up 
to covert access and thus makes them potential targets of state and sub-state groups.  This 
provides a security vulnerability that could potentially impact relations between states, an issue 
that has yet to be thoroughly investigated with empirical analysis.  
The study of the Internet as a conduit of attack and espionage, despite its benefits as a 
forum of free expression and information sharing, is an exceptionally important matter. The 
urgency in studying the Internet as a security threat is captured by Brenner (2009), who points 
out that, “If the chaos evolving in the cyberworld stayed in that virtual environment, we would 
have little or no reason to be concerned.  Unfortunately, what happens in the cyberworld does not 
stay in the cyberworld; it migrates out into our world because cyberspace is not a true 
externality.  It is simply a vector for human activity, both good and bad” (8).  Thus, thanks to the 
Internet, what happens in Vegas is no longer guaranteed to stay in Vegas.  While scholars 
continue to try to keep up by developing systematic knowledge on many phenomena associated 
with the Internet, there remain a wide variety of issues yet to be addressed.  This dissertation is 
driven by the fact that researchers in the social sciences have largely overlooked how events on 
the Internet, and the exploitation of the Internet’s weaknesses by a variety of groups, can impact 
the relations between states.10   
In order to remedy this oversight, this dissertation investigates three basic, yet 
fundamental questions related to the Internet, its weaknesses, and its use as a conduit of attack 
and espionage.  Because of the contemporary nature of this subject, coupled with the fact that 
                                                 
10 This approach to studying communication was also adapted by Headrick (1991) in his study on 
telecommunications from 1851 to 1945. 
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social scientists have yet to rigorously investigate Internet vulnerabilities, the following three 
chapters will borrow from three diverse theoretical frameworks in the international relations 
literature.  In particular, Chapter 2 focuses on a very basic, yet instrumental question in 
broadening our understanding of cyber threats: what state-based characteristics are most likely to 
increase the likelihood of being attacked via digital means.  This research question allows 
scholars to generalize about the role of political, social, and economic factors in cyber threat 
targeting, and to forecast where attacks may be launched in the future.  Because of the 
similarities in tactics between terrorist organizations and state- and sub-state hackers, the 
terrorism targeting literature will be used as a surrogate theoretical framework.  In terms of the 
dissertation, this chapter also provides operationalizations of the different types of cyber threats 
studied throughout the empirical chapters, and an introduction to the dataset as well.   
Chapter 3 relies upon the interstate rivalry literature in an effort to better understand the 
relationship between contentious relationships and the use of cyber attacks.  More specifically, a 
relatively new line of research has emerged that suggests that interstate rivalries promote the use 
of low-intensity forms of conflict.  These low-intensity forms of violence include terrorism, 
guerrilla combat, and perhaps even cyber threats.  A recent descriptive study produced by 
Valeriano and Maness (2014), however, finds that rivalries are likely to reduce the use of cyber 
threats between states, given that they may lead to more destructive forms of combat.  Chapter 3 
will test this proposition with cross sectional, time-series empirical data to determine if states 
engaged in interstate rivalries are more likely to be attacked via the Internet.  
Chapter 4 borrows from the crisis bargaining literature to study whether the loss of 
private, digital information influences the decisions of states to engage in armed conflict.  This 
chapter is based upon the premise that states have private information, such as unique knowledge 
15 
 
of their military strength and resolve.  The incentive to misrepresent such information is, 
according to Fearon (1995), one of the primary reasons why bargaining situations break down 
into armed conflict.  Chapter 4 argues that cyber threats release private information to the public 
that states would have otherwise kept private.  This information includes tactical and military 
plans, the security of digital networks, and even weapon blueprints.  With this information 
exposed, the targeted state can no longer misrepresent it in a bargaining situation, and would 
therefore be more likely to push for peace. 
As noted earlier, in addition to the novel subjects being studied, this dissertation employs 
quantitative methods to provide a generalized view of Internet vulnerabilities and their impact on 
interstate relations.  Up to this point, social science research has tended to study Internet 
vulnerabilities through case studies or other qualitative methods.  While these studies have 
certainly increased our knowledge of specific cases, this dissertation presents the first attempt to 
date to produce generalizable results that can predict which state-based characteristics will 
increase the likelihood of being targeted for attack, how international rivalry can impact the use 
of low-intensity forms of violence such as digital attacks, and if the theft of digital information 
will deter states from engaging in armed conflict.  In order to accomplish this feat, a unique 
dataset of attacks, terrorism and espionage from around the globe was subjected to a series of 
empirical tests.   
Finally, because of the diverse nature of the subjects being studied and the theory being 
examined, each chapter was designed to largely stand as an isolated piece of research.  As a 
result, each chapter has its own literature review, theoretical framework, research design, and 
results section.  This method has the advantage of offering a more in-depth analysis of the 
particular type of digital attack being investigated and a more thorough look at the literature 
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surrounding the theoretical framework.  Additionally, this method allows for a more efficient 
means of publishing this research in peer-reviewed academic journals with minimal editing. 
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Chapter 2 - Estimating the Likelihood of Cyber Threats, 1990-2009 
When Stephen Walt (1991) described what he saw as the “Renaissance of Security 
Studies,” the spectrum of international security threats was in a period of transition.  The nuclear 
stalemate that defined international relations throughout the Cold War had begun to crumble, 
ultimately replaced in the next decade by smaller, localized civil conflicts. At the dawn of the 
21st Century, the world of Security Studies is once again in transition, and the definition of what 
constitutes “security studies” prescribed by Walt may be too narrow.  Contemporary security 
threats can no longer be solely defined by physical military force, nor are they confined to a 
particular geographic location.  Instead, states, terrorist organizations, and individuals alike have 
begun to increasingly rely on electronic means to cause physical damage, steal vital information, 
and strike fear into ordinary individuals.  These new forms of electronic security vulnerabilities, 
collectively known as “cyber threats,” have thus far been largely neglected within the empirical 
security studies and international relations literature. 
While limited research exists that anecdotally posits the potential damage caused by a 
full-scale cyber attack (Clarke and Knake 2010), there is a substantial gap in the scholarly 
literature that attempts to adequately explain the characteristics of states that become targets of 
this new form of security vulnerability. Although broad anecdotes of the dangers of cyber threats 
abound, the lack of systematic empirical analysis from the scholarly community leaves vital 
computer networks around the world at risk.  This essay will borrow theory from the social 
sciences and apply quantitative methods as a means of studying international cyber threats and 
expanding our understanding of cyber threat targeting. 
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 Literature Review 
 The study of cyber threats by social scientists remains in its infancy.  In many respects, 
the present state of the social science cyber literature reflects the early approaches taken in 
researching physical terrorism.  Young and Findley (2011) point out that the terrorism literature 
was dominated by descriptive research for decades until the events of September 11, 2001.  It 
was only after such a horrific terrorist attack that many social scientists began to study the causes 
and targets of terrorism through more systematic qualitative and quantitative, large-N studies.  
Thus far, the study of cyber threats largely mirrors a descriptive, “pre-Sept. 11” approach; in 
particular, scholars focus on determining the possible effects of a cyber threat on the 
infrastructure of an industrialized nation (Clarke and Knake 2010), and formulating a wide-
variety of definitions to help categorize cyber activity.  The following review provides a broad 
representation of the current state of the social science literature as well as the identification of 
areas where research must still be conducted to aid in understanding this 21st Century security 
threat. 
 One of the key features of recent work on cyber threats is the categorization of cyber 
threats based on the origin of the attack and the intended motive.  As a result, the literature can 
be divided based on the category of attack studied (e.g., cyber attacks, cyber terrorism, and cyber 
espionage).  Each category maintains similar traits in scope and focus.  These include a drive to 
conceptualize the type of activity undertaken, the threat it poses, and its potential effects on the 
digital infrastructure of the target state.   
 The first category investigates the use of cyber capabilities by state-based actors against 
the infrastructure of other states (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1993; Betz 2012; Brenner 2007; Choucri 
and Goldsmith 2012; Devine 2008; Libicki 2000; Rawnsley 2005; Rid 2013; Trendle 2002).  
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These types of attacks are generally referred to as either cyberwar or cyber attacks.  Given that 
cyber attacks can be used by any state, great or small to, “tilt the odds against an invading army 
and remove the certainty of success that once made aggression worthwhile,” the literature 
surrounding cyber attacks is quickly becoming more robust (Libicki 2000, 30). 
 On a broad scale, scholars have addressed whether or not cyber attacks are a viable threat 
that deserves military or clandestine attention.  As early as 1993, the possibility of cyberwars and 
netwars were discussed in-depth, particularly relating to how globalization may lead to an 
increase in violent interactions and how technological shifts may alter the nature of conflict and 
warfare (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1993; Betz 2012; Libicki 2000).  More recently, authors such as 
Clarke and Knake (2010), who write for mainstream public consumption, take a sensationalized 
approach to explaining the effects of a full-scale cyber war against the United States.  They do so 
by crafting rather haunting scenarios of destruction and loss of basic day-to-day services.  
Despite claims that a cyber component to combat may prove to be anything from a means of 
shoring up military power to a revolutionary addition to military tactics, many researchers do not 
take an alarmist point of view on the matter.  Rid (2013), for example, takes the position that 
cyber attacks are not likely to achieve the level of damage foreseen by Clarke and Knake (2010).  
Instead, Rid argues that past cyber attacks fail to fit within Clausewitz’s concept of war, 
particularly that the use of force in war is violent, instrumental and political, three criteria that no 
single cyber attack meets.  Ultimately, he concludes that cyber attacks will be used for one of 
three purposes: subversion, espionage or sabotage.  Valeriano and Maness (2014) present 
evidence consistent with Rid’s analysis.  They study the impact of cyberwar on international 
rivalry using Joseph Nye’s (2011) definition of cyberwar as a foreign policy tactic used by states 
against other states. Using quantitative analysis, they find that only 20 of 124 active rivalries 
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have engaged in cyber conflicts, and those conflicts were limited in both magnitude and 
frequency.  Thus, views on the viability and the impact of cyber attacks are mixed in the 
literature to date.  The available evidence suggests, however, that cyber conflicts between states 
are rare and constrained events. 
 The information that we possess on cyber attacks is, however, limited.  A number of 
studies focus solely on the U.S. and do not analyze the impact that cyber attacks have on other 
states (Clarke and Knake 2010; Hunt 2012).  Additionally, the handful of cross-national studies 
of the subject are largely descriptive.  It is thus safe to conclude that the literature on this 
important subject is in its infancy.  There have been few attempts to develop rigorous theory to 
explain the phenomena, with Choucri and Goldsmith (2012) and Brenner (2007) standing out as 
exceptions.  To date, Valeriano and Maness (2014) have produced the only quantitative study of 
cyber attacks.  The focus of their study is narrow, however, as will be discussed below. 
 Perhaps the cyber attack literature is underdeveloped because, as Choucri and Goldsmith 
(2012) claim, “there is an enormous disconnect between the cyber realities of today and the 
theories of the twentieth century” (75).  A large number of IR theories focus on nation-states, but 
a host of sub-state actors such as Anonymous and Al-Qaeda affiliated hackers also have the 
potential to cause serious damage via electronic means, potentially as much or more damage than 
traditional state actors (Choucri and Goldsmith 2012).  Such attacks represent the second and 
most heavily researched category of cyber threats, cyber terrorism, defined here as cyber attacks 
on states by non-state entities. 
 The acknowledgment that much of Western society relies on network technology 
produces a powerful psychological component for the study of cyber terrorism. Weimann (2005) 
notes that, “psychological, political, and economic forces have combined to promote the fear of 
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cyberterrorism. From a psychological perspective, two of the greatest fears of modern time are 
combined into the term ‘cyberterrorism.’ The fear of random, violent victimization segues well 
with the distrust and outright fear of computer technology” (131).  Yet, despite the increased 
attention, the disagreements and focus of this literature largely mirror that of the cyber attack 
research.  For example, some maintain that cyber terrorism is the next major security threat for 
the United States (Bunker 2000; Chu et al. 2009; Embar-Seddon 2002; Kohlmann 2006; 
Weimann 2005), while others find that concern over cyber terrorism may be misplaced (Conway 
2002).  
 In contrast to the cyber attack literature, cyber terrorism research has placed a greater 
emphasis on defining what constitutes an act of cyber terrorism.  Colarik (2006) notes that most 
definitions agree that cyber terrorism involves some form of, “premeditated, politically 
motivated attack” (46).  Nuances in the definitions grow larger when the “cyber” component is 
addressed more thoroughly.  In a definition provided by Lourdeau (2004), cyber terrorism is an 
attack committed via computer and telecommunication services.  As suggested by Colarik 
(2006), other scholars define “cyber terrorism” simply as the point where terrorism meets 
cyberspace.  If this is true, then any use of computer technology by terrorist organizations (such 
as sending emails to plan an attack or using Google to research potential targets) could 
categorically fall under the umbrella of “cyber terrorism.”  To say the least, the difficulty in 
defining what constitutes physical “terrorism,” (see Hoffman 2006) coupled with the abstract 
nature of the Internet and electronic technology, produces a very diverse literature.     
 The third category of cyber threats in the social science literature is cyber espionage, 
which is the theft of private information from businesses and ordinary citizens (Fidler 2012; 
Guisnel 1997; Lewis 2011).  While the financial threat of cyber espionage is particularly grave to 
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industrialized nations, the literature on the issue is less substantial than for cyber attacks and 
cyber terrorism.  One of the few book-length investigations of cyber espionage and its history 
was produced by Guisnel (1997).  Despite the book’s age, Guisnel provides an excellent history 
of primitive electronic espionage in the early 1990s, as well as a description of how states and 
corporations may employ computers to extract large volumes of digital secrets from rival 
computer networks for personal gain.  The author points out that, “in the United States and 
Canada, threats by foreign powers against companies within both countries are perceived as 
threats to their national interests” (Guisnel 1997, 212).  While Guisnel addresses how U.S. and 
Canadian intelligence communities combat potential economic losses, he spends very little time 
discussing the interests of others states and the potential loss of information they face.   
 More recent publications focus on the use of cyber espionage by governments and the 
prevention of such intrusions.  Fidler (2012) addresses a variety of ways governments should 
address cyber espionage, ranging from classifying it as “just spying,” to treating it as a potential 
act of cyberwar.  In a commission report written by the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) for the Obama Administration, Lewis (2011) points out that a continued reliance 
on information technology infrastructure may require a massive overhaul of computer security 
regulations.  Of the various cyber threats facing the United States, the commission asserts that 
espionage and cyber crime remain the greatest.  It is noted that, “the Internet provides nation-
states, their intelligence agencies, and cyber criminals with vastly expanded capabilities to 
illicitly acquire information.  Economic espionage does the most damage: other nations steal 
technology, research products, and intellectual property” (Lewis 2011, 2).  Lewis’s report also 
demonstrates the most difficult aspect of studying cyber espionage - the security concerns of 
publicly announcing you were targeted.  The commission estimates that 80 major U.S. 
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companies were targeted for cyber espionage in 2010, despite the fact that only two companies 
publicly announced they were targeted. 
 Although the categorization of cyber threats helps to both frame and focus research, 
literature on all of these threats suffers from two distinct problems.  First, the literature is highly 
focused on addressing America’s vulnerabilities.  There are exceptions to this, such as Rawnsley 
(2005) who investigates information warfare and propaganda between China and Taiwan, and 
Trendle (2002) who researches a possible Arab-Israeli cyberwar.  Many articles also refer to the 
Russia-Georgia and Russia-Estonia cyber events, but these cases are often used only as a framing 
device (Devine 2008).  These examples aside, a vast majority of the current literature seeks to 
determine how cyber threats, particularly cyber attacks and cyber terrorism, may impact 
American infrastructure and how to protect against such intrusions.  This may be due to the fact 
that the United States is targeted more than any other state, making it an excellent example for 
scholars to rely upon, or that American policymakers are the targeted audience for such research.  
In any case, the literature is vastly US-centric. The second problem that the literature faces is the 
lack of systematic social science research on the subject, in the form of either rigorous qualitative 
studies or large-N, quantitative work.  The vast majority of the scholarship on the subject is 
descriptive in nature.  The notable exception is the research conducted by Valeriano and Maness 
(2014), who perform a content analysis through Google News which demonstrates the rarity of 
cyber attacks between rival states.  However, while the authors collect data to establish the rarity 
of cyber attacks, they do not develop theory to explain this paucity or provide empirical tests on 
the potential causes of cyber attacks. 
The research conducted in this paper addresses the current holes in the cyber literature, 
while it simultaneously expands our understanding of cyber threat targeting.  Contrary to the 
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current literature, which often focuses on identifying the effects of a cyber attack and their policy 
implications, the research question of this paper focuses on the cause.  In particular, what factors, 
be they economic, military, political, or social, cause a state to be the target of a cyber threat?  In 
order to answer this question, an extensive cyber threat dataset encompassing attacks from 
around the world is tested using quantitative methods, thus expanding the literature beyond its 
current emphasis on US-based and descriptive, qualitative studies.  This paper also draws largely 
from and expands upon terrorist targeting literature as a framework to establish targeting 
characteristics and ultimately determine whether those findings can be extrapolated to cover 
cyber threats as well. 
 Linking Terrorism and Cyber Threats: Theoretical Development 
 One aspect of studying cyber threats that adds to the issue’s complexity is the lack of an 
established theoretical framework.  Considering the current focus of the cyber literature, a 
theoretical framework is not necessarily required given that many papers attempt to define the 
categories of cyber threats or predict the potential effects of a cyber threat.  However, the aim of 
this paper is to study cyber threats using quantitative means to ascertain the attributes of targeted 
states.  In an effort to avoid founding hypotheses on an ad-hoc series of assumptions, the 
theoretical groundwork for this paper is based upon the physical terrorism targeting literature.  
That literature has determined a number of potential attributes that increase the likelihood of a 
state being targeted for terrorism and, given similarities between terrorism and cyber threats, 
using it as an early proxy for cyber threat targeting seems appropriate. 
 While the terrorism targeting literature is a useful foundation to craft theory on cyber 
threat targeting, it is important to recall that the former literature is also in its infancy (Toft et al. 
2010).  In preparation for their study on terrorist targeting of critical infrastructure, Ackerman et 
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al. (2007) note “…a paucity of material regarding the more general process of target selection by 
terrorist groups” (viii).  This assertion is backed by Toft et al. (2010), concluding that, “while the 
body of literature on the causes of terrorism is vast, the subject of terrorism targeting is 
somewhat neglected” (4411).  Adapting the terrorism targeting literature to study an issue like 
cyber threats is further complicated by the fact that many terrorism studies investigate the link 
between terrorist organization ideology and their specific targets (critical infrastructure, 
government foundations, etc.)  After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a more 
concerted effort was made to study physical terrorist groups, understand the logic and 
psychology behind their motives, and grasp their decision-making processes.  Thus far, the 
individuals and groups that utilize cyber threats have not received such attention.  Ultimately, the 
theoretical foundation for this paper relies on the few broad, state-level characteristics 
established by the terrorism literature as a means of framing the possible characteristics of states 
targeted for cyber threats.   
 Despite the rarity of terrorism targeting literature, encompassing previously developed 
research to help frame the question of cyber threat targeting is a step that should be taken for two 
primary reasons.  The first reason is for simplicity’s sake.  Since the use of broad quantitative 
data to study cyber threats is in its infancy, it may be prudent to reserve cyber-exclusive theory 
building until after exploratory research is concluded.  The present paper, and the findings it 
produces, may be used to develop cyber-specific theory in the future, but it can also be used to 
test the similarities and differences between cyber and physical threat targeting.   
 The second reason to employ the terrorism literature is that while cyber attacks, cyber 
terrorism, and cyber espionage occur in the virtual realm, they do share common attributes with 
physical terrorism.  Hoffman (2006) points out that all terrorist organizations have a single 
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common trait: “they do not commit actions randomly or senselessly” (173).  In most cases, the 
same is true of cyber tactics.  According to Hasham et al. (2011), “advanced cyber threat groups 
are extremely patient, tending to invest heavily in the research and development of custom 
malicious code and clever means to exfiltrate data” (3).  Historical cases also provide evidence of 
the heavily planned nature of cyber warfare.  For example, Stuxnet was specifically developed 
by Western nations to seek out certain Iranian computers and impede the enrichment of nuclear 
material.  Additionally, hactivist groups seek out specific targets for disruption.  In the case of 
Anonymous, which arguably straddles the line between crime and terrorism, the loose affiliation 
of hackers often target specific groups  that they believe prevent the spread of free information 
(such as the RIAA, the FBI, or the Justice Department). 
 The potential damage caused by terrorism and electronic attacks are similar as well.  For 
example, terrorist organizations seek to, “inflict psychological and physical damage on their 
targets” (Lewis 2002, 8).  While cyber threats prior to Stuxnet rarely caused physical damage, 
the impact they can have on industries and customers that rely on computers could easily cause 
both psychological and physical damage.11  According to Evans and Whittell (2010), the social 
impact of a successful cyber attack could be the equivalent of “a well-placed bomb” (n.p.).  Leon 
Panetta, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, backed that assertion by comparing a theoretical cyber 
attack to the 9/11 terrorist attacks: “A cyber attack perpetrated by nation states or violent 
extremist groups could be as destructive as the terrorist attack of 9/11.  Such a destructive cyber 
terrorist attack could paralyze the nation” (Ratnam 2012, n.p.).  Both forms of attack are also 
                                                 
11 The Stuxnet virus was designed to physically destroy Iranian nuclear centrifuges.  Once it infected the computers 
controlling the centrifuges, the virus automatically increased then decreased the speed in an effort to create 
vibrations.  Stuxnet was successful in destroying several Iranian centrifuges and slowing the process of nuclear 
material enrichment for a short period of time. 
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typically performed covertly and can be exceptionally difficult to attribute to any particular 
group (Weimann 2005).  Crenshaw (2012) points out that one of the most difficult obstacles to 
overcome when responding effectively to a physical terrorist attack is the attribution of 
responsibility.  In regards to attributing cyber threats, Gordon Snow (2011), the Assistant 
Director of the FBI Cyber Division notes, “the current Internet environment can make it 
extremely difficult to determine attribution.”  This assertion is backed by Weimann (2005), who 
states that many users (terrorists and state-sponsored hackers included) rely on anonymous 
“screen names,” making it exceptionally difficult for security agencies to track the user and 
ascertain their true identity. 
 Ultimately, the common attributes of physical terrorism and cyber threats suggest that 
they may share similar traits in targeting.  Libicki et al. (2007) point out that al Qaeda chooses 
targets and attack modalities, “designed to inflict a large amount of damage on the economic 
foundations [of states with] military, political, and commercial power” (xiv).  The goal of this 
paper is to determine if those economic, political, and social characteristics may also provide the 
incentive to target one particular state over another using cyber threats.   
 Of the many targeting factors studied within the terrorist literature, a state’s economic 
strength is one of the most robust lines of research.  For example, Tavares (2004) and Piazza 
(2008a) find that wealthier nations are more likely to experience terrorist attacks.  Tavares notes 
that one of the primary objectives of terrorist groups is to damage the economy of their target 
and to, “impose material cost on the population as a form of pressure on the society as a whole” 
(4).  The findings of Tavares and Piazza are further backed by Blomberg et al. (2004).   Their 
analysis indicates that democratic nations, in particular those with high incomes, experience high 
levels of terrorist activity. 
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 Unlike an act of physical aggression, which can happen at any time and in any place, 
cyber threats require some form of technological infrastructure through which to direct the 
attack.  One reason economically developed states may be prone to cyber threats is the fact that 
they tend to have the type of well-developed cyber infrastructure that is vulnerable to attack.  
Hawkins and Hawkins (2003) found that the 32 economically-robust states that make up the 
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) are home to 95% of the 
world’s Internet hosts.  Rogers (2000) also finds that the Internet is primarily concentrated in 
wealthy and well-educated urban areas.  Finally, Xiaoming and Kay (2004) demonstrate that per 
capita wealth is a primary factor in determining the spread of the Internet in Asian nations, and 
there is a strong relationship between a state’s GDP and Internet penetration.  They conclude 
that, “GDP per capita indicates a country’s economic strength as well as individual wealth.  The 
deployment of the Internet is a costly venture and only countries with strong economic power are 
able to build the Internet in such a way that it allows access to as many people as possible” (8).  
Ultimately, states with a strong economy or increasing economic growth may be more likely 
targets of cyber attacks and terrorism both because of their economic power and because they 
have the appropriate infrastructure available. 
 Literature on the causes of economic espionage provides additional insight.  Similar to 
cyber espionage, economic espionage is state-sponsored, conducted covertly, difficult to detect 
until after-the-fact, and meant to harm a target nation through non-military means.  According to 
a former French intelligence director, “In economics, we are competitors, not allies.  America 
has the most technical information of relevance.  It is easily accessible.  So naturally your 
country will receive the most attention from the intelligence services” (Schweizer 1996).  
According to the SANS Institute, “the same people doing the military espionage are engaged in 
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industrial espionage using the same or very similar techniques to steal information from 
organizations…” (Messmer 2008).  States that are willing to use economic espionage as a means 
of achieving their goals would not target a state that has few economic secrets to hide, especially 
if economic power is just as important as military power.  Instead, it would be more 
advantageous to seek information from states that have proven to be economically robust.  The 
ultimate motive of those who use cyber threats could range from economic devastation (U.S. 
Congressional Research Service 2004) to technological leapfrogging via industrial espionage 
(Parkhe 1992), both of which require targets with robust economies and Internet infrastructure 
for success. 
Ultimately, states with more robust economics could be targeted by cyber terrorists due to 
the increased economic damage they could cause if Internet connectivity were disrupted.  Thus, 
     H1: States that experience economic growth are more likely to be targets of cyber threats. 
 
 Economic strength can be converted into varying forms of state power, including military 
power.  Terrorist actors tend use unconventional means precisely because they do not have the 
economic or military capabilities to challenge states on the traditional battlefield.  Cyber threats 
from both states and sub-state actors may be used in a similar way – they challenge and weaken 
militarily superior actors.  For example, in a 2001 interview with a leading Gaza Muslim activist, 
military superiority of the opposing force was addressed.  The activist, in defense of the use of 
suicide terrorism, explained that, “we lack the arms [planes, missiles or artillery] possessed by 
the enemy” (Hoffman 2006, 155).  In a summary of the interview, Hoffman notes that “(terrorist) 
attacks are considered to be a means of offsetting a numerically superior, better-armed, and 
better-equipped opponent.”  In other words, organizations that are faced with a stronger 
opponent equipped with superior military weaponry and technology are more likely to use 
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unconventional tactics.  The terrorist attacks of September 11th were a deadly example of this 
inverse relationship. 
 In many regards, the use of cyber threats (while not as deadly in practice as terrorist 
attacks) could act as another form of unconventional warfare.  State actors, terrorist 
organizations, as well as individual actors in states with less-robust military options, could rely 
on cyber threats to target enemies they could not otherwise significantly impact through 
conventional means.  The use of cyber threats by terrorist organizations against larger, better-
equipped militaries, such as the United States and its allies, was (and still is) a particular concern 
during the protracted “War on Terror.”  According to Vatis (2001), “the United States and its 
allies must operate under the premise that military strikes against terrorists and their nation-state 
supporters will result in cyber attacks against U.S. and allied information infrastructures” (21).  
In fact, the United States Department of Defense issued a report in April 2013 stating that, “as 
more and more state and nonstate actors gain cyber expertise, its importance and reach as a 
global threat cannot be overstated” (Franzen 2013).  As a result of this new unconventional use 
of digital force, cyber threats were listed as the most pressing danger facing the U.S. in 2013.   
 Given the reliance of terrorist organizations on unconventional tactics and the prospect 
that states with less robust military infrastructures may seek to target more powerful enemies 
through the use of cyber threats, we can postulate that, 
     H2: As a state’s military size increases, it will experience an increase in cyber threats. 
 
 Aside from economic and military factors, the terrorism literature has diverse findings on 
the role that regime type may play in the risk of violence.  Eubank and Weinberg (1994; 2001), 
Li (2005), Pape (2003), Rogan (2010) and Savun and Phillips (2009) have all investigated the 
potential link between regime type and terrorist attacks.  Eubank and Weinberg (2001) notably 
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point out that, “democracy makes it possible for dissident groups of all sizes and shapes to wage 
campaigns of terrorist violence,” which opposes the view that democracies provide a peaceful 
means of conflict resolution (163).  Thus, the democratic political process is not responsible for 
the rise of terrorism, but instead it is the liberal attributes of a democracy (freedom of speech, 
expression, etc.) that permit these groups to exist.  More specifically, Eubank and Weinberg 
(1994; 2001) found that democratic societies are likely targets of attack as open societies allow 
terrorist groups to organize and carry out their attack with less chance of being noticed.  These 
views are further expanded upon by Li and Schaub (2004).  They note that, “…by guaranteeing 
citizen’s political rights and civil liberties, democracy allows terrorist groups much greater room 
to maneuver, lowering the costs and risks for committing terrorism” (242).  Not all studies 
research the same conclusion (Eyerman 1998; Li 2005), but the bulk of the literature maintains 
that the liberties associated with democratic governance are also associated with higher levels of 
terrorist activities.  
 Given the increased mobility afforded to terrorist organizations by democratic states, 
target hardening becomes increasingly difficult for free societies.  Terrorist organizations seek to 
minimize the impact of increased security in societies by randomizing their target selection or 
choosing an entirely new primary target.  This finding is backed by Brandt and Sandler (2010) 
who agree that terrorists shift their attention to harder-to-defend targets where success is more 
probable.  The authors point out that, “terrorists’ response to security upgrades is to direct attacks 
against the most vulnerable groups” (216).    
 Due to the unique nature of cyber targets, access to a target must generally be easily 
navigable in order to deliver the virus or other malicious code.  The conduit of access is, in most 
cases, the Internet itself.  As a result, those using cyber threats must look at how different states 
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“harden” access to the Internet and adjust their plans accordingly to attack more easily accessible 
targets.  Thus, the nature of Internet access and Internet freedom may play a crucial role in target 
selection. 
 Traditionally, democratic states are far more likely to embrace the Internet as a means of 
communication and free expression (Milner 2006).  As a means of communication, the views 
and opinions expressed in emails, blog posts, and websites are protected under freedom of 
speech (Goldman 2010).  As a result of the openness and freedom associated with the Internet in 
democratic states, users have the advantage of visiting any website they wish (within legal 
limits), have as many email accounts as they want, and open any attachment sent to them.  In 
many cases, it is the responsibility of the end-user to have the appropriate security software 
available to protect their equipment from malicious code. The cheap deployment of web 
connectivity also means an increasing number of industries are interconnected, as well as 
allowing for the digital regulation of water, gas, and other vital systems.  While the spread and 
use of Internet services has opened up new and exciting forms of communication and 
opportunities, it also increases the number of available targets. 
 In autocratic states, many leaders believe the Internet’s disadvantages outweigh its 
benefits.  According to Sussman (2000), “45 countries now restrict Internet access on the pretext 
of protecting the public from subversive ideas or violation of national security…they are all 
autocracies.”  For example, the Internet can provide uncensored information, which may 
ultimately “threaten the interests of the ruling groups in autocracies” (Milner 2006).  Non-
democratic ruling institutions do not necessarily rely on broad public support, thus some 
autocratic regimes largely impede the adoption of technologies perceived as threatening (Kalathil 
and Boas 2003).  Even though many autocratic states are suspicious of the Internet and the free 
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exchange of ideas, some have adopted the Web as a means of spreading propaganda and 
improving political control.  For example, China has recognized that, “future economic 
growth…will depend in large measure on the extent to which the country is integrated with the 
global information infrastructure” (Milner 2006).  In order to use the Internet to propel national 
goals, but also limit the free exchange of ideas, the Chinese government has implemented 
firewalls, routers, and filters to limit what its citizens and outside users can view.  Additionally, 
Chinese “Internet police” regularly use surveillance and coercion to ensure users are not viewing 
restricted information.  When viewed in a hard/soft target framework, the Internet infrastructure 
in an autocratic society is likely to be considered a “hard target.” 
 These different approaches to the Internet can have a substantial impact on the ease of 
deploying a cyber threat, making government type a potentially important factor in predicting 
which states may be a future target.  In democratic states, the Internet is an open forum for ideas 
and the free exchange of information.  That free exchange includes the ability to send and open 
email attachments that may contain security-exploiting viruses.  In essence, the Internet in a 
democratic state is a soft target.  In terms of industry, democratic states also tend to be more 
interconnected and reliant on Internet technology than autocracies.  If a state or group was 
seeking to disrupt the power and water supplies of an enemy coalition with a cyber attack, it 
would be much more logical to target a democratic state whose industries relied on a digital 
infrastructure to regulate production.  Therefore, the third hypothesis for this paper is, 
     H3: Democratic states are more likely to be targets of cyber threats than non-democracies. 
 In addition, scholars acknowledge that, “not all democracies have free media and 
sometimes media are free in countries that lack other democratic characteristics” (Whitten-
Woodring 2009, 595; Van Belle 1997).  As far as tactics go, terrorists may target states with the 
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media necessary to provide the free publicity and exposure they seek to expand their cause 
(Enders and Sandler 1999).  In much the same vein, groups using cyber tactics often rely on free 
media to explain their goals.  For example, the hacking group Anonymous is well-known for 
publishing home-made YouTube videos explaining their target selection, why they are attacking 
that particular target, and usually a list of demands.  A state without a free press, and access to 
video sharing sites such as YouTube, would largely nullify the ability of hacking groups to 
spread their message. Therefore, based on the findings of Eubank and Weinberg (2001) and 
Enders and Sandler (1999), 
      H4: States with greater freedom of the press will receive more cyber threats than states with        
      less press freedom. 
 
 Finally, it is important to include factors beyond domestic indicators.  Notably, the 
terrorist targeting literature explains that engagement in international conflict may create a 
grievance against the aggressing state.  Burgoon (2006) points out that external conflict may, 
“spark internal tensions or terrorist action from or against foreigners involved in the conflict” 
(189).  This is expanded upon by Savun and Phillips (2009) who note, “states that are highly 
involved in international affairs form or increase their already existing interests in other states.  
Regular interactions and contact between states sometimes lead to misunderstanding and create 
discontent” (888).  The authors go on to note that it is unlikely for a terrorist organization to 
target a state that has not negatively impacted groups within the country in which it operates.  
Finally, in reference to the United States exclusively, Flint (2003) finds that “the U.S.’s role as 
target lies in its twentieth-century position as world leader or hegemonic power.  The grievances 
associated with the United States’ contemporary global role are a precondition of terrorist 
activity” (162). 
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 Those states that are more engaged on the international stage, particularly when it comes 
to military conflict, make themselves a target for aggression due to the grievances they generate 
among target states and a range of sub-state actors.  However, despite this finding, the logistical 
cost of planning, organizing, and executing a physical terrorist attack may not be an option for all 
groups to air their grievances.  With their low cost of deployment, coupled with the fact that the 
target state’s homeland can be struck without a physical presence, a cyber threat could become 
an invaluable asset for a group seeking retribution against a perceived invading army.   
 By including the number of international conflicts each state engages in per year, this 
study can evaluate how foreign policy decisions impact the likelihood of being targeted for a 
cyber threat.  If the terrorist targeting literature can be applied to the study of cyber threats, then 
we can conclude that, 
     H5: As the number of interstate conflicts a state engages in increases, the likelihood of it  
           being targeted for a cyber threat will increase. 
 
The theory offered for this paper presents a variety of factors that may contribute to cyber 
threat targeting.  Clarifying the economic and political attributes of countries that are most likely 
to suffer cyber threats allows for a broader understanding of this emerging hazard and offers a 
different perspective from the more common question, “what are the effects of a cyber attack?” 
that is found in the mainstream literature.  In order to determine those attributes, and due to the 
rare nature of publicized cyber threats against public, private, and government networks, a 
thorough content analysis was undertaken to create the dependent variable for this analysis.  The 
following section details the data collection process, the operationalization of the variables, and 
the research methodology. 
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 Research Design 
 Cyber Dataset 
Given the sensitive nature of network security logs, many large companies and 
government agencies are reluctant to allow researchers access to their network data.  In an effort 
to exhaust any possible resources of cyber threat data, every branch of the U.S. Armed Forces, 
the FBI, the CIA, the Department of Homeland Security, as well as private companies such as 
Microsoft, Google, Apple, and Symantec were contacted.  All of these sources either denied the 
request for information or refused to return phone calls.  As a result, only one option was left to 
build a cyber dataset: content analysis. 
The cyber dataset employed in this quantitative analysis was assembled by Virtual 
Research Associates using an automated content analysis of the Reuters Global News Service.  
The search was limited to attacks that occurred between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 
2011.  Due to the lack of a common vernacular, many search terms were used to ensure the 
maximum number of cases was collected.  A complete list of the search terms used is available 
in Appendix A.  Ultimately, the raw dataset includes 15,879 cases.15   
Once the raw dataset was complete, a process of coding was undertaken to weed out 
redundant cases and those that were not clear examples of cyber threats.  After the raw dataset 
                                                 
15 While the total number of raw cases in the original dataset is robust, the software used by Virtual Research 
Associates is unable to categorize between articles of events and other types of reports.  For example, the search 
term “cyber” returned a host of cyber threat related events, however it also returned hundreds of articles dedicated to 
reviews of the Sony Cybershot camera.  A similar issue was encountered by including the search term “hacked,” 
which returned stories of computers being hacked, as well as more gruesome articles of individuals being physically 
“hacked apart” in violent altercations.  Due to the excessive number of non-cyber related articles in the raw dataset, 
each case was inspected to ensure it was an example of a computer or digital network attack or intrusion. 
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was pared down into potential cases of cyber threats, those were further investigated using the 
LexisNexis service.  This process ensured the remaining cases were indeed examples of a cyber 
threat, and allowed for a clearer idea of who the target and suspected source of the threat was.  
Unfortunately, in many cases the source of the attack was either not listed or was deemed heavily 
suspect.  Given this ambiguity, the present study is only able to investigate the characteristics of 
the targeted state.  The LexisNexis service was also used to verify the date of the attack and to 
ensure the correct year was listed for the beginning of the threat or its first discovery.   
The final step was to code the cases into one of three categories: cyber attack, cyber 
terrorism, and cyber espionage.  These categories were operationalized based largely on Brenner 
(2009) and reflect the classifications found in the cyber literature.  Those obscure or vague cases 
that could not be coded as a specific instance of cyber warfare, cyber terrorism, or cyber 
espionage remained in the broader cyber threat classification but was not included in the more 
specific categories.  
The first category, cyber attack, is similar to Brenner’s “cyberwarfare” in that these are 
cases in which a state government is suspected of being the source of an attack against another 
state.  The term was changed from “cyberwarfare” to “cyber attack” due to the connotation of the 
former that these attacks occur during a period of war.  In almost every instance this is not the 
case.  An example of a “cyber attack” case would be the 2009 Chinese cyber attack on Taiwan in 
an effort to paralyze the island’s government and economy.   Due to the sophisticated nature of 
the network and the virus code, the 2009 intrusion into the North American power grid by 
Chinese and Russian hackers would also fall under this category (as no sub-state group has 
claimed responsibility for the attack). 
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The second category is cyber terrorism, which encompasses a wide variety of cases.  At 
the most basic level, a case is deemed cyber terrorism if the suspected source of the cyber threat 
is a terrorist organization.  For example, in 1998 the Internet Black Tigers (an offshoot of the 
Tamil Tigers) launched a digital assault on Sri Lankan embassy computers around the world.  
The cyber terrorism category will also include those cases known as “hactivism,” in which 
websites are attacked and taken offline.   Most forms of hactivism are distributed denial of 
service (DDoS) attacks, which are commonly associated with groups such as Anonymous.  
These cases are included under cyber terrorism because the source of the attack purposefully 
targets a specific group/website due to a political disagreement.  If one subscribes to Hoffman’s 
(2006) working definition of terrorism, “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through 
violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change,” then disabling a website and 
preventing the dissemination of information could certainly lead to fear in the general population 
(40).    
The last category is cyber espionage.  This is a fairly straightforward category and will 
encompass cases where private, digital information was stolen or released to the public against 
the wishes of the target.  Cases that would fall into this category include Chinese attacks on 
Google, which released email conversations between Chinese dissidents.  The case of “Titan 
Rain,” in which 10 to 20 terabytes of information was stolen from the Pentagon computer 
network, would also classify as cyber espionage.   
Of course, a content analysis of cyber threat cases creates a variety of problems that must 
be acknowledged.  Perhaps the most blatant is that a successful cyber threat, especially one that 
seeks to steal military or economic secrets, should remain relatively unknown.  The fact that 
knowledge of a cyber threat was published signifies one of three outcomes: an attack was 
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originally intended to do harm and the source wanted the target to know of the attack; a failed 
attack was originally intended to remain a secret but, was foiled prior to its completion; or a 
successful attack was originally intended to remain a secret, but was discovered after its 
execution.  All three scenarios have been included in the dataset, as it can be concluded that even 
a failed cyber threat was intended by the source to harm the target in some fashion.  Although 
data on a phenomena such as cyber threats will inevitably have limitations, the dataset built 
through proprietary content analysis software for this project offers, at the very least, an initial 
cut at understanding this complex category of activity. 
 Dependent Variable 
   The primary dependent variable for this paper will be the aggregate number of cyber 
attack, cyber terrorism, and cyber espionage cases each state experienced each year from 1990 to 
2009.  In addition to the primary dependent variable, a series of additional analyses will be 
conducted to determine if alternative state characteristics exist individually among cyber attacks, 
cyber terrorism, or cyber espionage.  This process is undertaken as a result of findings from the 
terrorism literature, particularly Young and Findley (2011), who note that studying domestic and 
transnational terrorism as the same phenomenon may lead to incorrect conclusions based on the 
differing motivations that guide them.  The dependent variables measuring cyber attacks, 
terrorism, and espionage were coded using the process described in the previous section.16   
                                                 
16 The raw, uncoded cyber dataset provided by Virtual Research Associates was not tested, given the exceptional 
number of “junk cases” present in the data.  A more detailed description of these “junk cases” is provided in the 
previous footnote. 
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 Independent Variables 
 Gross Domestic Product – Per Capita 
Following past research in the terrorism literature, economic performance will be 
measured via gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.  GDP per capita was chosen as the 
economic measure since, “an increase in domestic income…will result in more spending by 
consumers and governments on goods and services which will leave a positive impact on the 
growth of the industrial sector” such as an expansion of the communication system (Ullah et al. 
2012).  In addition, this measure was used in studies such as Piazza (2006), Krueger and Laitin 
(2008) and Li (2005).  The argument will be made that as GDP per capita increases, so too will 
Internet infrastructure availability and the opportunity for increased targeting. 17   
The measure for gross domestic product (per capita) was borrowed from the World 
Development Indicators and Global Development Finance (WDI) dataset provided by the World 
Bank (World Bank 2013).  The GDP per capita measure was heavily skewed; as a result it was 
logged to improve normality. 
 Military Size 
Military size is measured as the total number of “active duty miltiary personnel, including 
paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they may be used 
to support or replace regular military forces” (World Bank 2013).  As with the previous 
                                                 
17 Despite a wide reaching literature on the subject, the number of Internet and broadband users will not be included 
in this analysis.  This choice was made for two reasons.  First, there is a high degree of correlation between Internet 
users and both polity and the economic variables.  Second, Internet user statistics are historically undependable.  
According to van Dijk (2005, p. 46), “Internet statistics are notoriously unreliable because of defective sampling, 
nonresponse, and bad quality of much (marketing) telephone interviewing or Web surveys.” 
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economic variables, military size was obtained from the World Bank WDI dataset (2013), and is 
logged for normality. 
 Regime Type 
Regime type data was provided by the Polity IV project (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 
2012).  The Polity IV data measures regime authority on a 21-point scale, ranging from -10 
(hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy).  Among a number of reasons, Polity IV 
data was used for consistency with other conflict studies (Plumper and Neumayer 2010). 
 Freedom of the Press 
The freedom of the press data was provided by the Quality of Government dataset.  This 
measure “indicates the extent to which feedoms of speech and press are affected by government 
censorship, including ownership of media outlets” (QoG Codebook 2013, 69). Censorship is 
defined as any restriction placed on the freedom of the press, speech, or on musical or artistic 
expression.  Each state is measured on a scale from 0 to 2, from complete government censorship 
(coded 0) to absolutely no government censorship of the media (coded as a 2).  While the 
Freedom House measure is more commonly used as a measure of press freedom, a shift in the 
project’s method of coding states in the early 1990s would have substanitally reduced the 
number of cases available in the analysis. 
 International Conflict 
International conflict data was derived from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
(UCDP)/PRIO armed conflict dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002).  Each state is assigned the number 
of international conflicts in which it engaged for each year of the analysis.  For this particular 
measure of conflict, at least one side must be a state government and there must be at least 25 
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battle-related fatalities.  Given the rarity of armed international conflict in the post-Cold War era, 
the PRIO measure, with it’s relatively low threshold of violence, was deemed more approperiate 
than the Correlates of War measure, which only includes conflicts with 1,000 or more battle-
related causulities.   
Media Bias 
Because the independent variable is a content analysis of media reports provided by 
Reuters, a variable is included to control for any potential media bias that may exist in each state.  
The variable is a count of the total number of articles from Reuters concerning each country in 
each year of the analysis (Murdie and Peksen 2013).  The natural log of the control is used for 
normality. 
 Below, Table 2.1 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. 
 Methodology 
 The data for this research is in a time series cross section format, with a target state/year 
unit of analysis.  Since the dependent variable is comprised of event data, an event count model 
is the most appropriate choice.  A Poisson model was eliminated as a possible option because it 
assumes that the data are independent and homogenous, which is an assumption that will not 
hold for the current dependent variable.  Ultimately, a zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) 
was chosen for the models testing the cyber aggregate, terrorism, and espionage measures 
because of the abundance of zeros in the primary dependent variable.  Of the 1,576 cases, there 
were only 338 non-zero observations.  Both Vuong (Vuong 1989) and a variety of tests such as 
residual plots and AIC (Long and Freese 2005) confirmed that a zero-inflated model is preferable 
over a standard negative binomial estimate.   
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 The use of zero-inflated models in the study of terrorism has gained increased popularity 
as studies become more complex. In their study of terrorist target preferences, Drakos and Gofas 
(2006) address the need for zero-inflated modeling.  They point out that both Poisson and 
negative binomial models assume that the occurrence of zero counts is the result of a draw from 
the given sample.  The authors state of the terrorism literature, “the observed zero counts in the 
sample might be the outcome either of a country that never experiences terrorism (always zero 
count) or of a country that did not experience terrorism in the given sample and the count could 
well be positive in another period” (81).   The same logic applies to studies focused on cyber 
threats.  Thus, researchers are left with two options to account for the overabundance of zeros in 
their dependent variable: zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) or zero-inflated negative binomial.  As 
noted, statistical tests confirmed a ZINB model is the optimal choice for this study. 
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
All Cyber Threats (coded) 3,754 0.07 0.72 0 24 
Cyber Attacks 3,754 0.004 0.06 0 1 
Cyber Terrorism 3,754 0.04 0.42 0 17 
Cyber Espionage 3,754 0.03 0.34 0 11 
GDP Per Capita (Logged) 3,586 7.80 1.64 4.16 12.13 
Military Size (Logged) 3,194 10.55 1.86 4.61 15.24 
Polity 3,169 2.76 6.75 -10 10 
Freedom of Press 3,303 1.06 0.74 0 2 
Interstate Conflict 3,754 0.03 0.19 0 3 
Media Bias (Logged) 3,579 5.85 2.24 0 12.37 
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While the coded aggregate, terrorism, and espionage dependent variables all converge 
successfully with a ZINB model, the cyber attack measure was unable to find convergence.  This 
is attributed to the extremely rare nature of the event; out of 3,754 events, only 14 country-years 
experienced an attack.  Of those 14 country-years with an event, only the United States in 2009 
was targeted for more than one cyber attack.  Given the exceptionally rare nature of cyber 
attacks, and the difficulty experienced by the ZINB in finding convergence, the decision was 
made to make the cyber attack variable dichotomous.  This required changing the finding for the 
United States in 2009 from three cyber attacks to one, the remainder of the variable already 
ranged from 0 to 1. With this transformation, the cyber attack model was successfully tested 
using a rare event logit.  Rare event logistic models were originally developed by King and Zeng 
(2001) in an effort to aid in the study of extremely rare events, such as war.  The authors note 
that conventional logistic regressions tend to “sharply underestimate the probability of rare 
events,” and are “grossly inefficient for rare events data” (137). 
In addition to convergence difficulty, rare event panel data may encounter a number of 
methodological problems.  For example, the aggregated cyber threat and cyber espionage models 
tested in this research suffer from autocorrelation, as confirmed via the Wooldridge test for panel 
data.  Since AR processes cannot be incorporated into a ZINB estimates at this time, each model 
with autocorrelation includes a lagged version of the dependent variable as a control.    
 Additionally, given that the data is clustered by state, a means of accounting for group-
level variation was undertaken.  In particular, when confronted with clustered or grouped data, 
many scholars rely on fixed or random effects models (Clark and Linzer 2012).  A series of 
spatial and temporal controls were added to test whether a fixed or random effects model would 
be preferred.  The results of a Hausman specification test affirm that fixed effects models are a 
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better fit.  Unfortunately, ZINB and rare event logistic estimates are unable to accommodate 
fixed effects.18  Additionally, according to Allison (2009), “in applications where the within-
person variation is small relative to the between-person variation, the standard errors of the fixed 
effects coefficients may be too large to tolerate” (cited in Williams 2012, 2).  This also applies to 
the present study, where measures such as polity, freedom of speech, and international conflicts 
vary little or not at all within states, but vary substantially across units.  Given that the rare event 
models take into account the excessive number of zeros in the dependent variable, and the small 
within-group variation that exists across many of the model variables, the standard ZINB and 
rare event logit models were deemed to be the optimal choices.19   
  A Ramsey reset test also confirms the models suffer from omitted variable bias.  
However, the significance of this test was expected given that the theoretical framework utilized 
in this research is based on the study of a different phenomenon.  While studies of both physical 
and digital aggression would likely include similar political, economic, and social variables, 
there simply must be additional factors that make a state the target of a cyber threat that have no 
bearing on physical terrorism.  For example, measures of government and private funding 
dedicated to network security, offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, and other cyber-
                                                 
18 An attempt was made to run a negative binomial model with dummy variables for the different country codes.  
Unfortunately, this model proved to be too complex for STATA.  Paul Allison notes this technique is a means of 
applying fixed effects to rare event panel data, but admits it “can be computationally demanding for conventional 
software if the number of individuals is large” (Allison 2012).  Table A.1 in Appendix A reports the results of a 
fixed effects logit model, and the original rare event logit.  The results are largely similar, aside from a shift in 
significance for the military size measure. 
19 Table A.2 in Appendix A provides the results of the fixed effects models, many of which demonstrate a difference 
in both indicator sign and significance when compared to the ZINB models.  However, given the benefits of the 
ZINB model and the excessive number of zeros in the dependent variable, the zero-inflated negative binomial was 
deemed to be the more appropriate specification for this analysis. 
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exclusive factors are not the focus of terrorism targeting studies and thus are not included in this 
paper.  Additionally, it must be acknowledged that the data necessary to measure many of those 
attributes are either notoriously unreliable or unavailable for scholars (van Dijk 2005).  Given 
that this is the first attempt at quantifying the study of cyber threat targeting and the framework 
is based upon the study of a similar yet physical form of aggression, certain targeting 
characteristics are bound to be omitted.  Omitted variables may thus be one of the limitations 
inherent in studies of phenomena that have received scant empirical attention in the past and in 
relatively new fields of research.  Further research with new data will hopefully overcome this 
limitation. 
Finally, each model was tested using a variance inflation factor (VIF) test, to ensure that 
correlation among the variables was not present.  No serious correlation was found, particularly 
among the economic measures or the regime type/political freedoms measures. 
 Results & Discussion 
ZINB & Rare Event Logistic Results 
 The analysis results are presented in Table 2.2.  Much like a logistic regression, 
additional techniques are required to interpret the impact of each independent variable in a ZINB 
and rare event logistic regression.  A host of different statistical tools are used to interpret 
coefficients, from incidence rate ratios (Savun and Phillips 2009) to more complex Monte Carlo 
simulations (Piazza 2011).  For the purposes of this research, factors and marginal effects were 
utilized in providing an accurate interpretation of the coefficients (Dreher et al. 2010; Santifort-
Jordan and Sandler 2014), and provide the predicted number of events at varying levels 
(typically a standard deviation increase) of the specified independent variable.  Because the 
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number of state/year combinations, however, it is unrealistic to specify the marginal effects for 
each.  As a result, the global mean of the independent variables will be substituted for many of 
the analyses.  However, it should be noted this technique only provides an estimate of the 
“average state” and may not necessarily reflect the targeting likelihood of a particular state.  To 
aid in interpretation and to demonstrate the wide variation between the means of an average state 
and those of the United States, specialized marginal effects are reported throughout.20   The 
following section will discuss the statistical findings of the regressions, and the next section will 
provide additional discussion, particularly highlighting how these findings compare to those of 
the terrorist targeting literature. 
The results of the analyses demonstrate varying support for the hypotheses, dependent 
upon the particular cyber threat being studied.  The first hypothesis, focusing on the relationship 
between GDP per capita and cyber threats, receives varying support across the four models.   
While the first model is statistically insignificant, the second model indicates that a one percent 
increase in GDP per capita will increase the number of cyber attacks by a factor of 2.33.  
Inversely, Model 3 demonstrates that a one percent increase in GDP per capita results in a 
decrease in cyber terrorism cases by a factor of 0.71.  Surprisingly, GDP per capita is a 
statistically insignificant factor for states being targeted with cyber espionage, suggesting that a 
robust economic atmosphere is not necessarily attractive to those states, groups or individuals 
seeking to steal private information.   
Concerning the substantive effects, the use of marginal effects sheds more light on the 
relationship between a robust economy and cyber threat targeting.   For example, despite the  
 
                                                 
20 Marginal effects graphs for the four models can be found in Appendix A. 
48 
 
Table 2.2 Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial & Rare-Event Logit Results 
 Model 1 
Aggregate Cyber 
Model 2 
Cyber Attacks 
Model 3 
Cyber Terrorism 
Model 4 
Cyber Espionage  
Inflated Negative Binomial 
GDP Per Capita (Logged) 
0.14 
(0.93) 
0.85** 
(2.06) 
-0.35* 
(-1.78) 
0.34 
(1.23) 
Military Size (Logged) 
0.55*** 
(3.97) 
1.43** 
(2.30) 
0.02 
(0.10) 
1.27*** 
(6.68) 
Polity 
-0.13*** 
(-3.90) 
0.07 
(1.15) 
-0.19*** 
(-3.43) 
-0.13* 
(-1.68) 
Freedom of the Press 
1.66*** 
(3.66) 
-0.10 
(-0.12) 
2.04*** 
(2.69) 
2.45*** 
(2.58) 
International Conflicts 
0.42 
(0.74) 
0.68 
(1.02) 
0.80** 
(2.02) 
-0.05** 
(-2.13) 
Lagged D.V. 
0.02 
(1.49) 
- - - - - - 
0.05** 
(2.03) 
Media Bias (Logged) 
0.18 
(1.12) 
-0.45 
(-1.47) 
0.77*** 
(3.56) 
-0.38*** 
(-3.33) 
Constant 
-11.59*** 
(-4.12) 
-26.63*** 
(-2.83) 
-6.50** 
(-2.13) 
-19.79*** 
(-4.97) 
Inflated     
GDP Per Capita (Logged) 
-0.24 
(-0.96) 
- - - 
-0.90*** 
(-3.32) 
-0.57 
(-0.61) 
Military Size (Logged) 
0.50 
(1.34) 
- - - 
-0.13 
(-0.28) 
1.98*** 
(2.76) 
Polity 
-0.18** 
(-2.08) 
- - - 
-0.21* 
(-1.79) 
-0.46 
(-1.34) 
Freedom of the Press 
2.84*** 
(3.46) 
- - - 
3.54*** 
(2.91) 
8.75* 
(1.75) 
International Conflicts 
0.43 
(0.68) 
- - - 
1.13** 
(1.88) 
-1.04 
(-0.98) 
Lagged D.V. 
-2.11** 
(-2.26) 
- - - - - - 
-1.54*** 
(-2.57) 
Media Bias (Logged) 
-0.93*** 
(-2.67) 
- - - 
-0.55 
(-1.40) 
-3.57*** 
(-3.56) 
Constant 
3.04 
(0.60) 
- - - 
11.96** 
(2.10) 
5.14 
(0.62) 
Model N 2,650 2,771 2,771 2,650 
(z statistics in parentheses)  * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
statistically insignificant ZINB result, when testing the aggregate cyber data using global 
averages, the marginal effects show an increase of one percent in GDP per capita results in an 
increase in cyber threats by .3 percent.  This finding is significant at the 10% level.  For the 
United States, the impact of GDP per capita is more robust and significant at the 1% level of 
confidence: an increase in 1 percent in GDP per capita results in a 70 percent greater probability 
of a cyber threat.  Marginal effects also shed more light on Model 2, which suggests a positive 
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relationship between economic robustness and cyber attack targeting.  When modeling global 
averages, a state would experience a 90% percent growth in cyber attacks for every 1 percent 
increase in GDP per capita.  The United States would expect to see a similar increase in cyber 
attacks with every one-percent increase in GDP per capita.  These findings broadly suggest that 
states with more robust economies are targets of state-sponsored cyber attacks.  Additionally, 
increases in GDP per capita are shown to reduce cases of cyber terrorism.  While the global 
marginal effects are insignificant, a one-percent increase in America’s GDP per capita reduces 
cyber terrorism cases by 20%.  The notion that increases in GDP per capita increase cyber attack 
targeting but decrease cyber terrorism targeting is interesting.  It is possible that the resources 
that states devote towards defending against cyber attacks make it easier to defend against less 
sophisticated forms of cyber terrorism.  In other words, states are able to overcome targeting 
hardening but non-state actors may have more difficulty.  Finally, as expected, a one-percent 
increase in GDP per capita increases cyber espionage in the United States by 130%.   
The second hypothesis investigates the relationship between cyber threats and military 
size.  Three of the four analyses have statistically significant results and support the theoretical 
framework behind the hypothesis.  In particular, Models 1, 2, and 4 demonstrate that an increase 
in military size increases the number of cyber threat cases by a factor of 1.73, 4.18, and 3.56 
respectively.  Using marginal effects and global averages, a one percent increase in military size 
would result in a .04 percent increase in total cyber threat cases.  This increase jumps to 54 
percent when U.S. averages are substituted.  In Model 2, the marginal effects show that a one 
percent increase in the mean state military size results in a 143 percent increase in cyber attacks.  
Although considering the average state only sustains .004 cyber attacks a year, this increase is 
rather marginal.  For Model 3, despite the insignificant ZINB result, marginal effects with U.S. 
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averages show that a one percent increase in military size results in 15 percent increase in cyber 
terrorism, or an additional .44 cases during a typical year.  Finally, the marginal effects with U.S. 
averages for Model 4 predict that a one percent increase in military size results in 831 percent 
more cyber espionage cases.  Since the United States sustains 3.4 cyber espionage cases on 
average per year, a one percent increase in military size could translate into almost 25 additional 
cyber espionage events.  Surprisingly, the marginal effects with global averages were not 
significant, indicating that states with large armies are the target of cyber espionage far more 
often than the “typical” state.  
The third hypothesis seeks to determine the impact of regime type on cyber threat 
targeting.  Model 1 shows that a one point increase in the Polity IV scale decreases total cyber 
threat cases by a factor of .88.  Models 3 and 4 also show a similar pattern, as an increase in 
Polity results in decreased cases of cyber terrorism and espionage by a factor of .83 and .88, 
respectively.  The marginal effect results largely reassert the inverse relationship demonstrated 
by the ZINB models.  For example, if the United States were to decline by one point on the 
Polity IV scale, it may experience an additional .26 cyber terrorism cases.  In other words, these 
results show that increased democratic participation may reduce cyber targeting, which does not 
support the hypothesis framed previously. 
These findings do, however, mirror a small subset of the terrorism literature which finds 
that democratic states experience a decline in violence.  When combining a negative binomial 
model with the ITERATE database, Eyerman (1998) found that democracies experience fewer 
terrorist attacks than non-democracies.  Additionally, Li (2005) models the heterogeneity that 
exists between democratic regimes and finds that democratic participation reduces the number of 
terrorist events.  The present study supports this strain of the physical terrorism literature as 
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democratic states do not experience as many cyber terrorism events as their autocratic 
counterparts. These results will be discussed further in the next section. 
The fourth hypothesis tests a subsidiary of the terrorist literature focused on the freedom 
of expression within governments.  Eubank and Weinberg (2001) claim that terrorism is more 
likely in democratic states due to the freedom of movement and expression afforded to its 
citizens, but Whitten-Woodring (2009) points out that not all democracies have the same level of 
freedoms.  The theoretical assertion by Whitten-Woodring that increasing freedoms lead to 
higher levels of violence is largely supported by the present analysis.  To test this hypothesis, a 
3-point scale ranging from no freedom of speech to absolute freedom of speech is employed, and 
finds that an increase in the freedom of expression also increases cyber threats in general, as well 
as cyber terrorism and cyber espionage.  More specifically, an increase in one point on the scale 
increases the number of cyber threats, terrorism, and espionage by a factor of 5.26, 7.69, and 
11.59 respectively. 
The marginal effects also largely reflect the conclusions of the three significant models.  
In particular, when employing U.S. means, a decline from a 2 to a 1 on the freedom of speech 
scale reduces the number of aggregate cyber threats by 6.5 annual events.  While Model 2 does 
not produce a significant finding, the nuances of marginal effects demonstrate that an increase of 
one point on the scale decreases the number of cyber attacks on the average state by 0.1 events.  
A similar result is produced when substituting U.S. averages.  For Model 3, the global marginal 
effects show that only those states coded as having no freedom of speech are statistically more 
likely to experience cyber terrorism.  Finally, the marginal effects for Model 4 vary somewhat 
from the ZINB findings.  For example, the results using global averages are all statistically 
insignificant, signaling that the freedom of speech has no relationship on cyber espionage 
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targeting.  When substituting U.S. averages, the results demonstrate that only states with absolute 
freedom of speech are statistically likely to be targeted for cyber espionage.  This may suggest 
that there is a link between freedom of expression and the type of robust R&D that is likely to be 
a target of cyber espionage. 
The fifth hypothesis investigates the proposed relationship between interstate conflict and 
cyber threat targeting.  Unlike the other independent variables, this one seeks to determine the 
influence of foreign policy on the likelihood of targeting.  The results show mixed support for 
the hypothesis that an increase in the number of international conflicts would result in an 
increase of cyber threats.   The hypothesis is supported by Model 3, suggesting that states 
engaged in more armed conflicts abroad are likely to experience an increase in cyber terrorism 
by a factor of 2.23.  However, Model 4 shows that states engaged in more conflicts will 
experience fewer cases of cyber espionage.  In particular, engaging in one additional armed 
conflict will decrease the number of cyber espionage by a factor of 0.95. 
The final set of marginal effects produce particularly robust findings, and provide insight 
into the models that were not outwardly significant.  For example, the marginal effects with U.S. 
averages of Model 1 demonstrates that moving from zero conflicts to one will increase the 
number of total cyber threats by 3.9 cases.  When employing global means, the marginal effects 
of Model 2 show that engaging in one additional armed conflict will increase the number of 
cyber attacks by 0.7 cases.  Marginal effects with U.S. averages are statistically insignificant, 
however.  For Model 3, marginal effects with U.S. averages shows that moving from zero 
conflicts to one will increase the number of cyber terrorism events by 0.7 cases, while the results 
with global averages are all statistically insignificant.  Finally, the results for Model 4 with U.S. 
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averages demonstrate that engaging in one additional conflict will reduce cyber espionage by an 
average of 0.8 cases.   
 Discussion 
The results of this analysis provide some interesting insights into the nature of cyber 
threat targeting, as well as expanding upon the similarities and differences between cyber threat 
and physical terrorism targeting.  As expected, the results demonstrate that the terrorism 
literature cannot be used as a “one size fits all” theoretical foundation for the broad study of 
cyber threat targeting.   And while the theory did not explain all of the models, it provides the 
foundation for building cyber specific theory for different types of cyber threats.  Thus, the 
inability to demonstrate a statistically significant finding to support a hypothesis is, in this case, 
an opportunity to learn about those social, political, and economic factors that increase targeting 
likelihood.  This paper and the results produced provide future researchers with a springboard to 
test their own theories without solely relying on the terrorism literature as a guide. 
 More succinctly, this analysis demonstrates the varying characteristics that lead to states 
becoming targets of cyber attacks, cyber terrorism, and cyber espionage.  The cyber literature, 
with statistical evidence produced by this analysis, provides further evidence that the mentality 
behind the use of cyber threats may vary to a high degree.  For example, looking solely at the 
regression results, states that experience a decrease in GDP per capita, those that are more 
autocratic with higher levels of freedom of speech, and engage in more international armed 
conflicts are more likely to experience cyber terrorism.  This is in contrast to those states faced 
with cyber espionage, which have larger armies, are more autocratic with some freedom of 
speech, and fewer international conflicts.  Given these findings, it is becoming increasingly clear 
that cyber attacks, cyber terrorism, and cyber espionage may use the same digital network as a 
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venue through which to operate, but the targets of those attacks and their intended goals are 
somewhat diverse. 
In terms of the model results, the outcomes are varied and many find support in both the 
terrorism and cyber literatures, despite the fact that they did not always adhere to the expected 
direction of significance.  For example, the finding that an increase in GDP per capita may lead 
to a decrease in cyber terrorism is similar to the results reported in Li (2005), who found that the 
level of economic development of a country (measured via GDP per capita) reduces the 
likelihood of being targeted for a transnational terrorist attack.  This finding opposes the larger 
terrorism literature, specifically Tavares (2004) and Piazza (2008a) who find that wealthier 
nations are more likely to experience terrorist attacks. However, while cyber terrorism does not 
necessarily follow the same trajectory of physical terrorism, it should be noted that an increase in 
GDP per capita does significantly impact the likelihood of cyber attack targeting.  This suggests 
that wealthier nations may invest more into computer network defense, which can deter terrorist 
organizations that often rely upon rudimentary forms of cyber terrorism such as denial of service 
attacks.  However, the results show that the level of network defense capable of deterring cyber 
terrorists is not necessarily enough to deter nation-states from launching more sophisticated 
attacks.  
In contrast to GDP per capita, military size appears to attract both cyber terrorism and 
cyber espionage.  These results suggest that terrorist organizations are unable to compete directly 
with large, physical armies on the conventional battlefield.  Thus, terrorist groups may choose to 
target the militarily superior foes in less conventional areas, such as the digital network many 
large armies rely upon for communication, tactical preparation, and information storage.  Cyber 
terrorism attacks allow weaker groups to enact varying degrees of damage against a numerically 
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superior foe that would have otherwise been impossible to perform through physical force.  
Additionally, states and groups that use cyber espionage also target states with larger militaries.  
This suggests that states with large militaries may also have advanced technology that other 
states covet.  These include advanced forms of communication, more efficient weaponry, and 
advanced means of troop transport and deployment.  Such technologies may very well be the 
target of cyber espionage cases.  Additionally, groups and states may target the network 
infrastructures of states with large militaries seeking to find weaknesses or sensitive tactical 
information such as troop deployment schedules and future battle plans.  A particularly 
successful case of cyber espionage could give a numerically disadvantaged, smaller nation a 
tactical advantage against a numerically-superior foe. 
In addition to military size, the finding related to polity provides insight into the use of 
cyber threats against autocratic regimes.  For example, the cyber terrorism results suggest that 
digital weapons such as distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks are a tool of the repressed.  
For subjugated individuals in autocratic regimes without recourse through traditional politics and 
nonviolent demonstrations, cyber terrorism provides an opportunity to effectively challenge their 
stronger and better-equipped political opponents (Lichbach 1998).  According to Still (2005), 
politically-motivated cyber tactics “show the general public and the media that they are standing 
up against the establishment to protect the rights of people around the world that are endangered 
by national or corporate oppression and greed” (2).  In many regards, Still’s assertion of cyber 
terrorism tactics compliments Li’s (2005) theoretical argument that, “democratic participation 
reduces transnational terrorism [by increasing] satisfaction and political efficacy of citizens, 
reduces their grievances, thwarts terrorist recruitment, and raises public tolerance of 
counterterrorist policies” (294). 
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The findings related to regime type are coupled with the freedom of speech and press 
measure.  For example, the regime type finding suggests that autocratic states are more likely to 
experience cyber terrorism.  While the ZINB results for Model 3 show a significant and positive 
relationship, the marginal effects with global means demonstrate that only those states coded as a 
0, which indicates complete government dominance over media, are statistically likely to be 
targeted for cyber terrorism.  Thus, given the polity findings, we can speculate that autocratic 
states that suppress freedoms of speech are likely to experience more cyber terrorism than their 
democratic counterparts, further bolstering the assertion that cyber terrorism could be a weapon 
of the repressed. 
Finally, the armed conflict involvement measures provide insight into the impact of 
foreign policy decisions and targeting likelihood.  For example, Model 1 shows that if the United 
States were to engage in one interstate armed conflict, it could expect to be targeted for 
additional cyber threats.  This result may give policymakers an additional factor to consider 
when contemplating whether to engage in interstate conflict: not only must they contemplate the 
security vulnerability of the troops being sent into battle, vital domestic network infrastructures 
may also be put into harm’s way.  Given the findings of the analysis, the U.S. should be 
particularly concerned about cyber terrorism and cyber espionage if armed conflict were to break 
out.  Interestingly, the results for the interstate conflict measure were robust primarily when 
using U.S. averages, lending evidence to the notion that foreign policy decisions such as armed 
conflict engagement may only impact the domestic digital networks of global or regional 
military hegemons.    
Perhaps most importantly for future quantitative analysis, this paper demonstrates the 
danger of studying cyber threats as a “group phenomena” without acknowledging the distinctive 
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characteristics of cyber attacks, cyber terrorism, and cyber espionage.21  As the results clearly 
show, the predictors across each model are not uniformly significant or signed.  For this reason, 
one could not accurately posit that the results of Model 1 are representative of targeting state 
characteristics.  If such an assertion was made, one would mistakenly believe that military size 
had a statistically significant impact on cyber terrorism targeting, or that GDP per capita was not 
a significant indicator of cyber attacks.  Instead, researchers must acknowledge the nuances in 
the qualitative cyber literature, and apply those differences when categorizing the different types 
of cyber threats for analytical study.  Failing to do so puts researchers in danger of committing a 
type one or type two error. 
 Conclusion 
In order to obtain a more complete understanding of the threat posed to digital networks 
by cyber attacks, cyber terrorism, and cyber espionage, scholars must use every tool at their 
disposal.  This includes large-N, quantitative analyses as well as exploring examples of security 
vulnerabilities from past technological innovations.  As alluded to in the first chapter, the 
vulnerabilities in many revolutionary forms of communication have been exploited by actors 
seeking advantages over rivals.  For example, the radio transmissions of the United States were 
intentionally jammed by the Soviet Union as a means of limiting communication and preventing 
the spread of free information. The jamming of U.S. and other Western radio signals by the 
Soviets was part of the broader ideological and strategic struggle between the two powers.  This 
historic example demonstrates that factors such as government ideology and power struggle 
                                                 
21 In a similar fashion, Young and Findley (2011) found that research which combines international and domestic 
terrorism definitions may provide incorrect or inconclusive findings.  In an attempt to prevent such problems, a 
variety of tactics have been developed to parse international from domestic terrorism cases (Enders et al. 2011). 
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could potentially increase the likelihood of state targeting through the vulnerabilities of other 
technological innovations.  More broadly, the historical investigation shows that while the 
characteristics of those states targeted for cyber threats are unique, the broad problem of 
communication vulnerabilities and the notion that state characteristics may increase targeting are 
not necessarily unique.   
Keeping historical examples in mind, the goal of this chapter was to determine if state 
characteristics increase the likelihood of targeting through a 21st century form of communication.  
By using a comprehensive dataset of cyber threats spanning 20 years, we can now provide a 
more accurate picture of those economic, political, and social characteristics likely to make a 
state the target of a digital attack.  Additionally, the quantitative analysis conducted here further 
reinforces the categorization of cyber threats already present in the qualitative literature.  Future 
quantitative studies should acknowledge those differences and incorporate them in order to help 
ensure the most accurate results possible. 
Future studies can also build upon the work established here by continuing to gather and 
analyze cyber data.  Although it is exceptionally difficult to do, one vital step in building a robust 
cyber dataset would be to incorporate the sources of cyber attacks, cyber terrorism, and cyber 
espionage.  By only studying the targets of the threats, we are restricting our understanding of 
this phenomena to one side of a dyadic relationship.  Once the source of these threats can be 
accurately identified, more robust directed dyadic studies can be performed.  Additionally, more 
accurate measures of factors such as Internet penetration may be included as an independent 
variable or control.  While there is a healthy literature linking Internet usage to both economics 
and polity, a singular measure of Internet usage would certainly aid in clarifying the impact it has 
on cyber targeting.  Despite the fact that Internet penetration data does exist, it is exceptionally 
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unreliable and the number of missing cases would have further limited the analysis conducted 
here.  According to van Dijk (2005), “most survey data on computer and Internet penetration or 
use are too unreliable and invalid for us to be able to draw definite conclusions from them” (46).   
Additionally, the analysis could benefit from a more robust measure of press and speech 
freedom.  The measure used in this paper only categorized states based on a three-point scale, 
which overlooks many nuances in government control of media and the rights of private citizens 
to protest, assemble, and speak publicly.  While the Freedom House measure of press freedom 
includes many of these nuances, it would also limited the temporal range of the study.  Given the 
relatively new nature of cyber threats, a broad temporal range was desired to fully capture the 
maximum number of events as possible.    
In terms of the results provided in this paper, future researchers should also delve deeper 
into the individual components of the analysis and help determine the causal mechanisms behind 
their significance.  For example, what are the specific motivating factors behind hackers that 
choose to attack autocratic states more often than their democratic counterparts?  This is another 
facet of cyber studies that could be aided by the terrorism literature, which has already invested 
significant research studying similar questions. 
Ultimately, the quantitative study of cyber threats is a vital component of understanding a 
new generation of international security threats.   Instead of focusing attention on defining what 
cyber threats are or what their effects may be, as a vast majority of the present literature does, 
this papers helps to fill one of the substantial quantitative gaps that currently exists.  By relying 
on the unique dataset compiled for this project, research on cyber threats can now generalize 
beyond isolated events and seek to predict under what economic, political and social conditions 
cyber attacks, cyber terrorism, and cyber espionage are likely to occur.  The endeavor to study 
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such an abstract security threat may seem like a daunting task, but it is a necessary one to protect 
the vital digital networks that so many rely upon for basic social services.  
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Chapter 3 - International Rivalry and Cyber Attacks 
In the early months of 2013, the malicious spying software known as “MiniDuke” was 
deployed against Romania as well as a handful of other NATO countries.  Once it was 
discovered by Romanian security experts, the software was immediately attributed to a rival 
nation, most likely one from the former Soviet Union (Patran 2013).  This case was preceded by 
the high-profile Stuxnet virus used to temporarily disable Iranian nuclear facilities.  The 
discovery of the virus by Iranian scientists led to a series of accusations by Iranian military 
officials, most of which were pointed towards Israel and the United States, both rivals of the 
Middle Eastern nation (Reuters News Agency 2011).  Finally, in 2007, Estonia was targeted for a 
series of digital assaults that knocked government websites, including the Estonian president’s 
own site, offline.  The country declared it was the first victim of cyber warfare, and immediately 
Estonian officials accused its northern rival, Russia, for the attacks (Myers 2007).  As these cases 
demonstrate, cyber threats against national governments are often initially suspected to be the 
actions of a competing state.   
The presence of conflict within rivalries has long been a focus of research in international 
relations.  International rivals, states that view one another as competitors and enemies, have 
been found to engage in militarized disputes and wars more frequently than their non-rival 
counterparts (Colaresi et al. 2007; Dreyer 2012).  While rival states are more likely to engage in 
armed conflict, a new form of violence has arisen that may also be used between antagonistic 
actors.  This new form of assault, known collectively as cyber threats, involve the use of 
computer and network technology to disrupt or damage the information technology resources of 
a targeted state.  Despite the fact that a full-scale cyber war has never occurred, and given their 
propensity for conflict, one must wonder if states engaged in rivalries are more likely to be 
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targeted for cyber threats than neutral states.  In order to shed light on this contemporary security 
issue, this study incorporates quantitative data on international cyber threats from 1990 to 2009 
to determine if states engaged in rivalries are more prone to suffer cyber threats than non-rival 
states.   
This paper will proceed in six parts.  First, a review of the rivalry and cyber literatures 
will demonstrate trends within each respective field of study, and how the analysis conducted in 
this paper fills gaps in each.  The second section will provide the theoretical framework 
employed to understand the use of cyber threats within international rivalries.  That section is 
followed by the research design, a report of the regression results, and a brief discussion of those 
results.  The final section concludes, and offers direction for further research. 
 Literature Review 
The international relations literature addressing interstate rivalries is particularly robust, 
especially when compared to the social science literature on cyber threats.  Maoz and San-Akca 
(2012) parse the rivalry literature into three broad categories: the conditions that impact the 
frequency of conflict within rivalries (Conrad 2011; Findley et al. 2012; Maoz and San-Akca 
2012; Vasquez 1995), the issues that lead to armed conflict (Colaresi and Thompson 2002; 
Rasler and Thompson 2006; Vasquez 1996) and the termination of rivalries (Bennett 1996; 1997; 
1998; Goertz and Diehl 1995).  This paper fits into the first category, but with a twist.  Namely, 
instead of simply studying the frequency of armed conflict within rivalries, this study seeks to 
identify new types of force, less deadly than armed combat, that may be used against states 
embroiled in an international dispute.  To do so, this study must first outline the scholarship that 
explores the use of conflict between interstate rivals, encompassing both armed conflict and 
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more subtle forms of violence.  Additionally, a brief overview of the social science cyber 
literature will be provided.  
The use of force among interstate rivals has been addressed by a wide range of studies.  
Notably, many scholars choose to frame “force” between rivals in the form of traditional armed 
conflict (Goertz and Diehl 1993; Hensel 1996; Maoz and Mor 1996).  While the use of 
conventional armed force is the most visible outlet of aggression between interstate rivals, 
Conrad (2011) differs from the traditional literature in his claim that the, “potential for 
militarized conflict, rather than armed physical conflict itself, can drive a state’s consideration to 
use alternative forms of military force” (532).  The author posits that alternative uses of force 
may include state-sponsored terrorism, a form of violence that had been largely overlooked in 
the rivalry literature.  By analyzing the annual number of transnational terrorist attacks that occur 
in all countries between 1975 and 2003, Conrad determined that states involved in ongoing 
rivalries were victims of more attacks than states that were not part of an ongoing rivalry.  
Because the attribution of state-sponsorship in terrorism is exceptionally difficult, Conrad was 
only able to look at the target of such attacks, rather than investigating rivalry violence in the 
more traditional dyadic setup.  However, given the findings, the author concludes, “logically, 
states involved in these hostile relationships are also likely to sponsor more terrorist attacks than 
states not involved in rivalries” (Conrad 2011, 546). 
Conrad’s question of whether states in a rivalry use alternative forms of violence has 
prompted additional scholarship on the matter.  Findley et al. (2012) posit several reasons why 
rival states might use terrorist groups as a proxy for armed conflict.  Most notably, the use of 
terrorist groups may help to “manage the strategic and political costs of rivalries,” while 
traditional armed conflict is often viewed as costly and uncertain (236).  The use of terrorism not 
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only exacts real costs on the target through casualties and counterterrorism expenses, but it also 
has the potential to have positive domestic ramifications for politicians that support terrorist 
actors.  For example, government officials may align themselves with terrorist organizations that 
garner popular support or sympathy in the country.  In an analysis of terror events in politically-
relevant directed dyads from 1968 to 2002, Findley et al. demonstrate that rivalry is a positive 
indicator of transnational terrorism.  The authors conclude by noting their findings, “suggest that 
disputes between states have implications for a security threat – terrorism – that has commonly 
been regarded as a phenomenon driven by economic, political, and social features of individual 
states” (245).  
Maoz and San-Akca (2012) also investigate the relationship between rivalry and 
violence.  However, instead of focusing their analysis on the state sponsorship of terrorism, the 
authors investigate non-state armed groups (NAGs) such as ethnic or religious insurgents as well 
as guerilla organizations.  The authors point out that states and NAGs who share mutual goals 
have several incentives to work together, particularly when the state is engaged in an enduring 
rivalry.  For example, rivalries create opportunities for NAGs to acquire resources in order to 
sustain their operations.  In the same manner, states may be eager to support NAGs as a means of 
imposing costs and inflicting causalities on a rival target.  Examining an original dataset 
encompassing observations for 175 NAGs and 83 state supporters since the end of World War II, 
the authors show that the presence of rivalries increase the likelihood of cooperation among 
states and NAGs.  Additionally, such cooperation is likely to escalate the tension between two 
rival states.  This finding implies that, unlike state-sponsored terrorism and the anonymity that 
comes with such support, the backing of NAGs provide states with a more conspicuous means to 
target rival states. 
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 The three studies conducted by Conrad (2011), Findley et al. (2012), and Maoz and San-
Akca (2012) help demonstrate that rival states may not only engage in elevated levels of armed 
conflict, but they may also experience increased levels of terrorist and NAG attacks.  The use of 
sub-state violence as a surrogate for more deadly state-to-state armed conflict raises the question 
of whether rivals use other forms of low-level violence, such as cyber threats, against their 
enemies.  The term “cyber threat” encompasses a wide array of digital assaults on networked 
resources.  These assaults are typically identified as cyber attacks, cyber terrorism, and cyber 
espionage.  And while the targets and goals of these different forms of digital attack vary, they 
all rely on the same network infrastructure, they are all exceptionally difficult to trace back to the 
original source, and they can all be very effective.  In fact, according to Evans and Whittell 
(2010), the social impact of a successful cyber attack could be the equivalent of “a well-placed 
bomb.”  This analogy was given support by Leon Panetta, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, who 
noted, “A cyber attack perpetrated by nation states or violent extremist groups could be as 
destructive as the terrorist attack of 9/11.  Such a destructive cyber terrorist attack could paralyze 
the nation” (Ratnam 2012, n.p.). 
  In contrast to the interstate rivalry literature, the cyber threat literature is still in its 
relative infancy.  Many of the articles published on the issue rely heavily on anecdotal and 
descriptive evidence.  One notable exception is the research produced by Valeriano and Maness 
(2014), who venture beyond descriptive information to quantify cyber attacks between rival 
states.  The authors point out that deterrence, which plays heavily into conflict-prone rivalries, 
often provoke further conflict and extreme threats (Hensel and Diehl 1994; Vasquez 1993).  As a 
result of the breakdown of deterrence, the authors posit that rivals may be less prone to use acts 
of cyber war due to fears of retaliation.  In the event that cyber attacks are used, their impact 
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would be exceedingly minimal due to deterrence dynamics.  They also hypothesize that most 
cyber attacks should be limited to regional interactions, since the most dangerous rivalries are 
often driven by geographic contiguity (i.e., Russia and Georgia, Pakistan and India, Israel and 
Iran).  In order to test their hypotheses, Valeriano and Maness build a dataset of cyber attacks 
using content analysis of the Google News service, and carefully code the suspected source and 
target of the attacks, as well as the nature of attack that was used.  Finally, these attacks were 
compared to the 124 active and ongoing dyadic interstate rivalries from 2001 to 2011.  Their 
analysis demonstrates that only 20 of 124 rivalries have employed cyber attacks, and most of 
those fall into the “lower end in terms of quantity” (17).  Additionally, their statistics show that 
cyber attacks tend to be more common in regions dominated by a major regional power, such as 
China and India. 
While Valeriano and Maness should be commended for their effort and early foray into 
the quantitative study of cyber threats, their analysis has limitations.  For example, the authors do 
not perform statistical tests with control variables that help to establish causality.  Thus, their 
conclusions do not provide researchers with any generalizable results, particularly regarding how 
participation in a rivalry statistically impacts the odds of being targeted for future digital attacks.  
Additionally, the authors use only Klein, Goertz and Diehl’s rivalry data and not Thompson’s 
(2001).  While they note that they are only interested in dyads with the existence of militarized 
conflict, they fail to provide a clear theoretical reason to expect a correlation between past 
military conflict and the use of cyber threats in a rivalry relationship.  Rivals that have not used 
armed conflict frequently may be just as prone to employ cyber weapons as those that have 
resorted to force, and Thompson’s more inclusive rivalry data would have captured and even 
allowed differentiation among these different forms of rivalry. Finally, the authors explore just 
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one type of cyber weapon, cyber attacks, while the possibility exists that rivals use a range of 
cyber weapons against one another.   Despite these shortcomings, Valeriano and Maness have 
provided a thought-provoking addition to both the rivalry and cyber threat literature. 
In sum, while scholars such as Maoz and San-Akca (2012) and Conrad (2011) have 
investigated the use of low-intensity forms of violence within international rivalries, the use of 
digital conflict between rival states has yet been studied using a broad cyber threat dataset.  The 
research conducted by Valeriano and Maness (2014) takes an important first step toward 
building understanding on the issue, but additional work remains to be done.  Most importantly, 
the full range of potential cyber threats need to be analyzed with generalizable empirical 
methods. 
 Theoretical Development 
 As noted in the literature review, scholars largely agree that varying levels of armed 
conflict are common within international rivalries.  As Thompson and Dreyer (2012) point out, 
“rivalry has a greater impact on increasing the probability of warfare than the democratic peace 
has in decreasing the probability of warfare” (17).  While the importance of rivalry is 
unquestioned, scholars still disagree on issues such as the severity of armed attacks and the 
likelihood of conflict throughout the lifetime of an antagonistic relationship.  Furthermore, the 
research conducted by Conrad (2011), Findley et al. (2012), and Maoz and San-Akca (2012) lend 
a unique dimension to the literature by demonstrating that states may use less conventional forms 
of violence, particularly terrorism and guerrilla support, against their enemies as a proxy for 
military combat.  The purpose of this study is to determine if states embroiled in a rivalry also 
experience increased numbers of cyber threats.     
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 Within the rivalry literature, there are two competing means of operationalizing the 
nature and conflict threshold of international antagonistic relationships.  The first, and arguably 
most common, is the original conceptualization of rivalry formulated by Goertz and Diehl (1993) 
(Conrad and Souva 2011).  This definition hinges of four components.  The first is spatial 
consistency: “rivalries consist of the same pair of states competing with each other, and the 
expectation of a future conflict relationship is one that is specific as to whom the opponent will 
be” (Klein et al. 2006).  In other words, the actors in rivalries are states, and all rivalries are 
dyadic.  The second component is duration.  In their original dataset, Klein and Goertz coined 
short-term rivalries as “proto-rivalries,” and were included in the data along with enduring, long-
term rivalries.  For the 2006 dataset, Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006) have dropped proto-
rivalries, choosing instead to classify such relationships as isolated conflict.  The third 
component is a history of armed conflict.  As the authors note, “we saw ‘rivalry relationships’ as 
forming a particular subset of ‘international relations’. We did not focus on ‘relations’ in general, 
but militarized and conflictual ones in particular” (Klein et al. 2006, 334).  Finally, the last 
dimension of rivalries is the concept of linked conflict, in that rival states have a shared history 
that impacts contemporary events, and there is an expectation of conflict in the future. 
 In contrast to the data produced by Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006), which is grounded on 
the assumption that rivals have a history of armed conflict, Thompson (2001) and Thompson and 
Dreyer (2012) operationalize rivalries in a different manner.  According to Thompson (2001), 
Diehl and Goertz’s original dataset and definition of rivalry falters because it, “assumes that a 
fairly substantial amount of militarized disputation must occur in order to create rivalry histories 
and futures” (569).  Thompson disagrees with this approach, because it eschews the relationship 
of two states prior to their first military engagement.  In other words, onset and termination dates 
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of rivalries in datasets such as Diehl and Goertz are too reliant on “formal indicators” or 
historical events that may or may not accurately reflect when suspicions emerged between two 
belligerents.  Thompson suggests a more “holistic” approach by interpreting historical evidence 
and classifying states as rivals based upon their perceptions of one another, and not solely on 
militarized conflict.  Doing so avoids artificially censoring and truncating the rivalry data, 
however the construction of such a dataset also makes it less easily replicable (583).  Thus, 
Thompson sees the coding of rivalries as a process that should categorize some competitors as 
threatening enemies, with a variable outcome that may include a level of explicit conflict ranging 
from hostile public statements to armed conflict.  
 As Conrad (2011) notes, “rivals always want to harm their opponents but are wary of the 
costs and uncertain outcomes associated with going to war, particularly given their ongoing and 
repeated interactions with each other” (534).  Cyber threats, in the same manner as terrorism and 
state-sponsored guerrilla warfare, provide states with the opportunity to harm while potentially 
avoiding the uncertainty of war.  And while the two definitions of what constitute a rivalry may 
differ, they both provide an incentive for the use of cyber threats.  In the Klein, Goertz and Diehl 
definition, rivalry is defined by the presence of both armed conflict and the presence of an 
unresolved issue that precipitated the use of armed violence.  Conrad (2011) points out that, “the 
characterizations of rivalries imply that even if armed conflict ends, the motivations for the 
initial use of force may persist.  In other words, the original grievances that led to armed conflict 
still permeate the relationship” (533).  The existence of this common issue, especially between 
periods of armed violence, may lead rival states to rely upon low-intensity, unconventional 
tactics in an effort to inflict injury upon their enemy and potentially gain an upper hand in the 
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event of another armed confrontation.  Rival states may also be targeted for cyber threats as a 
means of extorting concessions over the unresolved, mutual issue of contention. 
 Inversely, the Thompson and Dreyer rivalry definition is not founded upon a history of 
military conflict or the presence of a single divisive issue; instead it is based upon the presence 
of mutual distrust and shared animosity.  Thompson (2001) “expressly avoids using armed 
conflict as a means of categorizing rivals and notes that rivals can involve ‘latent threats’ rather 
than actual military threats” (in Conrad 2011, 533).  Thus, the possibility exists that both 
policymakers and military planners may rely upon unconventional tactics as a means of inflicting 
injury and damage on their rival’s population, military, and infrastructure. More specifically, 
rival states may use cyber threats as a means of damaging their enemy’s digital infrastructure or 
stealing private information with a reduced chance of discovery, and therefore a reduced chance 
of initiating an unwanted armed conflict.  Thus, the use of cyber threats can undermine a rival’s 
power, while increasing “uncertainty about the origin of the threat” (Kupperman et al. 1982).   
 The difficulty in attribution make cyber threats an optimal means of causing damage on a 
rival with minimal risk of precipitating armed conflict.  According to Wheeler and Larsen 
(2007), “attribution is difficult and inherently limited.  In particular, attackers can cause attacks 
to be delayed and perform their attacks through many intermediaries in many jurisdictions,” thus 
hiding the true identity of the source (ES-2).  This difficulty is attributed to the current 
architecture and policies that seek to govern the Internet.  Hunker et al. (2008) note, “a 
combination of the Internet’s architecture and the evolving administrative and governance 
systems that oversee the Internet make attributing a cyber attack extremely challenging” (5).  In 
fact, attribution can be made more difficult through relatively simple tactics used by the hacker, 
such as deleting network logs, or as a result of system administrators being poorly trained in 
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network security (Hunker et al. 2008).  Further, attribution difficulty is supported by Gordon 
Snow (2011), the Assistant Director of the FBI Cyber Division, who admits that, “the current 
Internet environment can make it extremely difficult to determine attribution.”  Ultimately, this 
characteristic satisfies a role in both rivalry definitions.  For the Klein, Goertz and Diehl 
definition, attribution difficulty provides states with a means of softening their enemy and 
stealing private information during and between periods of armed conflict.  For the Thompson 
and Dreyer definition, cyber threats give states the opportunity to inflict damage on their rival 
target without engaging in full-scale war.  Cyber threats also mirror physical terrorism in that 
they provide the source state with “strategic ambiguity and plausible deniability,” while also 
providing a means of imposing costs on their target (Findley et al. 2012, 237; Conrad 2011). 
 In addition to the difficulty in attributing a cyber threat back to its original source, cyber 
threats can be used as a means of leveling the playing field between rivals of differing military 
power.  This is a common argument made by scholars of state-sponsored terrorism.  Findley et 
al. (2012) note that “state sponsorship of terrorism can enable a state to compensate for strategic 
weakness vis-à-vis rivals,” and that “states lacking the capacity to project traditional military 
power, or lacking strategic military assets, may actively use terrorist proxies to make up for this 
deficit” (237).  Hoffman (2006) reiterates this point: “(terrorist) attacks are considered to be a 
means of offsetting a numerically superior, better-armed, and better-equipped opponent” (155).  
The same logic applies to the use of cyber threats.  The code used to build and deploy cyber 
attack, cyber terrorism, and cyber espionage programs can be relatively cheap (Lewis 2010), they 
can pilfer much larger amounts of private information than physical espionage in a shorter period 
of time, they can substantially impact the economy of a targeted state (Lewis 2011), and they can 
have a devastating impact on civilian morale and military/state operations (Evans and Whittell 
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2010).  In sum, weaker states with less-capable military equipment or those at a numerical 
disadvantage may rely upon unconventional forms of force to weaken their rivals, and help 
balance the terms of the next potential armed engagement. 
 Finally, a common trait among rivals is the large amount of time spent in the absence of 
armed conflict (Conrad 2011).  Even during periods of peace, however, mutual grievances persist 
and the potential for conflict may be higher than non-rivals.  As a result, rival states do not want 
to initiate an immediate armed conflict and must be more selective in their choice of policies 
towards their rival counterpart.  Avenues of conventional diplomacy exist, however “states 
frequently choose additional military options” (Conrad 2011, 533).  With the ever-increasing 
reliance of states on digital networks to control basic social services like communication and 
electric grids, the deployment of cyber threats, in conjunction with terrorism and guerrilla 
support, would potentially give rival states a plethora of non-military options to use during 
periods of relative peace to limit the potential for escalation to armed conflict.  
While a theoretical and tactical justification exists regarding the use of unconventional 
violence in international rivalries, it should be noted that Valeriano and Maness (2014) rely upon 
an alternative theoretical justification for why rival states may avoid such low-level aggression.  
Despite the fact that many cyber threats are difficult to attribute to their source, Valeriano and 
Maness (2014) posit that, “due to the threat of retaliation and the ready possibility of actual 
direct combat, cyber operations will be limited in the international sphere” and between rival 
states (9).  Thus, in contrast to the explanation above and the difficulty in attributing a cyber 
attack to its source (Hunker et al. 2008; Snow 2012; Wheeler and Larsen 2007), states may be 
reluctant to use cyber attacks in an effort to avoid “a conflict spiral and a never ending situation 
of continuous threats.”   
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Despite the assertion that rival states seek to avoid conflict spirals, the use of deterrence 
such as threats of retaliation, alliances and military buildups often fail to obtain concessions from 
their enemy, and in some cases they may provoke further conflict (Hensel and Diehl 1994; 
Vasquez 1993).  While it conflicts with their primary hypothesis, Valeriano and Maness admit 
that deterrence may not stop states from using more limited forms of cyber threats, such as cyber 
terrorism and cyber espionage.  They conclude that, “rivals will tolerate cyberwar operations if 
they do not cross a line that leads directly into the loss of massive life,” which may explain why 
minor acts of terror not directed at largely populated regions are common in international 
rivalries (Valeriano and Maness 2014, 7; Conrad 2011).  Thus far, cyber threats have not been 
responsible for a substantial loss of life, and as noted may be an effective means of aggression 
between antagonistic actors without risking devolving into perpetual armed violence.  This is 
particularly true, since cyber threats can be directed towards specific, non-vital digital networks 
that could cause disruption, and no causalities, in the targeted state.  Their conclusion that rivals 
may tolerate cyberwar operations also supports the present theoretical framework, lending 
anecdotal support to the notion that states acknowledge they may be targeted for digital attack 
while engaged in an international rivalry, but may not respond unless the damage costs cross an 
unknown threshold. 
As the literature review demonstrates, states in an antagonistic relationship are more 
prone to suffer terrorist attacks, and are also more apt to support guerrilla groups as a means of 
inflicting harm to a targeted enemy.  This is founded upon the larger rivalry literature, which 
finds that conflict within antagonistic state relationships are statistically more likely to occur.  
Additionally, the present theoretical framework provides a justification that rival states have an 
incentive to employ cyber threats for a variety of different reasons.  These reasons include 
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inflicting damage on their rival counterpart during and between armed conflicts, providing a 
means of causing harm without engaging in war, plus the deniability and strategic ambiguity of 
cyber threats provides a minimal chance of retribution.  Given the findings on the relationship 
between terrorist acts and rivalry, and the similar benefits of terrorism and cyber threats, we can 
posit: 
H1: States involved in rivalries will experience an increased number of cyber threats. 
Because the most applicable study testing cyber threats and rivalry status, Valeriano and 
Maness, did not assess their findings using a regression analysis, this study will borrow 
components of the research design found in Conrad’s (2011) terrorism study.  The following 
section outlines the methods used to test the hypothesis, and operationalizes the dependent, 
independent, and control variables. 
 Research Design 
 One of the more common estimation strategies in the rivalry literature, particularly those 
studies focused on state-sponsored terrorism and guerrilla group support, is the use of directed 
dyads (Findley et al. 2012).  Other studies, such as Maoz and San-Akca (2012) incorporate triads 
which consist of the non-state armed group, the target of that group, and any potential supporters.  
The use of dyadic and triadic units of analysis are optimal for the study of rivalry, particularly 
because they aid in establishing casual links between indicators and patterns.  They also allow 
researchers to examine the dynamic relationship of both origin countries and target countries 
(Findley et al. 2012).  One of the drawbacks of dyads, or triads for that matter, is the substantial 
amount and accuracy of data required, particularly for the source state.  For terrorism studies, the 
ITERATE dataset provides the nationality of the terrorist group suspected of committing the act 
of violence, giving researchers a better idea of the potential state sponsor of such violent acts.   
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As noted previously, despite the similar benefits between terrorism and cyber threats, it is 
much more difficult to identify the source of most digital assaults.  Thus, while Valeriano and 
Maness do include the purported source of the cyber attacks analyzed in their study, one would 
be wise to approach their data on cyber attacks with caution.  Relying on published news articles 
to supply the source of a cyber threat may lead researchers down the wrong path.  For example, 
as noted previously, in 2007 a series of cyber attacks were launch against Estonia from Russian 
computer networks.  Early published reports, especially those quoting the Estonian foreign 
minister, immediately placed blame for the attacks on the Russian government.  However, as 
more information became available and the attacks were analyzed by professionals, it was 
eventually determined that a group of pro-government Russian youths were responsible for the 
attacks.  While the legitimate source behind the attacks was eventually ascertained, in part 
because of the high-profile nature and attention given the attacks by the international media, the 
true source of many cyber threats remains a mystery.   
Given the exceptionally difficult nature of attributing a cyber threat back to its actual 
source, employing a dyadic unit of analysis to study cyber threats in a rivalry situation may not 
be reliable.  As Conrad (2011) notes in his study of terrorism, “the plausible deniability that 
states enjoy when supporting terrorist activities creates a similar plausible deniability in 
identifying those states for any data collection effort” (536).  It is even more difficult to track 
down the culprit behind cyber activities, and this has a significant impact on the form the unit of 
analysis must take. 
The present analysis thus focuses solely on the states that are targets of cyber attacks 
because target data can be deemed reliable.  To test this paper’s theory, the unit of analysis is the 
total number of cyber threats each state is targeted for each year from 1990 to 2001 or 2009, 
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depending on the measure of rivalry being tested.  The following sections outline the dependent 
and independent variables. 
 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for this study is the aggregated number of cyber threats each state 
sustains per year.  Given that the aim of this research is to determine if states embroiled in 
rivalries sustain an increasing number of cyber threats than their non-rival counterparts, the cyber 
threat measure will not be subdivided into the specific categories of cyber attacks, cyber 
terrorism and cyber espionage.  Theoretically, a rival state could target their enemy with all three 
types of digital assault, each with a specific purpose or means of inflicting economic, political or 
social harm.   
At the time this research was conducted, no comprehensive cyber threat dataset has been 
developed for academic consumption.  Given the sensitive nature of network security logs, many 
large companies and government agencies are reluctant to allow researchers access to their 
network data.  In an effort to exhaust any possible resources of cyber threat data, every branch of 
the U.S. Armed Forces, the FBI, the CIA, the Department of Homeland Security, as well as 
private companies such as Microsoft, Google, Apple, and Symantec were contacted.  All of these 
sources either denied the request for information or refused to return phone calls.  As a result, a 
content analysis of published news reports was used to build a new data collection. 
The cyber dataset employed in this quantitative analysis was assembled by Virtual 
Research Associates using automated content analysis of the Reuters Global News Service.  The 
search was limited to attacks that occurred between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2011.  
Due to the lack of a common vernacular, many search terms were used to ensure the maximum 
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number of cases was collected.  A complete list of the search terms used is available in Appendix 
A.  Ultimately, the raw dataset includes 15,879 cases.   
Once the raw dataset was complete, a process of coding was undertaken to weed out 
redundant cases and those that were not clear examples of cyber threats.  After the raw dataset 
was pared down into potential cases of cyber threats, those were further investigated using the 
LexisNexis service.  This process ensured the remaining cases were indeed examples of a cyber 
threat, and allowed for a clearer idea of who the target was and the legitimacy of the case.  The 
date of the attack was also refined to ensure the correct year was listed for the beginning of the 
threat or its first discovery.  The final, coded dataset used in this analysis contains 240 cases of 
international cyber threats from 1990 to 2009. 
Of course, a content analysis of cyber threat cases creates a variety of problems that must 
be acknowledged.  Perhaps the most blatant is that a successful cyber threat, especially one that 
seeks to steal military or economic secrets, should remain relatively unknown.  The fact that 
knowledge of a cyber threat was published signifies one of three outcomes: an attack was 
originally intended to do harm and the source wanted the target to know of the attack; a failed 
attack was originally intended to remain a secret but was foiled prior to its execution; or a 
successful attack was originally intended to remain a secret, but was discovered after its 
execution.  All three scenarios have been included in the dataset, as it can be concluded that even 
a failed cyber threat was intended by the source to harm the target in some fashion. 
 Independent Variables 
As noted previously, there are two definitions of rivalry that many scholars rely upon for 
their analysis.  The first dataset, compiled by Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006), provides an 
analysis of dyads with three or more militarized disputes from 1816 to 2001.  This dataset is a 
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departure from their previous operationalization of rivalry, eschewing the required minimum 
passage of time (10 years for proto-rivalries and 20 for enduring rivalries).  As a result, the first 
independent variable for this analysis is a dichotomous variable indicating whether a state was in 
an enduring rivalry or not.  The use of a dichotomous measure mirrors the technique used by 
Conrad (2011). 
A second regression will be conducted to test an independent variable based on the 
Thompson and Dreyer (2012) rivalry dataset.  As described earlier, this data is built using a 
historical analysis of state interactions, and thus contains a fewer number of rivalries than the 
Klein, Goertz and Diehl data.  Also unlike the Klein, Goertz and Diehl dataset, the Thompson 
and Dreyer data covers the entire timespan of the dependent variable.  This variable was built 
using the chronological list of rivalries found in the appendix of Thompson and Dreyer (2012).  
Like the first analysis, this variable will be a dichotomous measure of whether each state is 
engaged in at least one rivalry for each year, 1990 to 2001.  
An additional set of regressions will be conducted that divert from Conrad’s study.  
Instead of testing a dichotomous measure of rivalry participation, two variables have been 
created that indicate the total number of rivalries each state is involved in during each year for 
each rivalry definition.  Thus, these independent variables allow the analysis to determine if 
increased rivalry participation leads to increased numbers of cyber threats, as opposed to the 
earlier analyses which simply measure if rivalry participation leads to increased cyber threats.  In 
sum, four different independent variables have been created and will be analyzed to test the 
hypothesis: two dichotomous measures and two count measures.   
It should be noted that the difference in operationalization between the two rivalry 
definitions creates a considerable variance in the number of rivalries each identifies.  For 
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example, Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006) note that they, “code 183 cases that Thompson does not 
identify as rivalries, and Thompson codes 67 cases that we do not.  These cases of disagreement 
are considerable and a nontrivial matter.  The 67 Thompson rivalries that we do not identify 
comprise 39% of his cases, and the 183 rivalries in our data that he does not identify comprise 
63% of our data” (346).  As an example of the discrepancy in coding, Conrad and Souva (2011) 
cite the Nicaragua and Colombia dyad, which Klein, Goertz and Diehl code as a rivalry from 
1994 to 2001.  Thompson, on the other hand, does not consider this dyad to be a rivalry during 
that period of time.  However, he does code the two states are being in an antagonistic 
relationship between 1979 and 1992.  While the purpose of this paper is not to take a position on 
which measurement is more appropriate, analyzing both datasets will provide insight into 
whether past armed conflict or the perception of rivalry impacts the number of cyber threats a 
state is targeted for. 
 Control Variables 
The preceding section provides the two measures necessary to test the hypothesis.  In 
addition, a variety of control variables must be included to ensure the analysis accurately 
captures the impact of rivalry on cyber threat targeting.  Unfortunately, no previous research has 
studied cyber threats in a broad, quantitative manner.  While Valeriano and Maness study the 
connection between cyber attacks and rivalry, they do not test their hypotheses with multivariate 
techniques.  As a result of the lack of past quantitative research, and given the similarities 
between cyber threats and terrorism, this study will rely the terrorism targeting literature as a 
surrogate framework and adapt the common targeting factors as controls.  These controls have 
many similarities to those employed by Conrad (2011). 
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 GPD Per Capita 
Of the many targeting factors studied within the terrorist literature, a state’s economic 
strength is one of the most robust lines of research.  Tavares (2004) and Piazza (2008b) find that 
wealthier nations are more likely to experience terrorist attacks.  Tavares (p 4) notes that one of 
the primary objectives of terrorist groups is to damage the economy of their target and to, 
“impose material cost on the population as a form of pressure on the society as a whole”.  The 
findings of Tavares and Piazza are further backed by Blomberg et al. (2004).   Their analysis 
indicates that democratic nations, in particular those with high incomes, experience high levels 
of terrorist activity. 
Economically developed states may also be prone to cyber threats since they tend to have 
the type of well-developed cyber infrastructure that is vulnerable to attack.  Hawkins and 
Hawkins (2003) found that the 32 economically-robust states that make up the Organization for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) are home to 95% of the world’s Internet 
hosts.  Rogers (2000) also finds that the Internet is primarily concentrated in wealthy and well-
educated urban areas.  Finally, Xiaoming and Kay (2004) demonstrate that per capita wealth is a 
primary factor in determining the spread of the Internet in Asian nations, and there is a strong 
relationship between a state’s GDP and Internet penetration.  They conclude that, “GDP per 
capita indicates a country’s economic strength as well as individual wealth.  The deployment of 
the Internet is a costly venture and only countries with strong economic power are able to build 
the Internet in such a way that it allows access to as many people as possible” (8).22 
                                                 
22 While data on Internet access could be used, it is extremely unreliable (van Dijk 2005). 
81 
 
The logged gross domestic product (per capita) data was taken from the World 
Development Indicators and Global Development Finance (WDI) dataset provided by the World 
Bank (World Bank 2013).  The variable was logged to correct for a skewed distribution. 
 Military Size 
Terrorist actors tend use unconventional means precisely because they do not have the 
economic or military capabilities to challenge states on the traditional battlefield.  For example, 
in a 2001 interview with a leading Gaza Muslim activist, military superiority of the opposing 
force was addressed.  The activist, in defense of the use of suicide terrorism, explained that, “we 
lack the arms [planes, missiles or artillery] possessed by the enemy” (Hoffman 2006, 155).  In a 
summary of the interview, Hoffman notes that “(terrorist) attacks are considered to be a means of 
offsetting a numerically superior, better-armed, and better-equipped opponent.”  In other words, 
organizations that are faced with an opponent equipped with superior military weaponry and 
technology are more likely to use unconventional tactics.  
Cyber threats from both states and sub-state actors may be used in a similar way – they 
challenge and weaken militarily superior actors.  The use of cyber threats by terrorist 
organizations against better-equipped militaries, such as the United States and its allies, was (and 
still is) a particular concern during the protracted “War on Terror.”  According to Vatis (2001), 
“the United States and its allies must operate under the premise that military strikes against 
terrorists and their nation-state supporters will result in cyber attacks against U.S. and allied 
information infrastructures” (21).  In fact, the United States Department of Defense issued a 
report in April 2013 stating that, “as more and more state and nonstate actors gain cyber 
expertise, its importance and reach as a global threat cannot be overstated” (Franzen 2013).  As a 
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result of this new unconventional use of digital force, cyber threats were listed as the most 
pressing danger facing the U.S. in 2013. 
The military size data were obtained from the World Bank WDI dataset (2013), and are 
logged for normality. 
 Regime Type 
 Eubank and Weinberg (1994; 2001), Li (2005), Pape (2003), Rogan (2010) and Savun 
and Phillips (2009) have all investigated the potential link between regime type and terrorist 
attacks.  Eubank and Weinberg (2001) notably point out that, “democracy makes it possible for 
dissident groups of all sizes and shapes to wage campaigns of terrorist violence,” a perspective 
that runs counter to the view that democracies provide a peaceful means of conflict resolution 
(163).  Eubank and Weinberg (1994; 2001) point out, however, that it is not necessarily the 
democratic political process that is responsible for the rise of terrorism, but rather the liberal 
attributes of a democracy (freedom of speech, expression, etc.) that permit dissident groups to 
exist.  Democratic societies have a proclivity to become targets of attack because open societies 
allow terrorist groups to organize and carry out their attack with less chance of being noticed.  
These views are further expanded upon by Li and Schaub (2004) who note that, “…by 
guaranteeing citizen’s political rights and civil liberties, democracy allows terrorist groups much 
greater room to maneuver, lowering the costs and risks for committing terrorism” (242). 
 Different views of the Internet can have a substantial impact on the ease of deploying a 
cyber threat, making government type a vital factor in predicting which states may be a future 
target.  Traditionally, democratic states are far more likely to embrace the Internet as a means of 
communication and free expression (Milner 2006).  As a result of the openness and freedom 
associated with the Internet in democratic states, users have the advantage of visiting any website 
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they wish (within legal limits), have as many email accounts as they want, and open any 
attachment sent to them.  In many cases, it is the responsibility of the end-user to have the 
appropriate security software available to protect their equipment from malicious code. The 
cheap deployment of web connectivity also means an increasing number of industries are 
interconnected, as well as allowing for the digital regulation of water, gas, and other vital 
systems.  While the spread and use of Internet services has opened up new and exciting forms of 
communication and opportunities, it also increases the number of available targets. 
In autocratic states, many leaders believe the Internet’s disadvantages outweigh its 
benefits.  According to Sussman (2000), “45 countries now restrict Internet access on the pretext 
of protecting the public from subversive ideas or violation of national security…they are all 
autocracies.”  Non-democratic ruling institutions also do not necessarily rely on broad public 
support, thus some autocratic regimes largely impede the adoption of technologies perceived as 
threatening (Kalathil and Boas 2003).  Even though many autocratic states are suspicious of the 
Internet and the free exchange of ideas, some have adopted the Web as a means of spreading 
propaganda and improving political control.  For example, China has recognized that, “future 
economic growth…will depend in large measure on the extent to which the country is integrated 
with the global information infrastructure” (Milner 2006).  In order to use the Internet to propel 
national goals, but also limit the free exchange of ideas, the Chinese government has 
implemented firewalls, routers, and filters to limit what its citizens and outside users can view.  
When viewed in a hard/soft target framework, the Internet infrastructure in an autocratic society 
is likely to be considered a “hard target.”  
Due to the unique nature of cyber targets, access to a target must generally be easily 
navigable in order to deliver the virus or other malicious code.  The conduit of access is, in most 
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cases, the Internet itself.  As a result, those using cyber threats must look at how different states 
“harden” access to the Internet and adjust their plans accordingly to attack more easily accessible 
targets.  Thus, regime type and the nature of Internet access and Internet freedom may play a 
crucial role in target selection. 
The regime classification data was provided by the Polity IV Project (Marshall and 
Jaggers 2002).  The Polity IV data measures regime authority on a 21-point scale, ranging from -
10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy).  Among a number of reasons, Polity 
IV data was used for consistency with other conflict studies (Plumper and Neumayer 2010). 
    Population 
 Population is often included in terrorism studies both as a key component of the analysis 
or as a control variable (Krueger and Laitin 2008; Li 2005; Wade and Reiter 2007).  For 
example, Krueger and Laitin (2008) find that population is a statistically significant predictor of 
terrorist origins, as well as a predictor of where terrorism would occur.  Wade and Reiter (2007) 
include total population (logged) as a control, “following the supposition that larger states 
provide more targets and more areas against which to launch suicide terrorist attacks” (239). 
In many regards, a larger population base also creates more opportunities and targets for 
states and non-state actors to attack using cyber threats.  A larger population requires a larger and 
more sophisticated critical infrastructure for basic social services, such as electricity and water 
(FEMA 2011).  Such complex critical infrastructure, particularly those controlled via networked 
workstations, opens up a wide variety of potential targets in which to inflict economic 
devastation.  Additionally, if the goal of hackers is to create confusion and social panic, targeting 
states with robust populations provides a larger audience. 
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The measure of population included in this study, which is recorded in millions and 
logged for normality, comes from the Penn World Table dataset (Heston et al. 2012). 
 Geography 
Li and Schaub (2004), Li (2005) and Savun and Phillips (2009) have all included regional 
variables in their terrorism studies with varying success and significance.  Enders and Sandler 
(2006) investigate geography directly by studying whether political shocks, such as the end of 
the Cold War and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, resulted in increased terrorism in 
low-income countries and regions.  They theorize that the 9/11 attacks resulted in a reduction of 
available, high-level targets in wealthy nations.  As a result, terrorists have sought out targets in 
poor nations and specific regions (particularly the Middle East and Asia) where U.S. interests 
were readily accessible.  Because of the conflicting results of previous studies and the shear lack 
of attention geography has received, Savun and Phillips (2009) state outwardly in their analysis 
that they could not develop a theoretical expectation regarding how regional variation could 
impact the likelihood of terrorism.   
 In this study, geographic measures are included partly as a means of absorbing cultural 
factors such as the adoption of the Internet and other targeted technologies (Savun and Phillips 
2009).  In his discussion of the Internet, David Nye (2006) points out that, “people adapted the 
Internet to a wide range of social, political, economic, and esthetic contexts, weaving it into the 
fabric of experience.  Every culture continues to make choices about what to do with this new 
technology” (63).  Indeed, the physical specifications of the Internet are virtually identical 
throughout the world, but the adoption, adaption, and social construction of the Internet may 
vary extensively due to cultural inclinations. 
86 
 
The inclusion of regional dummies is an established means of absorbing cultural variation 
within the terrorist targeting literature.  As a result, this paper will replicate the technique used by 
Li and Schaub (2004) and include a regional dummy for each continent on the globe, excluding 
Antarctica.  The regional dummies used in this research will differ slightly from those of Li and 
Schaub, as North and South America will be divided into individual indicators.  Given the 
expectation that the United States is the most targeted state in the world, North America will be 
excluded from the analysis and used as a comparison case for the other regional dummies. 
 Media Bias 
Because the independent variable is a content analysis of media reports provided by 
Reuters, a variable is included to control for any potential media bias that may exist in each state.  
The variable is a count of the total number of articles from Reuters concerning each country in 
each year of the analysis (Murdie and Peksen 2013).  The natural log of the control is used for 
normality. 
Table 3.1 below provides the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. 
 Methodology 
 The event data captures a relatively rare event, documented cyber attacks on countries.  A 
series of statistical tests were performed, include Vuong (Vuong 1989) residual plots, and the 
AIC statistics (Long and Freese 2005), all of which confirm that a zero-inflated negative 
binomial is preferable over the standard negative binomial estimate. 
After selecting the ZINB model, tests were conducted to ensure the model was correctly 
specified.  A Durbin-Watson test determined that the model suffers from autocorrelation.  To 
remedy this issue, a single lagged version of the dependent variable was added to the model as a 
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control variable (Davis 2007).23  A variance inflation factor (VIF) test also indicates that no 
serious multicollinearity exists. 
Additionally, given that the data is clustered by state, a means of accounting for group-
level variation was undertaken.  In particular, when confronted with clustered or grouped data,  
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics 
 
                                                 
23 Without the lagged dependent variable, the Durbin-Watson statistic for all five models averaged 0.90.  By 
including the lagged dependent variable as a control in each model, the Durbin-Watson statistic increased to roughly 
2.20. 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Cyber Threats 3,754 .07 .72 0 24 
Klein, Goertz & 
Diehl (Dichotomous) 
2,212 .46 .50 0 1 
Klein, Goertz & 
Diehl (Count) 
2,212 1.10 2.41 0 39 
Thompson 
(Dichotomous) 
3,754 .30 .46 0 1 
Thompson (Count) 3,754 .49 .98 0 6 
GDP per capita 
(logged) 
3,586 7.80 1.64 4.16 12.13 
Military Size 
(logged) 
3,515 10.54 1.87 3.91 15.24 
Regime Type 3,169 2.76 6.75 -10 10 
Total Population – 
2011 (logged) 
3,493 1.91 1.88 -3.20 7.19 
Media Bias (logged) 3,579 5.85 2.24 0 12.37 
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many scholars rely on fixed effects models (Clark and Linzer 2012).  The results of a Hausman 
specification test were statistically significant at the .05 level, indicating that fixed effects should 
be used.  A comparison of a fixed effects and basic ZINB models demonstrate some differences 
in both the significance and signs of the coefficients.  Despite these differences, however, the 
ZINB specification is better suited to the present analysis.  Fixed effects are unable to estimate 
the effect of variables that vary across individuals but not over time.  In the case of the two 
independent variables, some states are in a constant number of rivalries throughout the studied 
period.  Additionally, control variables such as regime type and geography may vary across 
states, but they have little or no within-state variation.  Provided that the ZINB estimation more 
accurately models an excessive number of zeros in the dependent variable, and STATA is unable 
to estimate a ZINB model with fixed effects, the basic ZINB specification was deemed to be the 
optimal choice.24 
Finally, in a fashion similar to a logistic regression, additional techniques are required in 
order to appropriately interpret the results of a ZINB model.  The range of techniques used by 
researchers to interpret similar models include incidence rate ratios (Conrad 2011; Savun and 
Phillips 2009) as well as more complex Monte Carlo simulations (Piazza 2011).  For the 
purposes of this research, two different means of interpretation will be implemented.  For the 
dichotomous measures of the primary independent variables, incidence rate ratios (IRRs) will be 
used.  For the more complex count measures of the independent variables, the regression results 
will be interpreted using IRRs as well as marginal effects (Dreher et al. 2010; Santifort-Jordan 
and Sandler 2014).  In the cases where marginal effects are used, the global mean of the control 
variables will be used to calculate the estimation.  However, it should be noted this technique 
                                                 
24 The fixed effects model results are provided in Table B.1 and Table B.2 in Appendix B. 
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only provides an estimate of the “average state” and may not necessarily reflect the targeting 
likelihood of a particular state.  To aid in interpretation and to demonstrate the wide variation 
between the means of an average state and those of the United States, specialized marginal 
effects are reported throughout.25   
 Results 
Table 3.2 below presents the first set of findings.  Both models incorporate a 
dichotomous measure of rivalry, a technique similar to the analysis conducted by Conrad 
(2011).26  While the analysis conducted by Findley et al., (2012) used dyads as a unit of analysis, 
their primary independent variable is also the presence of a rivalry between two states.  Thus, 
one could consider their independent variable dichotomous as well, given that any given pair of 
states are either in a rivalry or they are not.  Both studies find robust evidence that states in an 
antagonistic international relationship are more likely to sustain increased numbers of terrorist 
attacks than non-rivalry states, and supporting their hypotheses that rivalries can be defined by 
low-level conflict, as well as more deadly armed conflict. 
Unlike the past terrorism studies, the results in the present analysis demonstrate a 
negative relationship between the use of cyber threats and participation in a rivalry.  The first 
model tests the definition of rivalry prescribed by Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006).  The results 
show a state involved in a rivalry will see a decline in the number of cyber threats by a factor of 
                                                 
25 Marginal effects charts for the five models can be found in Appendix B. 
26 Both models are studies of cyber threats from 1990 to 2001.  Despite the fact that the Thompson and Dreyer data 
is coded to 2010, limiting Model 2 allows for a more accurate comparison with the Klein, Goertz and Diehl dataset 
which ends in 2001.   
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.20, holding all over variables constant.  This finding is statistically significant at the 1% level of 
confidence.  The second model, testing the definition of rivalry established by Thompson and  
Table 3.2 ZINB Dichotomous Estimates of Cyber Attack Event Counts 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Coefficient IRR Coefficient IRR 
Inflated Negative Binomial     
Enduring Rivalry – Binary (1990-2001) 
-1.62*** 
(-2.87) 
0.20 - - - - - - 
Strategic Rivalry – Binary (1990-2001) - - - - - - 
-2.33*** 
(-3.57) 
0.10 
GDP per capita (logged) 
-0.01 
(-0.03) 
0.99 
-0.04 
(-0.19) 
0.96 
Military Size (logged) 
-0.37 
(-0.72) 
0.69 
-0.50* 
(-1.80) 
0.61 
Regime Type 
-0.03 
(-0.79) 
0.97 
-0.08** 
(-2.34) 
0.92 
Total Population (logged) 
0.58** 
(2.28) 
1.79 
0.23 
(1.15) 
1.25 
Media Bias (logged) 
1.28* 
(1.86) 
3.60 
2.33*** 
(5.81) 
10.30 
Geography – South America 
-22.83*** 
(-19.87) 
0.00 
-17.90*** 
(-17.22) 
0.00 
Geography – Europe 
-0.87 
(-1.14) 
0.42 
-0.72 
(-1.03) 
0.49 
Geography – Africa 
-26.83*** 
(-26.22) 
0.00 
-23.33*** 
(-24.50) 
0.00 
Geography – Asia 
0.92 
(1.46) 
2.52 
2.65*** 
(4.20) 
14.23 
Geography – Oceania 
1.39** 
(2.16) 
4.01 
1.22** 
(1.98) 
3.39 
Lagged D.V.  
0.01 
(0.64) 
1.01 
-0.01 
(-1.55) 
0.99 
Constant 
-9.79*** 
(-2.82) 
0.00 
-17.07*** 
(-4.87) 
0.00 
Inflated Logit     
State involved in rivalry? – KGD 
-1.27 
(-1.59) 
-1.27 - - - - - - 
State involved in rivalry? – Thompson - - - - - - 
-7.09** 
(-2.19) 
-7.09 
GDP per capita (logged) 
0.54 
(0.95) 
0.54 
1.72** 
(2.06) 
1.72 
Military Size (logged) 
-0.52 
(-0.55) 
-0.52 
-1.93** 
(-2.27) 
-1.93 
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Regime Type 
0.04 
(0.46) 
0.04 
0.09 
(1.29) 
0.09 
Total Population (logged) 
1.70** 
(2.47) 
1.70 
5.31** 
(2.33) 
5.31 
Media Bias (logged) 
-2.14** 
(-2.08) 
-2.14 
-2.51** 
(-2.48) 
-2.51 
Lagged D.V.  
-0.56 
(-1.17) 
-0.56 
-0.35* 
(-1.81) 
-0.35 
Constant 
15.55* 
(1.74) 
15.55 
11.78 
(1.47) 
11.78 
Model N 1,460 1,460 1,463 1,463 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  (Z Scores in parentheses),  Two-Tail Test; (Regional dummies not reported) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 ZINB Count Estimates of Cyber Attacks 
 
 
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Coefficient IRR Coefficient IRR Coefficient IRR 
Inflated Negative Binomial       
Enduring Rivalry – Count (1990-2001) 
-0.20** 
(-2.06) 
0.82 - - - - - - - - -  - - - 
Strategic Rivalry – Count (1990-2001) - - - - - - 
0.35 
(1.36) 
1.42 - - -  - - -  
Strategic Rivalry – Count (1990-2009) - - - - - - - - - - - - 
0.52* 
(1.78) 
1.69 
GDP per capita (logged) 
-0.23 
(-0.57) 
0.80 
-0.66 
(-1.10) 
0.52 
0.20 
(1.33) 
1.22 
Military Size (logged) 
-0.43 
(-0.84) 
0.65 
-1.11** 
(-2.28) 
0.33 
0.01 
(0.03) 
1.01 
Regime Type 
-0.06** 
(-2.01) 
0.95 
-0.06 
(-0.85) 
0.94 
0.04 
(1.17) 
1.05 
Total Population (logged) 
0.25** 
(2.50) 
1.29 
-0.13 
(-0.37) 
1.14 
0.04 
(0.13) 
1.04 
Media Bias (logged) 
1.65*** 
(2.87) 
5.19 
1.98* 
(1.94) 
7.26 
0.44*** 
(3.37) 
1.55 
Lagged D.V.  
-0.05* 
(-1.78) 
0.95 
-0.02 
(-1.24) 
0.98 
0.01 
(0.69) 
1.01 
Constant 
-8.69 
(-1.60) 
.000 
-0.19 
(-0.06) 
0.83 
-7.17*** 
(-2.27) 
0.00 
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Inflated Logit       
Enduring Rivalry – Count (1990-2001) 
-0.21** 
(-1.63) 
-0.21 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Strategic Rivalry – Count (1990-2001) - - - - - - 
0.27 
(1.02) 
0.27 - - - - - - 
Strategic Rivalry – Count (1990-2009) - - - - - - - - -  - - -  
0.45 
(1.56) 
0.45 
GDP per capita (logged) 
0.10 
(0.20) 
0.10 
-0.36 
(-0.57) 
-0.36 
-0.17 
(-0.76) 
-0.17 
Military Size (logged) 
-0.14 
(-0.22) 
-0.14 
-0.81 
(-1.19) 
-0.81 
-0.08 
(-0.18) 
0.08 
Regime Type 
0.04 
(0.67) 
0.04 
0.02 
(0.18) 
0.02 
0.08 
(1.46) 
0.08 
Total Population (logged) 
0.60* 
(1.83) 
0.60 
0.44 
(1.17) 
0.44 
-0.18 
(0.48) 
-0.18 
Media Bias (logged) 
-0.86 
(-1.45) 
-0.86 
-0.44 
(-0.41) 
-0.44 
-0.42* 
(-1.68) 
-0.42 
Lagged D.V.  
-0.71** 
(-2.28) 
-0.71 
-0.82 
(-1.48) 
-0.82 
-1.68 
(-1.49) 
-1.68 
Constant 
8.16 
(1.04) 
7.01 
16.22** 
(2.41) 
16.22 
7.56 
(1.41) 
4.27 
Model N 1,460 1,460 1,463 1,463 2,511 2,511 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  (Z Scores in parentheses),  Two-Tail Test 
 
Dreyer (2012) supports the conclusions from the first model.  The analysis demonstrates that 
rivalries based on the perception of antagonism and not necessarily on a history of armed conflict 
reduce the number of cyber threats by a factor of .10.  This finding is also statistically significant 
at the 1% level, holding the control variables constant.   
 When using marginal effects, the true impact of rivalry on cyber threat targeting becomes 
apparent, especially for the United States.   First however, the results show that, when analyzing 
Model 1 using global means for the control variables, a state that shifts from being in no rivalries 
to being in at least one will experience negligibly fewer cyber threats.  More specifically, it is 
predicted that a state in no rivalry will experience .0000000152 cyber threats annually from 1990 
to 2001, while those states that do engage in a rivalry will experience .00000000987 annual 
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cyber threats.  This exceptionally marginal decline is attributed to the rare nature of cyber threats 
across much of the globe, especially during the 1990s and early 2000s.  While the average 
number of cyber threats a “typical” state experiences declines only marginally when moving 
from non-rivalry to rivalry status, the impact is much more substantial for a state like the United 
States.  When the U.S. average value for each control variable is substituted for the global 
values, the results show that moving from non-rivalry to rivalry participation will reduce the 
number of cyber threats against the U.S. by 22.65 events.  Considering the United States sustains 
an average of 7.2 cyber threats per year, with a maximum number of 24 attacks in a single year, a 
decline of almost 23 events is substantial. 
 The marginal effects of Model 2 provide similar conclusions to Model 1.  When averages 
for the United States are tested, the results show a drop of 20.85 cyber threats per year when 
moving from a status of non-rivalry to rivalry.  Much like the first model, the decline in cyber 
threats for the average state are negligible.  The average global state not participating in 
international rivalries could expect to be targeted for .000000174 cyber threats per year, while 
those in a rivalry are targeted for an average of .0000000252 threats per year. 
The first two models represent a replication of the analysis conducted by Conrad (2011), 
particularly by reproducing the dichotomous measure of rivalry status and implementing similar 
controls.  While the results of the current analysis do not support the conclusions of Conrad 
(2011), Findley et al. (2012) and Maoz and San-Akca (2012), specifically that rival states use 
low-level unconventional tactics during periods of peace, further study may shed additional light 
on the subject.  Table 3.3 presents an initial step toward a more nuanced understanding of the 
relationship between rivalry and cyber threats.  Models 3 and 4 expand upon a dichotomous 
measure of rivalry participation and specifies the number of rivalries each state is engaged in per 
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year.  Thus, Table 3.3 allows us to see the impact that participation in multiple rivalries has on 
cyber threat targeting, as opposed to the earlier analyses which simply models participation as a 
yes/no choice. 
Table 3.3 provides the findings for Models 3 through 5.27  Model 3 and Model 4 test a 
measure of rivalry from Klein, Goertz and Diehl as well as Thompson and Dreyer from 1990 to 
2001.  As noted previously however, these measures count the number of rivalries each state is in 
during each year of the analysis.  The results for Model 3 show an increase in one rivalry will 
decrease the number of cyber threats by a factor of .82.  For the “average country,” this decrease 
is exceptionally marginal, much like Models 1 and 2.  However, for a country like the United 
States, which is engaged in between 3 and 11 rivalries depending on the given year, the results 
are more noteworthy.  The marginal effects predict that an increase from three rivalries to four 
will decrease the number of cyber threats by 2.8.  This decrease becomes smaller, however, as 
the U.S. engages in more rivalries.  For example, moving from ten rivalries to eleven only 
reduces the predicted number of cyber threats by .7 events. 
While Model 3 shows a negative relationship between rivalries and cyber threats, the 
Thompson and Dreyer measure of rivalry tested in Model 4 paints a different picture.  The 
results of Model 4 suggest that no statistically significant relationship exists between rivalries 
based on perception and cyber threat targeting.  However, marginal effects results demonstrate 
that this relationship is statistically significant for the United States.  Specifically, from 1990 to 
2001, the United States engaged in one or two rivalries.  The marginal effects results show that 
                                                 
27 These models were run without regional dummies, due to a failure to find convergence.  The omission of control 
variables from zero-inflated models as a result of a failure to find convergence is common in the literature (Findley 
and Young 2010; Morris and Slocum 2012).  Negative binomial models with regional dummies also failed to 
converge, potentially as a result of the excessive number of zeros in the dependent variable. 
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moving from one rivalry to two will increase the predicted number of cyber threats by 1.96 
events annually.  From 1990 to 2001, the United States sustained an average of 6.1 cyber threats 
per year.  Thus, an increase in one rivalry would raise the number of cyber threats by almost 
32%.   
Models 5 in Table 3.3 tests the same event count independent variables, but it expands 
the temporal range of the Thompson and Dreyer data from 1990 to 2009.  This regression was 
conducted in order to take advantage of the full Thompson and Dreyer data, as well as 
incorporate more of the cyber threat data.  The latter is particularly important, considering that 
cyber threats have continued to increase in volume throughout the studied period.  Because the 
Klein, Goertz and Diehl measure is only coded from 1990 to 2001, extrapolating an additional 
eight years of data from the original twelve may have produced suspect results.  As a result, the 
Klein, Goertz and Diehl measure was omitted.  
Interestingly, the increased temporal range has shifted the Thompson and Dreyer measure 
from statistically insignificant to significant at the 10% level.  Model 5 shows that an increase in 
one rivalry will increase the number of cyber threats by a factor of 1.68 events, holding all other 
variables constant.  For the United States, which experienced between one and three rivalries per 
year between 1990 and 2009, an increase in one rivalry would result in an average of 3.83 
additional cyber threats.  Given that the United States averaged 5.8 cyber threats per year from 
1990 to 2009, an increase in one rivalry could potentially increase the average number of cyber 
threats in the U.S. by 66%.  When substituting global averages for the marginal effects analysis, 
an increase in one rivalry would result in approximately .001 additional cyber threats.  However, 
the marginal effects show that only states that experience between zero and three rivalries are 
statistically more likely to be targeted for additional cyber threats.  
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 Discussion 
The results of the ZINB analysis provide insight into the use of alternative forms of low-
level conflict in international rivalries.  Before now, such studies focused primarily on the use of 
state-sponsored terrorism and guerrilla warfare within antagonistic relationships, all of which 
found a positive relationship between such tactics and rivalry participation.  The singular study, 
up to this point, which investigated cyber attacks and rivalries found that deterrence may be 
responsible for a decline in cyber threats amongst rivalry dyads.  The present study, which 
expands upon the earlier work of Valeriano and Maness (2014) and adapts the general analytical 
framework of the terrorism studies, finds varying support for the hypothesis that states engaged 
in rivalries are more likely to experience increased numbers of cyber threats.   
Models 1 through 3 lend statistical evidence to the argument made by Valeriano and 
Maness, namely in that rivalry participation is likely to reduce cyber threat targeting.  The 
authors provide a series of explanations why this may be true, with the most convincing being 
that many governments, particularly the United States, consider cyber attacks to be an act of war.  
Thus, given the rationalist argument that war is both costly and risky, states may choose to avoid 
using cyber tactics to prevent an escalation of tension (Fearon 1995).  This is in direct opposition 
to the results of studies such as Findley et al. (2012) and Conrad (2011), which find that rival 
states use terrorism as a proxy for armed conflict.  However, as noted by Findley et al., rival 
states may actually tolerate a certain level of terrorist activity.  Thus, given the relatively new 
and unknown impact that cyber threats may have, we can speculate that states have yet to define 
a “tolerable threshold” of damage sustained during a cyber threat that may warrant a more 
violent response.  As a result, rivals are unwilling to use such tactics in fear of inciting a broader 
conflict than they had not originally prepared for.  This is in contrast to physical terrorism, which 
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given the findings of Findley et al. (2012) and Conrad (2011), many rival states seem to tolerate 
at a certain level without armed retaliation. 
Alternatively, it is possible that states engaged in enduring rivalries have built up their 
cyber defenses, thus hardening any potential digital targets.  This maneuver could be a result of 
their suspicious attitude toward rivals, whom have been willing to engage in armed conflict in 
the past.  Thus, if states are willing to meet on the battlefield over a common issue, there may be 
very little incentive not to engage their rival in the digital domain as well.  It is possible that 
states understand this threat, and have bolstered their digital defense as a proactive measure.  
Additionally, states in enduring rivalries may be wearier of admitting to the media that they were 
targeted for a cyber threat.  Such media attention would provide both the source rival, and other 
potential rivals, with greater knowledge of the target state’s security vulnerabilities.    
While the findings of Models 1 through 3 support the conclusions made by Valeriano and 
Maness, the incorporation of an event count measure of rivalry participation somewhat 
complicates matters.  Model 3, which tests the Klein, Goertz and Diehl definition, finds that 
increases in rivalry participation reduce the number of cyber threats a state will experience, 
backing the theoretical foundation of the earlier cyber attack study.  However, the definition of 
rivalry proposed by Thompsons and Dreyer (states are rivals if they perceive each other to be 
hostile) ultimately produces different results.  Models 4 and 5 show that an increase in rivalry 
participation results in an increase in cyber threat targeting, which refutes the deterrent theory of 
Valeriano and Maness and supports the terrorism studies of Findley et al. and Conrad.  A 
potential explanation for the different findings is the varying definition of what constitutes a 
rivalry.   
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As noted, Thompson and Dreyer rely on a detailed analysis of the historical record to 
determine if animosity exists between two states.  While this method results in fewer identified 
rivalries than the Klein, Goertz and Diehl data, such relationships are not necessarily defined by 
a history of armed conflict.  As Fearon (1994) points out in his crisis bargaining analysis, “If 
crises are characterized by private information and costly signaling, then states will ‘select 
themselves’ into or out of crises according these prior beliefs, and this fact will have implications 
for subsequent inferences and choices” (245).  In sum, Fearon’s bargaining perspective asserts 
that past military engagement unveils previously-held information from both actors in a dyad 
that each had wanted to keep private.  This information includes their willingness to engage in 
armed conflict.  For the Klein, Goertz and Diehl definition of rivalry, such states are included in 
the dataset only if they have a history of repeated prior military conflict.  Thus, these states have 
a better idea of each other’s willingness to engage in armed conflict.  This may explain the 
negative relationship between rivalry participation and cyber threat targeting found in Models 1 
and 3, as states are unwilling to provoke a rival into a broader conflict. 
 Inversely, Thompson and Dreyer’s measure of rivalry is not predicated on a history of 
armed conflict, but merely on the perception of national leaders towards a perceived enemy.  
That is not to say that these rival states do not engage in armed conflict, but it is not a necessary 
component to be included in the dataset.  Given Fearon’s assertion that past military conflict 
provides each state with private information, particularly the point at which each actor is willing 
to engage in war, the method of coding employed by Thompson and Dreyer may explain the 
positive relationship between rivalry status and increased cyber threat targeting.  As Models 4 
and 5 demonstrate, states that are coded as being perceived as rivals but not necessarily engaging 
in past military conflicts are more likely to be targeted for cyber threats.  This may be a result of 
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increasing levels of withheld private information by each state; such private information includes 
their willingness to engage in combat.  Given that two perceived foes have less information 
about each other, such states may be more willing to use cyber threats in ignorance of their 
target’s tolerance of violence.  Alternatively, the lack of armed conflict may increase the number 
of “soft targets” which are more accessible for cyber threats.  The armed conflict experienced by 
enduring rivals may have compelled states to harden their networks and implement other means 
of defense. 
 Finally, the overall significance of the control variables, and the use of terrorism as a 
framework for the study of cyber threats, should be noted.  Surprisingly, the GDP per capita 
measure was statistically insignificant in every model except one, although the one significant 
result in Model 2 demonstrates the expected positive relationship between cyber threats and 
economic robustness.  Military size and regime type are also relatively poor predictors of cyber 
threats in these models, as they are only significant in two models each.  The results for military 
size both show that increases in military size reduce cyber threats, suggesting that larger 
militaries are more capable of defending against digital assaults.  Additionally, the significant 
regime type findings demonstrate that democratic states are less likely to experience cyber 
threats, lending evidence to the notion that digital attacks may be a weapon of the repressed and 
used against autocratic regimes.  And lastly, the population control is statistically significant in 
three models, and suggests that more populous states are more likely to be targeted by cyber 
threats. 
 As the general lack of significance for many of the controls show, the use of the terrorism 
targeting literature as a framework is not necessarily the most appropriate means of studying 
cyber threats.  With that being said, however, given that the study of cyber threats is still in its 
100 
 
infancy, and the characteristics of targeted states has yet to be established, incorporating general 
state characteristics such as regime type, GDP per capita, population and military spending are 
currently the best means to study digital threats.  In the future, additional factors such as Internet 
penetration rates, broadband usage, and other specific digitally-related indicators should be 
included.  Unfortunately, at the time of this research, many of those variables are unreliable and 
are limited both temporally and spatially (van Dijk 2005).  Researchers should not be 
discouraged from studying cyber threats due to limited data access, but rather should adapt 
previous research and theoretical frameworks until such time as a dedicated cyber threat research 
agenda can stand on its own. 
 Conclusion 
The historic examples of communication vulnerabilities outlined in the first chapter 
provide a wealth of instances in which international rivalries play a role in targeting as well as 
the development of more advanced communications technology.  For example, according to 
Steele and Stein (2002, 31), “as Great Power rivalry reemerged in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, competition in telegraph communications was one domain for that rivalry.”  The authors 
note that British domination of cables, as well as a fear of espionage, spurred the French and 
Germans to develop their own competing telegraph systems.  However, in time those states 
began to establish their own espionage programs, especially prior to World War I.  In particular 
the French heavily targeted the transmissions of Germany, which was a rival with whom France 
had several previous military engagements (Headrick 1991).  Thus, interstate rivalries and a fear 
of espionage not only impacted which states adopted telegraph technology, but rivalry also 
influenced the targets of newly-established espionage programs.  Another example, as noted in 
the previous chapter, was the Soviet jamming of Western radio signals in an effort to prevent 
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contact with West Berlin and to prevent the spread of free information in Soviet-controlled areas.  
While such targeting may have been partly the result of ideological differences, those differences 
were a principle foundation of the rivalry that persisted between the U.S. and Soviet Union 
throughout the Cold War.   
Building upon the historic examples of the early 20th century, the results produced by this 
analysis help shed light on the impact of rivalry situations and the exploitation of 21st century 
communication technology.  In particular, this study provides statistical support for earlier 
research on cyber threats in rivalry situations, as well as building upon terrorism research by 
exhibiting the similarities and differences between these two unconventional forms of violence.  
This paper also demonstrates that the definition of rivalry and the measurement style of that 
indicator can have a dramatic impact on a study’s results.   
Ultimately, this research was designed as a “first cut” into the quantitative study of cyber 
threats and international rivalries.  As a result, a host of additional questions have yet to be 
answered.  For example, this research lends credibility to the argument that cyber threats are 
used by states in tense, potentially volatile interstate relationships.  The next logical step is to 
study the impact of cyber threats in crisis bargaining situations, principally to determine if cyber 
threats have any effect on states’ decisions to engage in armed combat.  Such a study would 
incorporate the bargaining theory literature, which was briefly touched upon earlier.  
Additionally, more in-depth case studies should be conducted on rival states and their use of 
cyber threats.  An excellent example would be the relationship between Pakistan and India, states 
which have engaged in armed conflict and tense standoffs in the recent past, are considered 
perpetual rivals, and have been known to use cyber threats against each other.  Alternatively, the 
rivalry between Argentina and Great Britain is worthy of study, as these rival states have not 
102 
 
fought a war since the beginning of the Information Age, but have recently used cyber attacks 
against rival targets. 
 In sum, the quantitative study of cyber threats is still in its infancy.  However, each study 
that is conducted, using both qualitative and quantitative methods, helps to clarify a largely 
unexplored subject.  While a large-scale cyber war has never, and hopefully will never occur, 
research such as this helps to prepare states for potential digital assaults by detecting targets, 
identifying where such attacks may originate, and where security should be bolstered to defend 
against such attacks.  Given the exceptional harm that cyber threats could unleash against an 
increasingly digitized world, it is important for scholars to establish and build upon a robust 
research agenda focused on unraveling the many unanswered questions that surround digital 
vulnerabilities.  This research, and the research that came before it, are hopefully only the first 
wave of studies investigating this 21st century security threat.  
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Chapter 4 - The Impact of Cyber Espionage on  
International Crisis Bargaining 
In 2005, network security professionals in the United States detected a significant 
increase in cyber espionage activity originating from mainland Chinese servers.  As military and 
civilian personnel investigated the intrusions further, the objective and damage of the attacks 
became more and more startling.  According to published reports, hackers in the Chinese 
province of Guangdong had secretly assaulted U.S. military, government, and contractor 
computer networks for several years in complete secrecy (Crowell 2010, 16).  The information 
taken by the hackers included sensitive documents, some of which were related to the F-35 
fighter project overseen by Lockheed Martin (Clarke and Knake 2010).  Ultimately, it was 
concluded that “Titian Rain,” the designated name for the attacks, resulted in a loss of between 
10 and 20 terabytes of digital information from U.S. servers.  To put the loss of information into 
more concrete terms, if a human were to physically steal the amount of information taken 
digitally during Titan Rain, the accumulated documents would total ten copies of the 
Encyclopedia Britannica (that’s 32 volumes and 44 million words, ten times over) (Clarke and 
Knake 2010). 
The example of Titan Rain is just one of many cases of cyber espionage that have 
exposed states’ private information to a host of international actors, including rival states.  While 
cyber espionage and other cyber attacks have been widely investigated through case studies and 
a handful of quantitative studies, the impact of cyber espionage on state interactions has yet to be 
addressed.  To remedy this research oversight, the focus of this study will be to investigate 
whether the loss of private, digital information – particularly through cyber attacks – can impact 
the decision of rational state leaders to engage in armed conflict.  In order to study this complex 
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topic, a theoretical foundation will be built upon the crisis bargaining model.  As the next section 
will address, one of the central tenants of the crisis bargaining model is the assumption that 
peaceful relations between states can break down because of the incentive to misrepresent and 
withhold private information.  This paper will seek to determine if states targeted for cyber 
attacks and cyber espionage cases, such as Titan Rain, will seek peace more often than their 
untargeted counterparts due to the release of private information which provides clarity on the 
two states’ bargaining range. 
The following research will proceed in six parts.  The next section outlines the crisis 
bargaining model, with a particular emphasis on the findings of Fearon (1995) and those scholars 
who have adapted the crisis bargaining model in their own research.  The second section 
provides an investigation of cyber espionage, and the information that can exposed through such 
attacks.  The third section contains a description of the variables to be tested, followed by the 
analysis results and a discussion of the findings.  The final section will conclude, and provides 
direction for additional research. 
 Information and War 
 
 The crisis bargaining model is a widely used means of investigating the interaction 
between states, and in particular why those interactions may lead to armed conflict.  According 
to the common rationalist perspective of conflict, there are five contributing factors that may lead 
to the outbreak of war: 1.) anarchy; 2.) expected benefits greater than expected costs; 3.) rational 
preventative war; 4.) rational miscalculation due to lack of information; 5.) rational 
miscalculation or disagreement about relative power.  Of these five potential causes, Fearon 
(1995) broadly notes that “the standard rationalist arguments fail to either address or to 
adequately explain what prevents (rational) leaders from reaching ex ante bargains that would 
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avoid the costs and risks of fighting” (380).  Through a process of elimination, Fearon eventually 
parses the list down to two primary causes of bargaining breakdowns: “private information about 
relative capabilities or resolve and incentives to misrepresent such information,” as well as the 
inability to uphold a bargain (381).   
The first rationalist mechanism that leads to interstate conflict, and the focus of this 
paper, is the incentive of rational states to misrepresent private information.  Such private 
information includes the willingness to engage in combat, as well as military strength and new 
weapon technology.  Because states have an incentive to avoid war, they should also have a 
desire to obtain a favorable resolution to the issue of contention.  As a result, Fearon (1995) 
predicts that states, “have an incentive to exaggerate their true willingness or capability to fight” 
(395).  Doing so provides states with both short-term and long-term advantages, including the 
possibility of concessions from an existing foe and deterring future challengers.  Thus, even 
though states should rationally seek peace, they may be willing to exaggerate or misrepresent 
private information if it accomplishes a greater end.  While this implies that rational states are 
seeking a peaceful resolution through the misrepresentation of information, it could also trigger 
the war they were aiming to avoid.  Additionally, states have an incentive to conceal hidden 
capabilities or resolve, particularly if such information would make them militarily vulnerable.  
As Fearon (1995) states, “combined with the fact of private information, these various incentives 
to misrepresent can explain why even rational leaders may be unable to avoid the miscalculations 
of relative will and power that can cause war” (396).   
The link between asymmetric information exchange and bargaining breakdowns is 
further addressed by Goemans (2000), who points out that, “if both sides knew how the pie 
would be divided after the war, both would be better off if they divided accordingly before the 
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war” (24).  With this in mind, Powell (2002) further explains Fearon’s (1995) theory.  In his 
example, two states (S1 and S2) engage in a series of bargaining moves.  In this game, S1 can 
make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to S2, which has the option to accept the offer (maintain peace) or 
reject it (engage S1 in war).  If the states were to have complete information, then S1 can safely 
make the maximum acceptable demand of S2 without risking armed conflict.  Without complete 
information however, which is typically the case in a bargaining situation, S1 may demand more 
than S2 is willing or able to give.  As a result, S2 has only two choices: initiate another round of 
bargaining or militarily engage S1.  This example demonstrates how private information, and the 
incentive to misrepresent information, creates inefficiencies in bargaining situations and could 
ultimately lead to conflict. 
In terms of the quantitative study of asymmetric information and crisis bargaining, 
scholars have relied upon a variety of proxies to measure both formal and informal information 
exchange between states.  As Bell (2013) notes, “a central dilemma associated with this literature 
results from the difficulties in empirically testing many of the theoretical models that point to 
information and uncertainty as important conditioning factors in the march to war” (453).  
Despite this difficulty, scholars have come up with innovative means to conceptualize the 
exchange of information during bargaining situations.  At a very specific level, scholars have 
focused attention on intangible state information that can be gathered by outside actors.  Namely, 
these state characteristics include power (Bearce et al. 2006; Reed 2003), resolve (Fearon 1994; 
1997; Morrow 1989) as well as domestic political conditions (Smith 1996; Tarar 2006).   
First, with regard to state power, the dynamic relationship between dyadic power parity 
and information has been analyzed by Reed (2003) among a number of others (Fey and Ramsay 
2011; Reed et al. 2008).  The author starts with the assumption of past studies, which often show 
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that dyads of states which are power preponderant are often more peaceful than those at power 
parity.  However, in contrast to this common argument that the distribution of power is a central 
cause of conflict, Reed (2003) maintains that “uncertainty about the distribution of power is as 
important a predictor of the probability of conflict as is the observed balance of power” (633).  
Through the use of Bayesian statistics to evaluate the credibility of this bargaining model, Reed 
is able to demonstrate that as states approach parity, information asymmetries are at their highest 
point.  Thus, this information asymmetry is a contributing factor in the increased chances of 
conflict between at parity dyads.  
Bearce et al. (2006) also investigate state power, particularly by integrating the impact of 
joint military alliances on the spread of information both within the alliance, and the signal it 
sends to outside actors.  The authors follow Leeds (2003), who noted that alliance participation 
provides information to external actors, and expand upon that proposition by theorizing alliances 
could provide even more information to internal participants.  Resting their theoretical 
framework on the premise that asymmetric information exchange can lead to conflict, the authors 
find that participation in alliances does indeed impact information exchange.  This impact, 
however, is conditional.  Their analysis demonstrates that, within alliances, information 
exchange matters most for dyads of states at or near parity.  Theoretically, these are states that 
have the highest degree of information asymmetry, and are the most likely to engage in armed 
conflict due to a bargaining breakdown.  Inversely, for power preponderant dyads of states where 
the outcome of a military engagement would be relatively certain, the environment of 
information exchange provided by an alliance is less important.  This is due to the reduction of 
asymmetric information inherent in a power-preponderant relationship.   
108 
 
In addition to state power, audience costs and resolve are also pieces of information that 
can expose both state and leadership weaknesses as well as the willingness to fight or seek peace.  
As an example, Fearon (1994) investigates how audience costs influence international dispute 
escalation, particularly focusing on how states’ leaders are impacted by domestic political 
conditions.  In a formal analysis that estimates that “crises are public events carried out in front 
of domestic political audiences,” Fearon (1994, 577) finds that audience costs do in fact have an 
impact on the decisions leaders make regarding conflict escalation.  Notably, the analysis 
suggests that leaders who are most sensitive to audience costs are always the least likely to back 
down in disputes that become public contests.  As far as crisis bargaining is concerned, the 
model demonstrates how state structures might impact signaling and information exchange.  For 
example, if mobilizing troops produces a higher audience costs for democratic leaders than for 
their authoritarian counterparts, then it is conceivable that democratic states would be less likely 
to bluff through a physical display of force.  Ultimately, audience costs are in some 
circumstances a visible display of resolve, and can play an important role in information 
exchange during crisis bargaining situations. 
Coupled with the idea that domestic audience costs can impact leadership decisions, 
domestic political conditions can send signals to outside actors regarding state resolve to engage 
in armed conflict.  In his investigation of diversionary foreign policy, Smith (1996) points out 
that electoral prospects can have a significant impact on the foreign policy decisions of 
democratically elected leaders.  For example, when reelection is assured, rational leaders are able 
to make unbiased policy decisions, taking into consideration only international factors.  This is 
also true when a government has no prospect of being reelected.  However, Smith’s model 
supports the idea that when foreign policy decisions could impact the prospect of reelection, 
109 
 
governments are more likely to engage in violent foreign policy objectives.  As a result, outside 
states that may be the target of such aggression tend to be more conciliatory and less 
confrontational during periods of uncertain election outcomes (Clark 2003; Mitchell and Prins 
2004).  Smith’s model shows that state information, when it is exposed through election cycles, 
can impact the behavior of other states, particularly when violent diversionary actions are 
possible. 
While the state characteristics of power, resolve and domestic political conditions provide 
hints regarding the available bargaining range and therefore the willingness of the state to engage 
in conflict, the outward exposure of these characteristics are privy to the level of state external 
transparency.  External transparency “allows other states to observe political events and other 
state characteristics” (Bell 2013, 457).  Thus, in order for outside actors to gauge the power, 
resolve, and domestic political conditions of a bargaining partner, some level of external 
transparency must be present.   
Defining what constitutes external transparency, and whether it is synonymous with 
democratic regimes, has produced a wide range of findings.  For example, Hollyer et al. (2011) 
point out that the presence of elections alone is not enough to sufficiently classify a state as 
democratic, and that transparency must be included as a part of defining political regimes.  They 
point to the case of the U.S. State Department and their reaction to the Wikileaks scandal, which 
“makes clear that democratic governments strategize according to, rely upon, and even promote 
the degree of obfuscation they enjoy in policymaking” (Hollyer et al. 2011, 1193).  Hollyer et al. 
define transparency as the willingness of a government to release policy-relevant information, 
and they find that democratic states are inherently more transparent than their autocratic 
counterparts.  Thus, a minimalist definition of democracy (initially introduced by Schumpeter in 
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1942) actually covers more than just the presence of elections, given the relationship between 
information transparency and free elections. 
The link between external transparency and crisis bargaining was further investigated by 
Bell (2013).  In his study, Bell assumes two key elements from the bargaining literature and 
adapts them to study strategic conflict avoidance.  First, interstate conflict results from a 
breakdown in bargaining between states.  If perfect and complete information were available to 
both sides, a visible bargaining space preferred by both actors would always be present. Second, 
negotiated outcomes acceptable to both parties can be complicated by information asymmetries 
and uncertainty (Bell 2013).  With these foundations in mind, Bell explains that externally 
transparent states are inherently at a disadvantage in terms of information asymmetry during 
bargaining situations, given the difficulty in withholding and misrepresenting such private 
information.  As a result, Bell hypothesizes that externally transparent governments are less 
likely to initiate conflict, particularly for diversionary purposes.  Through a large-N study, Bell 
shows that external transparency levels may impact whether states initiate MIDs, and therefore 
contributes to both the crisis bargaining as well as the diversionary theory literatures.  
 Of course, not all recent findings support the bargaining model.  Some formal approaches 
have produced results that run counter to bargaining assumptions.  Slantchev (2003) offers one 
prominent example by investigating war as a process of bargaining, not as the outcome of 
bargaining failure.28  What makes Slantchev’s model unique is his approach in studying a set of 
actor’s actions during conflict.  He points out that, “Once war is disaggregated from a lottery 
over exogenous outcomes into a process where war aims arise endogenously, it is possible to 
make a subtle distinction between two types of costs that are associated with conflict: the ability 
                                                 
28 This idea harkens back to Clausewitz’s definition of war as a continuation of politics by other means.   
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to bear costs and the ability to impose costs” (123).  This new approach to studying war allows 
for the possibility that states “condition negotiation strategies on their performance in the war 
and that such strategies depend on their ability to impose costs in unforeseen ways” (124).  
Ultimately, Slantchev finds that, despite the assumption of complete information, war is still 
possible because states utilize conditional strategies that “make war aims dependent on actions in 
the model” (131).   
 While formal models such as Slantchev’s continue to add important nuance to our 
understanding of the bargaining process, empirical literature to date has been largely supportive 
of Fearon’s (1995) rationalist explanations for war (Danilovic and Clare 2010).  However, the 
previous research focuses on intangible state characteristics that may influence asymmetric 
information exchange, such as power, domestic political conditions, and external transparency.  
In other words, research up to this point generally includes state characteristics that cannot be 
easily manipulated by other states.  Instead, the characteristics of power, regime type, external 
transparency, etc. are domestic attributes and may be, for some states, largely time-invariant.  
Additionally, as noted in the external transparency literature, the type of political regime has a 
major impact on the kind of information that is exposed to the outside world, and what kind of 
information can be used during crisis bargaining situations.  While the previous literature has 
certainly expanded our understanding of conflict outbreak, the research conducted in this paper 
will take a different approach to information exchange.  Instead of assuming states can, to some 
degree, control the private information that is exposed to outside forces, the present analysis will 
determine if private information that is unwillingly and forcefully exposed through cyber attacks 
can impact states’ propensity for conflict.   
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 Cyber Attacks and Information Exposure 
 
 The scholarly literature focused on cyber attacks and information loss is relatively sparse.  
This is particularly true of the cyber espionage literature.  Cyber espionage is the theft of private 
information from government, military, corporate and personal computer networks (Fidler 2012; 
Guisnel 1997; Lewis 2011).  Guisnel (1997) offers one of the few book-length investigations of 
cyber espionage.  Despite the book’s age, Guisnel provides an excellent history of primitive 
electronic espionage in the early 1990s, as well as a description of how states and corporations 
may employ computers to extract large volumes of digital secrets from rival computer networks 
for personal gain.  The author points out that, “in the United States and Canada, threats by 
foreign powers against companies within both countries are perceived as threats to their national 
interests” (Guisnel 1997, 212).  While Guisnel addresses how U.S. and Canadian intelligence 
communities combat potential economic losses, he spends very little time discussing the interests 
of other states and the potential loss of information they face. 
 A series of more recent publications has addressed potential government responses to acts 
of cyber espionage.  These responses range from classifying it as “just spying” to treating it as a 
potential act of cyber warfare (Fidler 2012).  Focusing specifically on the United States, Lewis 
(2011) notes that a massive overhaul of computer security regulations is needed to stay ahead of 
hackers.  A Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) notes that, “the Internet 
provides nation-states, their intelligence agencies, and cyber criminals with vastly expanded 
capabilities to illicitly acquire information.  Economic espionage does the most damage: other 
nations steal technology, research products, and intellectual property” (Lewis 2011, 2).  What 
has yet to be addressed, however, is how this loss of private information impacts relations 
between states and their propensity for conflict.   
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 While acts of cyber espionage are most often attributed with a loss of private information, 
the nature of that private information can vary greatly.  For example, at the most extreme level, 
cases such as Titan Rain can lead to the loss of massive amounts of sensitive or even classified 
data.  Exceptional acts of cyber espionage are, of course, not limited only to the United States.  
On March 20, 2013 South Korean computer networks were targeted by a sophisticated espionage 
campaign that was believed to have originated in North Korea.  The attack was accomplished by 
unleashing a piece of malicious code which “extracted classified information, including data 
related to U.S. forces in South Korea and military exercises carried out jointly by American and 
South Korean troops” (Gayathri 2013).  According to a report released by McAfee Labs, the 
attack was designed explicitly to gather intelligence on military networks.  Additionally, the 
malicious code may have been in operation since 2009, leaving terabytes of private information 
in danger of being stolen. 
 While some attacks are focused on classified military information, others target the 
economic assets of private businesses.  A 2013 McAfee report on cyber espionage breaks 
malicious cyber activity down into six parts: “the loss of intellectual property and business 
confidential information, cybercrime, the loss of sensitive business information (including 
possible stock market manipulation), opportunity costs (including service and employment 
interruptions), the additional costs of securing networks, and reputational damage to the hacked 
company” (3).  When combined, the global financial loss is roughly $400 billion a year.  While 
the global GDP was roughly $70 trillion in 2011, a particularly costly act of cyber espionage 
against a nationalized industry could substantially impact the GDP of a smaller nation.   
The same report further addresses the potential damage to national security by economic 
espionage.  It notes that, “the theft of military technology could make nations less secure by 
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strengthening potential opponents or harming export markets in aerospace, advanced materials, 
or other high-tech products” (4).  Furthermore, the McAfee staff point out that acts of cyber 
espionage also improve cyber warfare capabilities.  Finally, cyber espionage can “shift the terms 
of engagement in favor of foreign competitors” (4).  For the United States, the loss of sensitive, 
proprietary information via cyber espionage has led to “extensive damage” among the U.S. 
private technology firms involved with stealth, missile and nuclear capabilities (17).  Thus, it is 
clear that while some cases of cyber espionage do not actively target government servers, as they 
did in Titan Rain or the South Korean attacks of 2013, attacks directed at business interests can 
have a substantial impact on the security of states and the private information they possess as 
well.  
In addition to the loss of private information via cyber espionage, other types of cyber 
threats can result in a release of information.  A cyber attack is the use of cyber capabilities by 
state-based actors against the infrastructure of other states.  There is little doubt, especially in the 
United States, regarding the serious nature of cyber attacks against both private and government 
computer networks.  According to Martin Libicki, a senior management scientist at the Rand 
Corporation, cyber attacks are an “unprecedented threat to U.S. national security” (U.S. 
Congress 2013).  For example, the U.S. security company Mandiant has determined that a branch 
of the Chinese military has been infiltrating the computer systems responsible for regulating 
critical U.S. infrastructure, such as electric power grids and gas lines (Langfitt 2013).  According 
to Dan McWhorter, who oversees one of the company’s intelligence units, “If you have the 
ability to steal the documents, you could have just as easily crashed the hard drives.  From a 
national security standpoint, that’s very scary” (Langfitt 2013).  Thus, while the aim of a hacking 
operation may not necessarily be the extraction of digital information such as blueprints or other 
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sensitive data, hackers do learn that aspects of the target state’s network infrastructure is 
vulnerable.  This is tactical information that could be put to use, especially during bargaining 
situations: the targeted state knows it has potentially devastating security vulnerabilities, and the 
source state knows it can exploit that vulnerability if conflict is initiated.  Finally, the targeted 
state would be unable to misrepresent the robustness of its digital security, particularly if the 
vulnerability is published by the press.  Ultimately, both cyber espionage and cyber attacks 
expose private information, both tangible and intangible, that could be used against the targeted 
state in a crisis bargaining situation. 
Given the nature of cyber attacks and their ability to expose private information, the 
bargaining model provides an excellent framework from which to test the impact of the 
involuntary disclosure of private information on interstate conflict.  This proposition can be 
adapted to fit Powell’s earlier example of inter-state bargaining.  Acts of cyber espionage and 
other cyber attacks can expose states’ private information, creating an atmosphere where either 
S1 can safely make a maximum demand of S2, or where S2 knows the relative strength of S1’s 
willingness to engage in armed conflict if the demand is rejected.  This scenario is, however, 
dependent entirely on which state is targeted by the cyber threat.  In other words, if S2 is the 
targeted state, S1 can make the maximum demand since it has additional information S2 would 
have preferred to remain private.  If S1 is targeted (either before or after the demand), S2 may be 
able to determine the foe’s willingness to fight.  Ultimately, both war and inefficiency are results 
of asymmetric information.  And while the present study cannot investigate crisis bargaining as a 
dyadic relationship, due to the exceptional difficulty in attributing cyber attacks to their true 
source (see Crenshaw 2012), the basic example explained here provides a framework in which 
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cyber attacks may increase the amount of information that is available during the bargaining 
process, thereby reducing inefficiencies and reducing the outbreak of conflict. 
 Slantchev’s (2003) results support the theoretical foundation of this study as well.  
Slantchev (2003) suggests that, “The process of war can be usefully viewed as a contest, in 
which both sides attempt to reduce the opponent’s ability to impose costs on them while 
simultaneously trying to impose costs on the opponent, thereby improving their own bargaining 
position” (127).  Although Slantchev’s models address bargaining during conflict, the same 
“contest” can exist prior to the outbreak of war.  The use of espionage and other tactics (in the 
case of this paper, cyber attacks and cyber terrorism) could easily be used by belligerents in an 
ex ante bargaining situation to both impose costs on the enemy (steal information) as well as 
reduce the opponent’s ability to impose costs on them (use that information to increase defenses 
where necessary, increase one’s bargaining range, etc.).  As Schelling (1966) points out, “the 
power to hurt…is a kind of bargaining power.”  Cyber threats do hurt, although the damage is 
not always visible.  The damage can come in the form of a reduction in morale, the loss of 
information, a loss of tactical advantage, or a reduction in the targeted state’s bargaining 
leverage.  Thus, if one subscribes to Fearon’s (1995) theoretical framework and the findings of 
Schelling and Slantchev, it could be said that the denial of the ability to hurt will undermine the 
bargaining position of the opponent.  This assertion strikes at the heart of this research, and 
ultimately sums up the primary hypothesis: 
H1: A state that is targeted for cyber espionage or other cyber threat will suffer a loss of 
private information, and therefore will engage in fewer armed conflicts. 
 
While the bargaining theory posits that conflict is less likely when information 
asymmetry is reduced, it is possible that states targeted for cyber threats may engage in more 
non-combat international disputes.  The use of non-combat options to retaliate against states 
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which engage in unwanted cyber activity may be an option some states would consider, but it is 
of course one that runs the risk of increasing tension.  For example, the United States and its 
allies have imposed a series of increasingly harsh economic sanctions against Iran for its 
sponsorship of terrorist organizations and the continued development of a nuclear program.  
These actions have increased tension between Iran and the Western coalition, however that 
tension has not manifested as armed combat. In the same vein, as cyber attacks become more and 
more sophisticated and as the amount of information loss grows, it is understandable that 
targeted states begin to press the suspected attack source to cease their activities.  In a 12-page 
report submitted to Congress in 2011, the Pentagon noted that it would, “respond to hostile 
attacks in cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country” (Alexander 2011).  One 
such response would be the use of force short of war or conflict (Blechman and Kaplan 1978; 
Fordham and Sarver 2001), such as threats, mobilizations, etc. against the suspected source of 
the attack (Sanger and Bumiller 2011).  These options have already been discussed by U.S. 
officials for use against the Chinese government.  However, in 2011, President Obama decided 
against such measures as to avoid increasing international tension and as to not damage the 
economic ties between the two states. 
Considering the bargaining theory proposition that asymmetric information exchange 
reduces armed conflict, we must still conclude that states targeted for cyber attacks (including 
cyber espionage) may retaliate via non-armed means.  These means include public 
condemnation, troop mobilizations, and border fortifications which may heighten tensions 
between states, which are not intended to result in armed conflict.  Thus, given this prospect, we 
can hypothesize that: 
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H2: A state that is targeted for cyber espionage or other cyber attacks will suffer a loss of 
 information, and will engage in more international, non-armed disputes. 
 
 The next section outlines the variables used to tests these propositions, followed by a 
presentation and analysis of the results. 
 Research Design 
As noted above, this study explores the impact of information exposure through cyber 
threats on conflict participation.  Because data attributing many cyber threats to their original 
source is notoriously unreliable, the model described below is based upon a state-year unit of 
analysis.  The data in this analysis ranges from 1990 to 2005 because of the limitations of various 
datasets, and encompasses 149 states. 
 Dependent Variables 
 Three dependent variables will be analyzed to test the hypotheses previously described.  
The first dependent variable will be the total number of interstate wars each state is involved in 
per year using the Correlates of War (COW) data (Gleditsch et al. 2002).  The data encompass 
interstate conflicts from 1816 to 2007, however the temporal range for this study will be limited 
to the 1990-2005 time period.  In order to classify as an interstate war, the conflict must involve 
sustained combat, involve organized armed forces, and result in at least 1,000 battle-related 
combatant fatalities within a twelve-month period (Sarkees and Wayman 2010).  Additionally, 
for a state to be coded as a participant in an interstate war, it must either commit 1,000 troops to 
the war or suffer 100 battle-related deaths.  This measure is used to test the first hypothesis, 
namely that cyber attack targeting reduces participation in bloody, large-scale conflicts due to 
information loss. 
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 While the most common measure of conflict arguably comes from the Correlates of War 
project, other measures exist and are used in the international relations literature.  Most notably, 
the UCDP/PRIO dataset classifies armed conflict as: “a contested incompatibility that concerns 
government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least 
one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (Themner and 
Wallensteen 2013).  As Gleditsch et al. (2002) point out, there are disadvantages to the COW 
definition of conflict.  Namely, there are several protracted conflicts that have accumulated more 
than 1,000 deaths over the course of the event, however no single year of the conflict breaks the 
1,000-casualty threshold.  As a result, these conflicts are not included in the COW dataset.  With 
the lower, 25-casualty threshold, the UCDP/PRIO dataset can capture these events for study.  
Given that this study is only interested in interstate conflicts, only conflicts between 
internationally recognized states will be included in the dataset.  This measure of conflict will 
also test the first hypothesis. 
The third dependent variable also comes from the Correlates of War project, and was 
incorporated into a wide variety of the IR literature, including Bell’s (2013) study of conflict and 
bargaining.  The COW Militarized Interstate Dispute data (MID) contains interstate incidents 
from 1816 to 2010 (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004).  These incidents are coded on a scale 
from 1 to 5 based on the dispute’s level of hostility, ranging from “no militarized action” (1) to 
“join interstate war” (5).  Because this measure is used to test the second hypothesis, namely that 
states targeted for cyber attacks are more prone to enter non-violent disputes, MIDs classified as 
“4” and “5” have been dropped from the dataset.  As a result, this variable measures non-violent 
actions such as threats, alerts, and mobilizations. 
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 Independent Variables 
At the time this research was conducted, no comprehensive cyber threat dataset has been 
developed for academic consumption.  Given the sensitive nature of network security logs, many 
large companies and government agencies are reluctant to allow researchers access to their 
network data.  As a result, Virtual Research Associates, who used an automated content analysis 
of the Reuters Global News Service, assembled the independent variables included in this 
analysis.  The search was limited to cases of cyber attacks that occurred between January 1, 1990 
and December 31, 2011.  Due to the lack of a common vernacular, many search terms were used 
to ensure the maximum number of cases was collected.  A complete list of the search terms used 
is available in Appendix A.  Ultimately, the raw dataset includes 15,879 cases. 
Once the raw dataset was compiled, a process of coding was undertaken to weed out 
redundant cases and those that were not clear examples of cyber threats.  For example, one of the 
search terms was “Cyber,” which resulted in a large number of cyber attack, cyber terrorism, and 
cyber espionage cases.  Unfortunately, it also returned a large number of cases focused on the 
Sony “Cybershot” camera.  Such cases were removed from the dataset.  After the raw dataset 
was pared down into potential cases of cyber threats, those were further investigated using the 
LexisNexis service.  This process ensured the remaining cases were indeed examples of a cyber 
threat, and allowed for a clearer idea of who the target and, occasionally, suspected source of the 
threat was.  The date of the attack was also refined to ensure the correct year was listed for the 
beginning of the threat or its first discovery. 
Of course, a content analysis of cyber threat cases creates a variety of problems that must 
be acknowledged.  Perhaps the most blatant is that a successful cyber threat, especially one that 
seeks to steal military or economic secrets, should remain relatively unknown.  The fact that 
knowledge of a cyber threat was published signifies one of three outcomes: an attack was 
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originally intended to do harm and the source wanted the target to know of the attack; a failed 
attack was originally intended to remain a secret but was foiled prior to its execution; or a 
successful attack was originally intended to remain a secret, but was discovered after its 
execution.  All three scenarios have been included in the dataset, particularly since the 
publication of a security breach is a public acknowledgement that private-information exposure 
has occurred. 
The primary independent variable for this study was derived from the coded cyber data.  
This variable is the aggregate number of cyber espionage cases each state sustains per year.  This 
measure is operationalized based upon the definitions of cyber espionage provided by Guisnel 
(1997), Fidler (2012), and Lewis (2011), and encompass cases where private, digital information 
was stolen or released to the public against the will of the target.  Cyber espionage exposes 
private information at varying levels of confidentiality and demonstrates that security 
vulnerabilities exist in the targeted state’s digital network infrastructure.  Such vulnerabilities 
could be exploited in the event of armed conflict. 
 In addition to the total number of cyber espionage cases per year a state experiences, a 
separate analysis will be conducted which includes the sum total of cyber warfare and cyber 
terrorism cases each state experiences from 1990 to 2005.  Cyber warfare is defined as cases 
where there is substantial evidence the attack was sponsored or initiated by a national 
government or military.  Inversely, cyber terrorism cases encompass those where the suspected 
source was a non-state group, such as Anonymous.  By including the sum number of cyber 
warfare and cyber terrorism cases, this variable can measure how varying digital vulnerabilities 
impact the likelihood of conflict.  As noted above, cyber warfare and cyber terrorism may not 
necessarily result in the loss of tangible, sensitive information, however it does provide outside 
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actors with knowledge of security vulnerabilities.  With the increasing reliance of industrialized 
nations on computers and other networked technology to provide basic human services such as 
water and electricity, not to mention the military application of such networked services, 
exposing vulnerabilities in such systems most certainly could be defined as a loss of private 
information that states could no longer misrepresent. 
 Control Variables 
Given the scarcity of quantitative cyber attack research, and the unique approach it 
provides on asymmetric information exchange, a comparable analysis has yet to be produced 
from which to glean basic control variables.  As a result, this analysis will borrow controls from 
the conflict and bargaining theory literature, in an effort to ensure the relationship between 
conflict propensity and cyber attack targeting is being appropriately measured.  It should be 
noted, however, that because the present model is based on a country-year framework, many 
dyadic indicators of conflict cannot be included.  These dyadic indicators include similarity in 
preferences, sometimes measured via UN voting affinity (Gartzke and Jo 2002), as well as 
specific measures of geographic contiguity.  Despite these omissions, there are still several 
controls that can be added to build the strongest model possible.   
 Regime Type 
The first control variable in the model is regime type.  The inclusion of regime type helps 
to satisfy several possible contributing factors of interstate conflict involvement.  First, audience 
costs have been demonstrated to impact how states initiate or respond to threats.  Fearon (1994) 
noted that, “because it is easier to punish leaders in democracies than in autocracies, democratic 
leaders should on average face greater audience costs than autocratic leaders, other things equal” 
(Tarar and Leventoglu 2009, 819).  In other words, democratic leaders are better able to signal 
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their willingness and resolve to fight than their autocratic counterparts, lending evidence to the 
idea that public commitments are both a means of credibly conveying information and can be 
used as bargaining leverage (Fearon 1997; Schelling 1960).  A number of empirical studies, 
including Eyerman and Hart (1996), Gelpi and Griesdorf (2001), and Prins (2003), have 
demonstrated that democratic regimes are more susceptible to varying levels of audience cost. 
In addition to audience costs, regime type is also an indicator of external transparency.  
As noted earlier, external transparency can impact the amount of private information that is 
exposed to outside actors.  This private information includes public support for the national 
leadership, the size and determination of the opposition, as well as the general preparedness for 
potential conflict. Bell’s (2013) finds that such external transparency limits democratic leaders’ 
ability to engage in diversionary tactics by limiting their bargaining range.  As noted earlier, 
Hollyer et al.’s (2011) analysis of external transparency concluded that democracies are 
inherently more transparent than their autocratic counterparts. 
In order to control for the natural transparency of most democratic states, coupled with 
the impact of audience costs on leadership signaling, regime type is included as the first control 
variable.  It is anticipated that as regimes grow more democratic, their conflict propensity 
diminishes because of bargaining space increases.  The regime type variable will be borrowed 
from the Polity IV project, which categorizes each state based on a 21-point scale (-10 being a 
hereditary monarchy to +10 being a consolidated democracy). 
 Contiguity 
In addition to regime type, territoriality can have a significant impact on conflict 
propensity.  More specifically, territorial disputes have been demonstrated to be especially prone 
to escalate (Reiter 1999; Souva and Prins 2006).  This monadic model includes a measure 
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indicating each state’s total number of contiguous neighbors by land or sea.  It is assumed that 
states with a larger number of borders have a greater likelihood of being involved in a territorial 
dispute with a neighbor, thereby heightening the chances of conflict.  The contiguity data for this 
project was borrowed from the COW project (Correlates of War Project; Stinnett et al. 2002). 
 Military Capabilities 
 In addition to contiguity, which gives states an opportunity to initiate and participate in 
conflict, it is important to measure a state’s military capabilities (Lai and Slater 2006; Most and 
Starr 1989).  Accordingly, COW’s Composite Index of National Capabailties (CINC) score is 
included in the model to control for disparity in military capabilities across the interstate system. 
The CINC score is an average of six measures of a state’s power: total population, urban 
population, military personnel, military expenditures, primary energy consumption, and iron and 
steel production.  The natural log of the CINC score is used, both for normality and to “capture 
the declining marginal effects of increases in power” (Quackenbush and Rudy 2009, 275).   
 Alliances 
The literature regarding the impact of alliance membership on conflict is mixed (Prins 
2010), however some models suggest that alliance membership can increase the risk of war 
(Leeds 2003; Ray 1990; Senese and Vasquez 2004).  Alliances may, for example, “embolden 
members to engage in conflict with the belief that they have a network of states to support them” 
(Lai and Slater 2006, 120).  And, as noted earlier, alliance participation can have an impact on 
information exchange.  The present measure was derived from the dyadic COW data on alliance 
membership, and is the total number of alliances a state is a member of per year. 
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 Intergovernmental Organization Participation 
Much like the alliance literature, research focused on state participation in 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) has produced mixed results.  Oneal and Russett (1999) 
find that MID involvement is reduced by shared memberships in IGOs, while Gartzke et al. 
(2001) find that IGO membership increases low-level conflict.  More recently, Anderson et al. 
(n.d.) find that the relationship between IGO membership and conflict propensity is impacted by 
a temporal element.  Notably, their results find that IGO membership during the Cold War 
reduced the likelihood of militarized conflict, but increased conflict in the post-Cold War era.  
Because of the potential impact of IGO membership on interstate conflict, country-year IGO 
membership data was borrowed from the Correlates of War Project and included as a control 
variable.  The variable is measured as the total number of IGO memberships per state, per year 
from 1990 to 2005. 
 Economic Interdependence 
Economic interdependence also has an impact on the likelihood of interstate conflict.  
Although Russett and Oneal is include this variable as a fundamental leg of their Kantian peace 
triangle, a number of studies find evidence that raises questions about the pacifying notion of 
economic interdependence (Goldsmith 2013; Kleinberg et al. 2012; Prins 2010).  Some studies 
even suggest interdependence may be associated with higher levels of conflict (Goldsmith 2013).  
A greater value of trade may thus have the potential to either decrease or increase a state’s 
conflict propensity.  Economic interdependence (trade) is operationalized as imports plus exports 
divided by GDP in this study (Prins 2010).  The COW national trade data supplied the import 
and export statistics, while GDP data was taken from the World Bank. The natural log of this 
variable is used for normality.   
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 Prior Military Activity 
States that have used force and initiated conflict in the past may be more prone to use 
similar tools in the future (Levite, Jentleson and Berman 1992).  As a result, a lagged dependent 
variable will be included to control for past military activity.29 Additionally, including a lagged 
dependent variable controls for the effects of autocorrelation (Beck and Katz 1995).   
 Media Bias 
Because the independent variable is a content analysis of media reports provided by 
Reuters, a variable is included to control for any potential media bias that may exist in each state.  
The variable is a count of the total number of articles from Reuters concerning each country in 
each year of the analysis (Murdie and Peksen 2013).  The natural log of the control is used for 
normality. 
 Methodology 
As demonstrated in Table 4.1, interstate wars and MIDs are rare events in the post-1990 
timeframe.  Given the overabundance of zeros in the sample, an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
model is inappropriate for all three measures. OLS models also allow for negative values; this 
assumption is not theoretically compatible with the dependent variables tested in this analysis.  
Given the limitations and assumptions of OLS models, more appropriate regression models were 
needed to accurately measure the relationship between interstate conflict and information loss.  
Since the COW measure of conflict is binary (one either participates in a war or not), and rare, a 
rare event logistic model is used.  King and Zeng (2001) note that conventional logistic 
                                                 
29 While Oneal and Russett (2001) suggest including lags for three years to adequately capture the complex temporal 
interaction between states, the relatively low number of years investigated in the present study necessitates a single 
lag to avoid losing too much information. 
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Correlates of War 
(COW) 
2,980 0.02 0.13 0 1 
PRIO 2,980 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Militarized Interstate 
Disputes (MID) 
3,051 0.29 0.73 0 8 
Cyber Espionage 2,980 0.02 0.25 0 7 
Cyber Attacks & Cyber 
Terrorism Sum 
2,980 0.04 0.47 0 17 
Regime Type 2,556 2.58 6.81 -10 10 
Contiguity 2,984 5.72 3.46 0 29 
CINC (logged) 2,971 -7.34 2.47 -13.82 -1.69 
Alliances 3,006 1.65 2.08 0 21 
IGO Membership 2,984 56.96 22.29 1 129 
Economic 
Interdependence 
(Logged) 
2,592 -0.57 0.66 -3.57 3.94 
COW (Lagged) 2,785 0.02 0.13 0 1 
PRIO (Lagged) 2,785 0.04 0.19 0 1 
MID (Lagged) 2,858 0.29 0.73 0 8 
Media Bias (logged) 2,844 6.07 2.22 0 12.37 
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regressions tend to “sharply underestimate the probability of rare events,” and are “grossly 
inefficient for rare events data” (137).   
The second dependent variable, PRIO interstate conflict, is also analyzed using a rare 
event logistics model.  While the dataset includes six country-years where states are involved in 
more than one interstate war, the variable’s exceptionally low variance prevented a convergence 
while attempting a ZINB model.  As a result, the PRIO measure of conflict was recoded as a 
dichotomous measure.   
 The third dependent variable tests a slightly parsed version of the MID dataset.  In 
particular, those events coded as a use of force or war were removed from the data.  While MIDs  
classified as threats and displays of force are far more common than interstate war, they are still 
relatively rare.  Since a number of states engage in more than one MID during a given year of the 
sample, this dependent variable is analyzed using a zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) 
model.  A Vuong test (Vuong 1989), residual plot, and AIC statistics (Long and Freese 2005) all 
indicate that the ZINB model is preferable over the standard negative binomial estimate as well 
as both the standard Poisson and rare event Poisson models. 
Additional tests are also conducted to ensure that my estimates are correctly specified.  
Durbin-Watson tests determined that the MID and PRIO models suffered from autocorrelation.  
A single lagged version of the dependent variable was added to each model to remedy the issue 
(Davis 2007).  As noted above, there are strong theoretical reasons to include such a variable in 
all six models.  Additionally, all three models are clustered by the state.  Hausman specification 
tests were conducted to determine if fixed or random effects models should be employed to 
account for the group-level variation.  The Hausman test results for all the models suggest fixed 
effects should be implemented.  A comparison of rare event and fixed effect models for the 
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COW and PRIO measures resulted in identical coefficient significance for three of the four 
models.30  Because of the similarity between the two and the rare nature of interstate conflict, the 
rare event logit was deemed more appropriate.  For the MID model, STATA is unable to include 
fixed effects as a parameter in a zero-inflated negative binomial.  Standard fixed effects negative 
binomial estimates produce results consistent with the ZINB model.  ZINB estimates are 
considered preferable given the rarity of MIDs.  Lastly, variance inflation factor (VIF) tests were 
run and indicate that probabilistic levels of multicollinearity did not exist in any of the models. 
 Finally, the coefficients of rare event logistic and ZINB models cannot be interpreted as 
easily as those in an OLS.  Scholars have used a wide variety of techniques to facilitate 
interpretation, including incidence rate ratios (IRRs) (Conrad 2011; Savun and Phillips 2009) 
and Monte Carlo simulations (Piazza 2011).  Marginal effects are employed in this study (Dreher 
et al. 2010; Santifort-Jordan and Sandler 2014).  In an effort to distinguish between the findings 
of an “average state” and a hegemonic state, like the U.S., specialized marginal effects will be 
reported throughout. 
 Results 
Empirical results are presented in Tables 4.2 and 4.3.  Table 4.2 provides the results of 
Models 1 through 4, which test the COW and PRIO definitions of war.  Table 4.3 contains 
models 5 and 6, which test the impact of cyber espionage and cyber attacks/terrorism on short of 
war MIDs.  The results of these models demonstrate varying support for the theory and 
hypotheses outlined previously. 
                                                 
30 The fixed effects results can be found in Appendix C, Tables C.1 and C.2. 
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Model 1 tests the impact of cyber espionage cases on interstate war, as defined by the 
Correlates of War project.  The rare event logit results demonstrate that an increase of one cyber 
espionage case will decrease the number of COW interstate wars by a factor of .65.  Marginal 
effects with global averages shows that an increase in one cyber espionage case will decrease the 
number of interstate wars by .44 events.  More specifically, an average state that experiences 
seven cases of cyber espionage (the maximum number of events in a single state-year in the 
dataset) is predicted to be involved in three less interstate wars than a similar state that  
Table 4.2 Correlates of War (COW) & PRIO Interstate War Rare-Event Logistic Results 
 
 Model 1 
COW War 
Model 2 
COW War 
Model 3 
PRIO War 
Model 4 
PRIO War 
Cyber Espionage 
-0.44** 
(-1.99) 
- - - 
0.70*** 
(7.04) 
- - - 
Cyber Attack & Terrorism - - - 
-0.03 
(-0.32) 
- - - 
0.33*** 
(8.63) 
Regime Type 
-0.08* 
(-1.89) 
-0.08* 
(-1.83) 
-0.04* 
(-1.73) 
-0.04* 
(-1.66) 
Contiguity 
-0.09** 
(-2.00) 
-0.07 
(-1.47) 
-0.04 
(-1.13) 
-0.04 
(-1.22) 
Alliance Participation 
0.11** 
(1.96) 
0.07 
(1.43) 
-0.26*** 
(-3.93) 
-0.23*** 
(-3.57) 
CINC (logged) 
0.15 
(0.71) 
0.13 
(0.62) 
0.51** 
(2.49) 
0.49** 
(2.36) 
IGO Membership 
0.01 
(0.69) 
0.01 
(0.71) 
0.01 
(0.57) 
0.01 
(0.53) 
Economic Interdependence 
(logged) 
-0.40* 
(-1.79) 
-0.33 
(-1.53) 
-0.54* 
(-1.92) 
-0.57** 
(-1.98) 
COW (lagged) 
0.33 
(0.27) 
0.30 
(0.24) 
- - - - - - 
PRIO (lagged) - - - - - - 
5.41*** 
(10.17) 
5.45*** 
(10.19) 
Media Bias (logged) 
0.56** 
(2.10) 
0.50* 
(1.94) 
-0.13 
(-0.71) 
-0.13 
(-0.68) 
Constant 
-7.97** 
(-2.13) 
-7.75** 
(-2.08) 
-1.50 
(-0.53) 
-1.69 
(-0.59) 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  (Z Scores in parentheses),  Two-Tail Test 
Model 1 & 2 N = 2,126; Model 3 & 4 N = 2,126 
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Table 4.3 Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Results 
 
Model 5 Model 6 
Coefficient IRR Coefficient IRR 
Inflated Negative Binomial     
Cyber Espionage 
.02 
(0.42) 
1.02 - - - - - - 
Cyber Attack & Terrorism - - - - - - 
0.03 
(1.42) 
1.03 
Regime Type 
-0.01 
(-0.52) 
0.99 
-0.01 
(-0.47) 
0.99 
Contiguity 
0.03** 
(2.13) 
1.03 
0.03** 
(2.33) 
1.03 
Alliance Participation 
0.02 
(1.60) 
1.02 
0.02 
(1.55) 
1.02 
CINC (logged) 
0.04 
(0.46) 
1.04 
0.04 
(0.45) 
1.04 
IGO Membership 
-0.00 
(-0.51) 
1.00 
-0.00 
(-0.47) 
1.00 
Economic Interdependence (logged) 
0.10 
(0.81) 
1.10 
0.10 
(0.86) 
1.11 
MID (lagged) 
0.19*** 
(3.79) 
1.20 
0.18*** 
(3.61) 
1.20 
Media Bias (logged) 
0.20** 
(2.49) 
1.22 
0.19** 
(2.42) 
1.21 
Constant 
-1.90 
(-1.64) 
0.15 
-1.85 
(-1.61) 
0.16 
     
Inflated Logit     
Cyber Espionage 
0.04 
(0.07) 
0.04 - - - - - - 
Cyber Attack & Terrorism - - - - - - 
-0.04 
(-0.22) 
-0.04 
Regime Type 
-0.01 
(-0.26) 
-0.01 
-0.01 
(-0.23) 
-0.01 
Contiguity 
-0.06 
(-1.22) 
-0.06 
-0.06 
(-1.18) 
-0.06 
Alliance Participation 
-0.12 
(-1.58) 
-0.12 
-0.12 
(-1.54) 
-0.12 
CINC (logged) 
-0.08 
(-0.39) 
-0.08 
-0.07 
(-0.38) 
-0.07 
IGO Membership 
0.02** 
(2.03) 
0.02 
0.02** 
(2.06) 
0.02 
Economic Interdependence (logged) 
0.21 
(0.88) 
0.21 
0.22 
(0.91) 
0.22 
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MID (lagged) 
-1.80** 
(-2.47) 
-1.80 
-1.81** 
(-2.40) 
-1.81 
Media Bias (logged) 
-0.06 
(-0.34) 
-0.06 
-0.07 
(-0.41) 
-0.07 
Constant 
-0.37 
(-0.14) 
-0.37 
-0.28 
(-0.11) 
-0.28 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  (Z Scores in parentheses),  Two-Tail Test 
Model 5 & 6 N = 2,129 
 
experiences zero cyber espionage cases.  When substituting U.S. averages in the marginal 
effects, the results show that zero and one cyber espionage events are statistically insignificant in 
decreasing interstate war involvement.  However, each additional case of cyber espionage may 
reduce the number of interstate conflicts by .44 events.31   
Model 2 replaces the cyber espionage predictor with a measure combining cyber attack 
and cyber terrorism cases.  The rare event logit results show that these forms of digital attack are 
not statistically significant in the reduction of interstate conflict.  However, marginal effects with 
global averages gives us a more in-depth look at this relationship.  The marginal effect results 
predict that increasing numbers of cyber attacks and terrorist events do slightly reduce the 
number of interstate wars.  Specifically, increasing the number of cyber attacks and cyber 
terrorism cases by one decreases the number of interstate wars by approximately .02 events.  
While these results are not spectacular, they do support the first hypothesis.  Substituting U.S. 
averages, the marginal effects predict a similar relationship between cyber attack/terrorism and 
interstate war participation.  However, only three through eleven attacks are statistically likely to 
reduce the number of interstate wars in the United States. 
Model 3 tests a different operationalization of interstate war, provided by UCDP/PRIO. 
As noted previously, this dependent variable differs from that of the COW definition by 
                                                 
31 Graphs for the twelve marginal effect analyses can be found in Appendix C. 
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including interstate conflicts with as few as 25 battle-related deaths in a given year.  This unique, 
more robust operationalization produces starkly different results from those of Models 1 and 2.  
In particular, Model 3 demonstrates a strong, positive statistical relationship between cyber 
espionage and PRIO interstate conflict.  The rare event logit results show that an increase in one 
cyber espionage case may increase the number of interstate conflicts by a factor of 2.01.  This 
same relationship is shown when using marginal effects and global averages.  The marginal 
effect results predict that each additional cyber espionage case will increase the number of 
interstate conflicts by approximately .7 events.  The same relationship and increase in interstate 
conflict is exhibited when U.S. averages are substituted in the marginal effects. 
Model 4 also relies upon the UCDP/PRIO definition of war, but includes the combined 
cyber war/terrorism measure.  Like Model 3, the results demonstrate a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between cyber threats and an increase in war involvement.  In this case, 
an increase in one cyber attack or cyber terrorism event increases the number of wars by a factor 
of 1.39.  Marginal effects with global and U.S. averages reinforce the findings of the rare event 
logit.  With global averages, an increase in one cyber attack/terrorism case increases the number 
of wars by approximately .3.  Interestingly, the statistical significance of the findings only 
applies to states that experience up to fifteen cyber attack/terrorism cases.  Any attacks beyond 
that are not predicted to impact conflict propensity.  When substituting U.S. averages, the 
marginal effects show a similar increase of .3 wars for every additional cyber attack or cyber 
terrorism case sustained.  This finding is statistically significant for up to seventeen attacks, with 
the exception of ten and eleven attacks which are statistically insignificant in increasing war 
involvement. 
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The final two models, the results of which can be found in Table 4.3, test the second 
hypothesis.  In particular, it is theorized that cyber espionage, attacks, and terrorism may reduce 
war involvement due to a decrease in information asymmetry, however it may increase tensions 
between the target and the suspected source.  As a result, Models 5 and 6 test the cyber 
espionage and cyber attack/terrorism predictors with MIDs.  The first set of ZINB results in 
Table 4.3 outwardly suggests that there is no statistical relationship between cyber espionage and 
MID participation.  Marginal effects with global averages provide a more in-depth look at this 
relationship, and reveals that cyber espionage may indeed have some minor impact on MID 
participation.  Namely, states that are targeted for zero through two cyber espionage attacks are 
statistically likely to be involved in slightly more less-than-conflict MIDs, although the increase 
is not spectacular.  Interestingly, three or more cyber espionage attacks are not statistically more 
likely to increase a state’s MID involvement.  Marginal effects with U.S. averages also 
demonstrate that increasing cyber espionage increases MID participation.  Each cyber espionage 
case increases the number of MIDs with U.S. involvement by approximately .05 cases.  Unlike 
the results with global averages, American MID involvement is statistically likely to increase as 
cyber espionage targeting increases. 
Lastly, Model 6 tests the relationship between cyber attack and cyber terrorism targeting 
and MID participation.  The results largely mirror those of Model 5, with the ZINB outwardly 
suggesting that no statistically significant relationship exists.  However, marginal effects give us 
a more detailed picture.  When using global averages, the results show that states targeted by 
cyber espionage are likely to be involved in increasing numbers of less-than-conflict MIDs.  In 
particular, each cyber espionage case increases the number of MIDs by approximately .006.  
While this is not a significantly robust increase, it should be noted that the average state is only 
135 
 
involved in .18 MIDs (categorized as a 3 and below) per year.  Thus, each cyber espionage case 
equates to a 3% increase in MID participation.  The same relationship is exhibited when U.S. 
averages are used.  The marginal effects demonstrate the each cyber espionage case sustained by 
the U.S. increases MID involvement by approximately .08 MIDs.  Given that the U.S. 
experiences an average of .71 MIDs per year, an increase in .08 MIDs per cyber espionage case 
equals an increase in MIDs of almost 10%. 
 Analysis 
 One of the unique aspects of the present analysis, which has been neglected in past 
bargaining studies, is the involuntary nature of the information exposure being studied, namely 
covert cyber espionage, warfare, and terrorism events.  The models above give us a better 
understanding of the relationship between information exposure and conflict participation.  
Overall, the use of marginal effects and rare event models demonstrate varying support for the 
two hypotheses.  In terms of cyber threat targeting and armed conflict, the rare event logistic 
models are split in their support of the notion that information and security vulnerability 
exposure may play a role in reducing conflict participation.  More explicitly, Models 1 and 2 
support the theory that vulnerabilities exposed through digital attacks give outside actors, 
particularly other states, a more detailed idea of the targeted state’s preparedness, potential 
vulnerabilities in their security apparatus, and detailed information regarding issues such as troop 
positions and weapon capabilities.  Given this unwanted exposure, the results of these models 
suggest that targeted states may be more willing to bargain for peace than engage in armed 
conflict, especially those conflicts capable of inflicting more than 1,000 causalities.  These 
results broadly support the findings of bargaining scholars, and lend additional empirical support 
for bargaining theory.  
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 Additionally, through different operationalizations of armed conflict, the results suggest 
that targeted states differ in their reaction to cyber threats and the prospect of low-intensity 
conflict.  In particular, Models 3 and 4 demonstrate that states targeted for cyber espionage, 
cyber attacks, and cyber terrorism are more likely to engage in combat with casualty rates lower 
than those defined by the COW data.  These findings suggest that the information exposed by 
cyber threats may be enough to persuade a state to bargain for peace when the risk for serious 
combat is high.  However, they may also be willing to initiate low intensity conflict in response 
to cyber attacks and espionage.  Such actions on the part of the targeted may be a form of violent 
and particularly clear signaling, indicating that they are unwilling to tolerate the exploration and 
exploitation of their digital vulnerabilities.  This unwillingness to tolerate such activity is 
tempered, however, by the prospect of violent conflict with a potential for high thresholds of 
causalities.  
While Hypothesis 1 received varying support from the analysis, the results suggest that 
states are more likely to be in involved in MIDs, and thus lending support to Hypothesis 2.  In 
particular, these MIDs were limited to those that involve less-than-war levels of action, such as 
public condemnation, economic sanctions, verbal warnings, and mobilizations.  This finding, like 
those of Models 3 and 4, suggest that targeted states recognize the dangerous security 
vulnerabilities that are exposed through cyber attacks, and are willing to use forceful measures 
short of combat to counter and potentially deter them.  Also like the previous results, the increase 
in MID participation may be an indication that states are becoming less willing to ignore the 
damage caused by cyber attacks.  Given the increased effectiveness of cyber attacks, and the 
empirical evidence that increased targeting leads to increased low-intensity combat and less-
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than-combat MID involvement, it is conceivable that states are beginning to incorporate the 
active defense of their digital networks into their foreign policy portfolios. 
 Conclusion 
The first chapter of this dissertation points out that vulnerabilities in communication 
technology are not a unique problem.  And despite not being specifically tied to the bargaining 
literature, the accounts of 20th century communication demonstrates that states have historically 
attempted to pilfer information to gain an upper hand on their opponents.  This use of espionage 
is demonstrated by a plethora of European powers on telegraph cables prior to World War I.  
While the British had the most robust global cable system, and had actively spied on the 
unencrypted messages of its users, the French had the largest and most successful decryption 
operation among the great powers.  Prior to the outbreak of World War I, the French had at least 
partially broken the codes of many of its continental rivals, as well as the United States 
(Headrick 1991).  Shortly before the war, the French even shared with the British private 
information stolen from a mutual enemy: the Germans.  During the war, espionage allowed the 
belligerents to determine where enemy troops would be stationed, and where attacks would be 
launched.  While the use of espionage prior to World War I clearly did not prevent the outbreak 
of conflict, as postulated by the chapter’s theoretical framework and the larger bargaining theory 
literature, it does demonstrate that states are willing to use the vulnerabilities in communication 
technology to gain an upper hand on their opponents, and reduce the amount of private and 
misrepresented information available to the opposing side. 
Concerning the present chapter, the results of this analysis lend additional empirical 
evidence to the growing study of interstate crisis bargaining.  However, instead of focusing 
attention on public sources of intangible information, such as regime type, external transparency, 
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or domestic political conditions, the present research investigates how the loss of truly private 
information through covert, digital means can impact a state’s combat decisions.  This analysis 
suggests that scholars should not ignore how the actions of external actors, through the use of 
cyber tactics, reduce information asymmetry and the denial of the targeted state to misrepresent 
its private information.  The results also note that while states targeted for cyber attacks tend to 
shy away from large-scale armed combat, they are more willing to engage combat where 
causalities may be lighter, as well as short of combat MIDs.  Thus, the use of cyber espionage, 
warfare, and terrorism to steal information and expose security vulnerabilities may lead to 
heighten tensions between states, while they simultaneously reduce the probability of full scale 
war.   
 Of course, additional research should focus on the relationships between of cyber 
espionage, information asymmetry, and conflict.  Due to present data limitations and the 
exceptional difficulty in attributing cyber threats to their true source, this analysis was based 
upon a state-year model.  Hopefully future improvements in attack attribution and data collection 
methods will provide the means to conduct a dyadic study of the cyber/information/conflict 
relationship.  This would allow for a more complex, inclusive study that incorporates additional 
independent variables commonly used in other bargaining studies.  The dyadic framework would 
also allow for more clarification regarding how cyber attack targeting impacts both MID 
initiation and continuation. 
Ultimately, the increasing capacity of cyber attacks to cause widespread damage and steal 
previously unfathomable amounts of private information warrants increased attention from the 
scholarly community.  This study is the first to incorporate the growing empirical body of 
literature surrounding the bargaining theory to investigate how cyber attacks reduce information 
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asymmetry, and therefore impact state interactions.  Further research will lend additional 
clarification and new insight into how states both use and react to this unique 21st century 
security threat. 
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion 
This dissertation offers researchers a new means of studying the relationship between 
cyber threats and international relations.  Previously, the social science literature focused much 
of its attention on descriptive studies and probing the vulnerabilities of American digital 
networks.  However, cyber threats are not solely an American, or even a Western, problem.  
With over 2 billion people worldwide using the Internet, the danger of cyber threats against 
digital networks is now a global problem.  It thus seems appropriate for scholarly research to 
begin to produce less U.S.-centric and more generalizable scholarship.  In many regards, cyber 
research mirrors that of the terrorism literature prior to the attacks of 9/11.  It was only after 
those attacks that social scientists began in earnest to study physical terrorism through 
generalizable, empirical analyses.  Given the vulnerabilities inherent in cyber networks, it would 
seem wise to begin rigorous studies of cyber threats before a 9/11-like event occurs.  As a result, 
the present research breaks from the norm and aims to study the nature of cyber threats and how 
they impact, and are impacted by, international relations through empirical analysis.  Such an 
approach provides policymakers, and scholars, with a far more intricate picture of cyber threats 
and their role as a tool of foreign policy.  To do so, this dissertation has employed a unique 
dataset of almost two decades of cyber attack, cyber terrorism, and cyber espionage cases from 
across the globe.  With this innovative data, we can expand beyond the descriptive and U.S.-
centric approach of past studies.  With this objective in mind, this dissertation has investigated 
three important questions. 
The second chapter of this dissertation focuses on the first of these questions.  While the 
subject itself may seem rather simplistic in nature, it has yet to be addressed and is exceptionally 
important: which economic, political, and social characteristics make a state more likely to be 
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targeted for cyber threats?  Given a paucity of social science research on the subject, the 
theoretical foundation of this chapter is based upon the terrorist targeting literature.  As noted, 
there are a host of similarities between the tactics employed by physical terrorists and those of 
computer hackers.  These include a careful selection of the target, the potential physical and 
psychological damage, and the difficulty in attributing an attack to any particular state or group.  
As a result, the terrorism literature provides an appropriate theoretical surrogate for this initial 
research.  The results show that different state characteristics are likely to influence the forms of 
digital attack targeting.  For example, states that experience increases in GDP per capita and 
military size are more likely to be targeted for cyber attacks.  Inversely, states that experience 
increases in GDP per capita and those that are more democratic are less likely to be targeted for 
cyber terrorism.  Interestingly, those states with increasing levels of press freedom and those that 
engage in more international conflicts are more likely to be targeted for cyber terrorism.  Finally, 
increasing military size and press freedom are both statistically likely to increase cyber 
espionage targeting, while increases in a state’s level of democracy and international conflict 
involvement decrease targeting.   
Overall, the empirical results of Chapter 2 are novel in the cyber threat literature, and 
unique in that they can be generally applied to any state around the globe.  As noted, a vast 
majority of the current cyber literature, particularly the research that focuses on targeting, gives 
priority to the attributes that make the United States a popular target.  The analysis and marginal 
effects results conducted in Chapter 2 demonstrate that the characteristics that make the United 
States a target may not necessarily increase the odds of targeting for the “average state,” and vice 
versa.  This suggests that states are not targeted equally, and the results of descriptive studies 
focused on the U.S. may not necessary apply to other nations.  Additionally, the results show that 
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the use of the physical terrorism literature is not the most efficient surrogate theoretical 
framework for the study of cyber threats.  Despite similarities between the two forms of 
unconventional attack, the analysis suggests that the characteristics likely to increase terrorist 
attacks may not translate into additional cyber threat targeting.  Such empirical results help to 
illuminate the differences between the two forms of violence, and lend further insight into the 
problem of international cyber threats.    
The third chapter narrows the analysis of cyber threat targeting, but analyzing such 
activity through the lens of international rivalry.  In particular, this chapter seeks to determine if 
states that engage in international rivalries are more likely to be targeted for cyber threats than 
neutral states.  Traditionally, the rivalry literature has focused on interstate conflict or MIDs as 
the typical, violent interaction between rivals.  However, more recently, researchers such as 
Conrad (2011) and Findley et al. (2012) have begun to investigate how rivalries increase the use 
of alternative forms of violence.  The authors argue that, given the exceptionally high cost of 
armed interstate conflict, states may be more willing to use terrorist organizations as a proxy to 
inflict injury.  In both studies, the scholars found that rivalry participation is a positive indicator 
of terrorist activity.  This chapter seeks to determine if the same logic applies: does participation 
in international rivalries increase cyber threat targeting?  Interestingly, when employing a 
dichotomous measure of rivalry, the empirical results show that engaging in additional enduring 
and strategic rivalries reduces the number of aggregate cyber threats a state would experience.  
This negative relationship is also present when using a count measure of enduring rivalries.  
However, the results show that engaging in additional strategic rivalries will marginally increase 
the number of cyber threats a state experiences.  This suggests the threat posed by rivalry may 
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compel states to enhance their digital network security, or that states are hesitant to employ 
digital means against rivals. 
The results of chapter three contribute knowledge to both the rivalry as well as cyber 
threat literature.  For example, much of the rivalry literature relies heavily on analyzing one 
operationalization of rivalry or another.  These operationalizations are generally those of either 
Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) or Thompson and Dreyer (2012).  Interestingly, but perhaps not 
surprisingly, the definition of rivalry and the temporal range employed in an analysis can have a 
significant impact on the results.  In the case of the present research, those factors influenced the 
support each model lent to the hypothesis.  In the future, rivalry scholars should consider 
including both definitions of rivalry to test how past military engagement impacts their results.  
Additionally, this chapter lends further understanding of the factors that may increase cyber 
threat targeting.  While states engaged in rivalries with a violent past are likely to experience a 
decrease in cyber threats, those states viewed negatively by others are statistically likely to 
experience additional attacks.  This suggests that the manner in which a particular state is viewed 
internationally, regardless of past military activity, can have serious implications for their digital 
networks’ security.  Thus, domestic factors such as those explored in Chapter 2 may not play the 
only role in targeting.  Together, Chapters 2 and 3 give cyber researches a much better 
perspective of the threat digital networks face, and the state characteristics that may increase the 
likelihood of targeting. 
The fourth chapter deviates from cyber threat targeting, and investigates how cyber 
threats impact crisis bargaining situations.  In particular, Fearon (1995) notes that interstate wars 
are a consequence of bargaining breakdowns, often caused by states withholding and 
misrepresenting private information.  This chapter is based on the assumption that cyber threats, 
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especially cyber espionage, release information that the targeted state would have rather kept 
private.  As a result, the targeted state would be more likely to seek peace in bargaining 
situations, as opposed to engage in armed conflict.   The results, however, are mixed in their 
support of this hypothesis.  Specifically, different types of cyber threats have varying impacts on 
the types of conflicts states engage in.  For example, increasing number of cyber espionage, 
cyber attack, and cyber terrorism events are statistically likely to increase the number of low-
intensity conflicts a state engages in.  However, increasing numbers of cyber espionage cases are 
found to decrease participation in wars with over 1,000 causalities.  States may thus be willing to 
initiate or participate in low scale force following cyber attacks but the release of private 
information and the enhanced bargaining prospects that result reduces the chances of full scale 
war. 
Much like the previous chapters, Chapter 4 produces novel results and illuminates both 
an established literature and the burgeoning cyber literature.  As far as bargaining theory is 
concerned, this chapter takes an exceptionally unique perspective of asymmetric information 
exchange by investigating how actual, private information loss can impact conflict propensity.  
Prior to this study, the bargaining literature focused on proxy forms of information loss, 
including transparency and alliance participation.  While these proxies do have an impact on 
conflict participation, they are not forms of tangible information that a state could easily 
misrepresent or keep private.  By using cyber espionage as a measure of information exposure, 
this chapter establishes how the loss of tangible data, which could have been misrepresented or 
withheld by the targeted state, impacts the likelihood of conflict.  Again, much like the rivalry 
literature and the testing of only one definition of rivalry, many bargaining scholars focus 
heavily on one particular form of conflict, be it major armed encounters or less-bloody MIDs.  
145 
 
This chapter deviates from that norm, and incorporates varying levels of conflict intensity.  The 
results show that information loss through cyber espionage and other cyber threats can 
significantly impact participation in different forms of conflict.  This is a technique that should 
be adopted by bargaining theory researchers, in order to determine if proxy factors such as 
transparency have varying impacts on conflict.  Additionally, the chapter demonstrates that cyber 
threat targeting can influence the behavior of states, especially when it comes to conflict 
participation.  While it may deter states from engaging in bloody wars, it will actually increase 
the likelihood of low-intensity conflict.  
The three empirical chapters of this dissertation provide unique, innovative insight into 
the threats facing digital networks across the globe.  However, the chapters also add to the 
history of communication vulnerabilities, which have been present in varying forms of 
communication throughout the twentieth century.  Such vulnerabilities include espionage of 
telegraph cables, and signal jamming of radio transmissions.  The exploitation of the Internet as a 
weapon or tool of combat is simply another manifestation of a problem that has existed for quite 
some time.  In addition, these chapters highlight the use of the Internet as a tool of foreign policy 
by states, as well as expanding upon the weaknesses of the Internet described in Chapter 1.  
Specifically, the Internet was originally conceived as a means of reliable communication during 
a period of increased international tension.  However, the Internet’s inventors never conceived of 
the Web being used as a conduit of attack.  A vast majority of the previous social science 
literature provided anecdotal evidence that the Internet was being used in such a manner.  This 
dissertation adds to that literature by quantifying this global security problem, and investigating 
how cyber threats impact (and are impacted by) international relations.   
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As noted previously, however, this dissertation only serves as a “first cut” in the 
quantitative study of cyber threats.  Additional research is needed in order to gain a 
comprehensive grasp of this security threat.  Robust quantitative data like that employed in this 
study will prove invaluable in future analyses.  This dataset will thus continue to be updated and 
studied in order to fuel future research.  In order to understand the finer details of cyber threat 
targeting, the dataset will also require more refined coding in the future.  Specifically, the targets 
of individual attacks could be coded based on their industry or nature.  For example, attack 
targets could be denoted as financial (such as banks), government, military (such as DoD 
networks), business, or private.  Such a coding scheme would allow scholars to investigate which 
industries or entities are more likely to be targeted, and furthermore how the targeting of a 
specific industry impacts relations between states.  The dataset would also benefit from more 
robust information on the source of specific attacks.  Unfortunately, accurately attributing attacks 
to a specific state, organization, or individual using the raw data provided by Virtual Research 
Associates was exceptionally difficult for this data.  Future advancements in attribution may 
permit for increased certainty regarding the source of attacks, allowing researchers to conduct 
dyadic investigations.  While these data improvements would obviously add to our collective 
understanding of cyber threats as an international security threat, they do not detract from the 
novel results produced in this research. 
Ultimately, by employing three different theoretical foundations and unique quantitative 
data, this dissertation provides a groundbreaking perspective on international cyber threats.  
Future work can build upon this research by continuing to expand the cyber data and utilizing it 
to test new theories.  Only through methodologically rigorous studies can social scientists help 
explain the intricate nature of why states and sub-state groups use cyber threats, the international 
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environments in which they are more likely to be used, and how they impact relations between 
states.  As Internet technology is increasingly adopted as a component of industrial and national 
security networks, the danger of cyber threat targeting will only continue to rise.  Instead of 
waiting until a “digital 9/11” to explore these subjects in-depth, this dissertation will hopefully 
provide social scientists with the tools necessary to begin empirical studies of this 21st century 
security threat. 
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Appendix A - Chapter 2 Tables and Graphs 
 Virtual Associates Search Terms 
The following search terms were used to ensure as many cases of cyber threats as 
possible were detected: botnet, Chinese firewall, computer worm, cyber, cyber attack, cyber 
crime, cyber espionage, cyber sabotage, cyber spying, cyber terror, cyber terrorism, cyber threat, 
cyber war, cyber warfare, cyberattack, cyber-attack, cybercrime, cyber-crime, cyberespionage, 
cyber-espionage, cyber-sabotage, cyberspace, cyber-space, cyberterror, cyber-terror, 
cyberterrorism, cyber-terrorism, cyberthreat, cyber-threat, cyberwar, cyber-war, cyberwarfare, 
cyber-warfare, DDoS, denial of service, distributed denial of service, firewall, GhostNet, hacked, 
hacker, hackers, hacking, hacktivism, industrial espionage, LulzSec, Moonlight Maze, Pentagon 
firewall, power grid, Red Hacker Alliance, rootkit, Stuxnet, Titan Rain, Trojan horse virus, and 
Trojan horse.   
 Chapter 2 Additional Tables and Results 
Table A.1 Fixed Effects Logit and Rare Event Logit Comparison 
 
 (1 – Fixed Effects) (2 – Rare Event) 
 Attacks Attacks 
GDP Per Capita (Logged) 3.41** 0.85** 
 (2.38) (2.06) 
   
Military Size (Logged) -0.21 1.43** 
 (-0.07) (2.30) 
   
Polity 0.31 0.07 
 (0.44) (1.15) 
   
Freedom of the Press 1.27 -0.10 
 (1.26) (-0.12) 
   
International Conflicts 1.86 0.68 
 (1.15) (1.02) 
   
Media Bias (Logged) -0.46 -0.45 
 (-0.73) (-1.47) 
   
Constant - - - -26.63*** 
  (-2.83) 
(z statistics in parentheses)  * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table A.2 Fixed Effects Results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Aggregate Cyber Cyber Attacks Cyber Terrorism Cyber Espionage 
 
GDP Per Capita (Logged) 0.08** 3.41** 0.07*** 0.01 
 (2.40) (2.38) (2.94) (0.51) 
     
Military Size (Logged) -0.03 -0.21 -0.03 -0.01 
 (-0.86) (-0.07) (-1.20) (-0.37) 
     
Polity 0.00 0.31 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.07) (0.44) (0.18) (-0.12) 
     
Freedom of the Press 0.01 1.27 0.00 0.00 
 (0.28) (1.26) (0.11) (0.23) 
     
International Conflicts -0.01 1.85 -0.04 -0.03 
 (-0,17) (1.15) (-0.78) (-0.96) 
     
Lagged D.V. 0.19*** - - - - - - 0.34*** 
 (9.74)   (18.57) 
     
Media Bias (Logged) 0.04** -0.46 0.05*** -0.00 
 (2.09) (-0.73) (3.92) (-0.26) 
     
Constant -0.45 - - - -0.48 0.04 
 (-0.88)  (-1.35) (0.20) 
Model N 2,650 129 2,771 2,650 
(z statistics in parentheses); * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01; Models 1, 3 & 4 were run with xtreg, Model 2 was run with xtlogit 
 
Figure A.1  Model 1 – GDP Per Capita: Global Averages 
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Figure A.2  Model 1 – GDP Per Capita: U.S. Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.3  Model 2 – GDP Per Capita: Global Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.4  Model 2 – GDP Per Capita: U.S. Averages 
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Figure A.5  Model 3 – GDP Per Capita: Global Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.6  Model 3 – GDP Per Capita: U.S. Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.7  Model 4 – GDP Per Capita: Global Averages 
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Figure A.8  Model 4 – GDP Per Capita: U.S. Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.9  Model 1 – Military Size: Global Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.10  Model 1 – Military Size: U.S. Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
168 
 
Figure A.11  Model 2 – Military Size: Global Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.12  Model 2 – Military Size: U.S. Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.13  Model 3 – Military Size: Global Averages 
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Figure A.14  Model 3 – Military Size: U.S. Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.15  Model 4 – Military Size: Global Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.16  Model 4 – Military Size: U.S. Averages 
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Figure A.17  Model 1 – Polity: Global Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.18  Model 1 – Polity: U.S. Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.19  Model 2 – Polity: Global Averages 
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Figure A.20  Model 2 – Polity: U.S. Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.21  Model 3 – Polity: Global Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.22  Model 3 – Polity: U.S. Averages 
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Figure A.23  Model 4 – Polity: Global Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.24  Model 4 – Polity: U.S. Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.25  Model 1 – Freedom of Speech: Global Averages 
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Figure A.26  Model 1 – Freedom of Speech: U.S. Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.27  Model 2 – Freedom of Speech: Global Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.28  Model 2 – Freedom of Speech: U.S. Averages 
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Figure A.29  Model 3 – Freedom of Speech: Global Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.30  Model 3 – Freedom of Speech: U.S. Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.31  Model 4 – Freedom of Speech: Global Averages 
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Figure A.32  Model 4 – Freedom of Speech: U.S. Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.33  Model 1 – Interstate Conflict: Global Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.34  Model 1 – Interstate Conflict: U.S. Averages 
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Figure A.35  Model 2 – Interstate Conflict: Global Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.36  Model 2 – Interstate Conflict: U.S. Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.37  Model 3 – Interstate Conflict: Global Averages 
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Figure A.38  Model 3 – Interstate Conflict: U.S. Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.39  Model 4 – Interstate Conflict: Global Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.40  Model 4 – Interstate Conflict: U.S. Averages 
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Appendix B - Chapter 3 Tables and Graphs 
 Chapter 3 Additional Tables and Results 
Table B.1 Fixed Effects Estimates of Cyber Attack Event Counts (Binary) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Coefficient Coefficient 
   
Enduring Rivalry – Binary (1990-2001) 
-0.02 
(-0.35) 
- - - 
Strategic Rivalry – Binary (1990-2001) - - - 
0.14 
(1.38) 
GDP per capita (logged) 
0.17* 
(1.82) 
0.17* 
(1.84) 
Military Size (logged) 
-0.09 
(-1.25) 
-0.10 
(-1.39) 
Regime Type 
-0.00 
(-0.52) 
-0.00 
(-0.37) 
Total Population (logged) 
0.60* 
(1.92) 
0.73** 
(2.25) 
Media Bias (logged) 
0.06 
(1.49) 
0.06 
(1.54) 
Lagged D.V.  
0.22*** 
(7.97) 
0.22*** 
(7.92) 
Constant 
-1.97** 
(-1.97) 
-2.22** 
(-2.21) 
Model N 1,460 1,463 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  (Z Scores in parentheses),  Two-Tail Test; (Regional dummies omitted due to collinearity) 
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Table B.2 Fixed Effects Estimates of Cyber Attack Event Counts (Count) 
 
 
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
    
Enduring Rivalry – Count (1990-2001) 
-0.12*** 
(-5.19) 
- - - - - - 
Strategic Rivalry – Count (1990-2001) - - - 
0.28*** 
(4.48) 
- - - 
Strategic Rivalry – Count (1990-2009) - - -  - - - 
0.19*** 
(4.59) 
GDP per capita (logged) 
0.12 
(1.30) 
0.17* 
(1.88) 
0.06* 
(1.81) 
Military Size (logged) 
-0.08 
(-1.23) 
-0.11 
(-1.63) 
-0.06 
(-1.37) 
Regime Type 
-0.01 
(-0.75) 
-0.00 
(-0.25) 
0.00 
(0.33) 
Total Population (logged) 
0.57* 
(1.86) 
0.85*** 
(2.71) 
0.21 
(1.55) 
Media Bias (logged) 
0.06* 
(1.73) 
0.06 
(1.60) 
0.04** 
(2.26) 
Lagged D.V.  
0.19*** 
(6.49) 
0.21*** 
(7.42) 
0.18*** 
(8.99) 
Constant 
-1.49 
(-1.51) 
-2.48** 
(-2.51) 
-0.66 
(1.26) 
Model N 1,460 1,463 2,511 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  (Z Scores in parentheses),  Two-Tail Test 
 
Figure B.1 Model 1 – Enduring Rivalry Dummy 1990-2001: Global Averages 
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Figure B.2 Model 1 – Enduring Rivalry Dummy 1990-2001: U.S. Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.3 Model 2 – Strategic Rivalry Dummy 1990-2001: Global Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.4 Model 2 – Strategic Rivalry Dummy 1990-2001: U.S. Averages 
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Figure B.5 Model 3 – Enduring Rivalry Count 1990-2001: Global Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.6 Model 3 – Enduring Rivalry Count 1990-2001: U.S. Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.7 Model 4 – Strategic Rivalry Count 1990-2001: Global Averages 
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Figure B.8 Model 4 – Strategic Rivalry Count 1990-2001: U.S. Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.9 Model 5 – Strategic Rivalry Count 1990-2009: Global Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.10 Model 5 – Strategic Rivalry Count 1990-2009: U.S. Averages 
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Appendix C - Chapter 4 Tables and Graphs 
Table C.1 Correlates of War (COW) & PRIO Interstate War Fixed Effects Results 
 
 
Model 1 
COW War 
Model 2 
COW War 
Model 3 
PRIO War 
Model 4 
PRIO War 
       
Cyber Espionage -0.05*** 
(-3.87) 
- - - 
0.01 
(0.61) 
- - - 
Cyber Attack & Terrorism - - - 
0.01 
(0.95) 
- - - 
0.01* 
(1.65) 
Regime Type 0.00 
(0.57) 
0.00 
(0.56) 
-0.00 
(-0.18) 
-0.00 
(-0.18) 
Contiguity -0.05*** 
(-3.70) 
-0.05*** 
(3.63) 
-0.02* 
(-1.83) 
-0.02* 
(-1.80) 
Alliance Participation -0.00 
(-0.12) 
-0.00 
(-0.11) 
-0.00 
(-0.12) 
-0.00 
(-0.12) 
CINC (logged) -0.02 
(-0.91) 
-0.02 
(-0.89) 
-0.03 
(-1.53) 
-0.03 
(-1.55) 
IGO Membership -0.00** 
(-2.46) 
-0.00** 
(-2.50) 
-0.00 
(-0.83) 
-0.00 
(-0.87) 
Economic 
Interdependence (logged) 
0.00 
(0.08) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(-0.43) 
-0.00 
(-0.43) 
COW (lagged) -0.07*** 
(-3.00) 
-0.07*** 
(-3.18) 
- - - - - - 
PRIO (lagged) - - - - - - 
0.47*** 
(30.93) 
0.47*** 
(31.01) 
Media Bias (logged) 0.00 
(0.58) 
0.00 
(0.47) 
-0.00 
(-0.28) 
-0.00 
(-0.36) 
Constant 0.30* 
(1.75) 
0.30* 
(1.75) 
-0.00 
(-0.03) 
-0.01 
(-0.04) 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  (Z Scores in parentheses),  Two-Tail Test 
Model 1 & 2 N = 2,126; Model 3 & 4 N = 2,126 
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Table C.2 Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) Fixed Effects Results 
 
 
Model 5 Model 6 
Coefficient Coefficient 
Inflated Negative Binomial   
Cyber Espionage 
.13* 
(1.92) 
- - - 
Cyber Attack & Terrorism - - - 
0.14*** 
(4.71) 
Regime Type 
0.00 
(0.56) 
0.00 
(0.57) 
Contiguity 
0.04 
(0.54) 
0.04 
(0.61) 
Alliance Participation 
0.11*** 
(3.61) 
0.11*** 
(3.69) 
CINC (logged) 
0.10 
(0.91) 
0.09 
(0.87) 
IGO Membership 
0.00 
(1.33) 
0.00 
(1.24) 
Economic Interdependence (logged) 
0.00 
(0.11) 
0.00 
(0.10) 
MID (lagged) 
0.23*** 
(10.27) 
0.22*** 
(2.69) 
Media Bias (logged) 
0.06*** 
(2.91) 
0.06*** 
(2.69) 
Constant 
-0.22 
(-0.26) 
-0.23 
(-0.28) 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  (Z Scores in parentheses),  Two-Tail Test 
Model 5 & 6 N = 2,129 
 
 
 
 
 
 
185 
 
Figure C.1 Model 1 – Interstate Wars (COW): Global Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.2 Model 1 – Interstate Wars (COW): U.S. Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.3 Model 2 – Interstate Wars (COW): Global Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
186 
 
Figure C.4 Model 2 – Interstate Wars (COW): U.S. Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.5 Model 3 – Interstate Wars (PRIO): Global Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.6 Model 3 – Interstate Wars (PRIO): U.S. Averages 
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Figure C.7 Model 4 – Interstate Wars (PRIO): Global Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.8 Model 4 – Interstate Wars (PRIO): U.S. Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.9 Model 5 – Interstate Wars (MIDs): Global Averages 
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Figure C.10 Model 5 – Interstate Wars (MIDs): U.S. Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.11 Model 6 – Interstate Wars (MIDs): Global Averages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.12 Model 6 – Interstate Wars (MIDs): U.S. Averages 
